Critical Perspectives on the Evolution of a Rentier Constitutional State: Kuwait, 1950-1962 by ALNAFISI, SALEH
Durham E-Theses
Critical Perspectives on the Evolution of a Rentier
Constitutional State: Kuwait, 1950-1962
ALNAFISI, SALEH
How to cite:
ALNAFISI, SALEH (2013) Critical Perspectives on the Evolution of a Rentier Constitutional State:
Kuwait, 1950-1962, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6358/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP













CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF A RENTIER 























A Doctoral Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of 









The political economies of the oil rich GCC countries are generally contextualized within the 
framework of rentier state theory. The picture the theory portrays is that of an autonomous 
state with abundant revenues generated from oil which are in turn distributed to the larger 
population to gain political legitimacy within prevailing non-democratic cultures.  Albeit 
having a democratically elected parliament with a vibrant political environment for a 
comparatively long time, rentierism is also applied to the political economy of Kuwait. 
This study, hence, aims to explore the development of Kuwait into a rentier constitutional 
state beyond the generally accepted notions put forward by rentier state theory. Its focus is to 
understand the perceptions and ideas behind the economic and political policy decisions in 
the context of the oil boom of the 1950s and early 1960s.  Economically, therefore, the main 
aim is to explore and critically analyze why distributive policies, which constitute a main 
feature characterizing the country’s economy, were initiated in the post-oil era. 
The study also critically analyzes the diverse influences oil had on the concurrent rise in 
political activity and direction towards democratization, crowned by the framing of the 
constitution in 1962. In examining these developments, the study stresses the importance of 
looking not only at internal factors, but also at foreign and international influences that are 
brought about by oil booms. In the case of Kuwait, these include the primary role Britain 
played, in light of its oil interests, in the country’s internal affairs, and the ways in which oil 
sparked, for a small and newly rich Arab state, international dynamics that shaped the 
thinking of policymakers as to the importance of undertaking certain crucial reforms.  
An examination of the relevant archival record makes it is clear that the framework provided 
by rentier state theory is insufficient in capturing the complex factors that influence the 
economic and political decisions of policymakers in countries experiencing oil booms. The 
findings, therefore, challenge rentier state theory’s core assumptions, such as its stress on 
‘political utility’ as the main, if not sole, driver of socioeconomic policy, and the 
‘materialistic approach’ in which political activity is contextualized.  
The study shows that much of the socioeconomic policies that created what is referred to as a 
‘distributive state’ stemmed from much deeper influences than those postulated by the theory, 
such as certain perceptions of tradition and culture; views of citizen ‘rights’ and social justice 
in a specific historical context; and influences of social currents overtaking the region at the 
time. Furthermore, the study demonstrates how, in the period concerned, contrary to the 
position of the rentier state literature, oil played a significant role in the democratization of 
Kuwait, transforming it from a primitive patriarchal autocracy to a modern ‘rentier 
constitutional state’. The latter embodies, as the study argues, the concept of a rentier state 
combined with a constitutional form of government in which citizens are directly involved in 
the economic and political decision-making process.  
The study concludes that Eurocentric theoretical frameworks as expressed in rentier state 
theory may not always be sufficient in explaining the complex realities of countries such as 
Kuwait.  There is a need, therefore, for a new approach that engages directly with the internal 
and external dynamics of individual countries in order to understand their respective political 
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1.1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Rentier state theory has provided the framework for much of the research on the political 
and economic development of the oil producing Arab Gulf states over the past couple of 
decades. Generally, the model suggests that natural resource wealth has negative effects 
on such development. The resulting picture, particularly in oil states, would normally be 
an ‘autonomous’ state ‘distributing’ wealth in diverse ways to buy the quiescence of 
society. In the absence of domestic taxation, this not only harms the development of the 
economy but also undermines pressures for democratization. 
While most the economic characteristics of Kuwait seem more or less expected of rentier 
states in the context of the Arab Gulf, there are other faces of the country that do not 
neatly fit into the rentier state model. From the outset, it is clear that the notion of a 
content and politically numbed society receiving money from an autonomous state is 
inaccurate in the Kuwaiti case. In contrast, rather than being passive receivers of money, 
Kuwaiti society is not only highly politicized but also plays an active and integral role in 
the process of the allocation of public funds. This is mainly achieved through the 
constitutional powers granted to Kuwait’s parliament. In fact, through parliament, 
Kuwaiti society today is arguably the main and direct force behind the huge rises in 
government spending. Indeed, many of the laws to increase wages or benefits, for 
instance, were passed by parliament members despite government objections. While this 
indicates that economic policy in Kuwait is not shaped solely by an autonomous state 
(and in fact places the very concept of autonomy itself into question), it also suggests that 
the constitution gives people some genuine powers. This does not fit with the suggestion 
made by the literature that any such potential political openings would be mere façades, 
undertaken to allow people to ‘vent out’, and driven by rulers’ original aim to consolidate 
their position.  
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Interestingly, the constitution, which has shaped the framework of government for the 
past fifty years, was framed at the height of the oil boom of the 1950s and early 1960s. If 
we assume that the constitution does in fact give real powers to citizens, which naturally 
constitutes a big break with previous decades of autocratic rule, then it can be concluded 
that Kuwait witnessed a process of democratization coinciding with a rise in oil revenues. 
In connection to this, what is important to highlight is the fact that democratization and 
political reform took place side by side with the rise of distributive policies. As 
mentioned, the rentier state literature views such distributive policies as being designed to 
buy loyalty, avoid political reform and consolidate the autocratic style of government. In 
other words, distributive policies are contextualized in the literature according to their 
‘political utility’. However, the fact that political reform and distributive policies were 
being undertaken at the same time at the very least places the notion of ‘political utility’ 
as the major or indeed sole force behind distribution into question. 
In addition, contrary to the notion in the literature that oil leads to a dampening of social 
and political activity, the arrival of oil revenues in Kuwait was coupled with an 
unprecedented rise in such activity during the 1950s. In fact, not only did the level of 
activity increase, but the diversity of its agents as well. The political and social 
movements were no longer confined to elite merchants, but had begun to spread across 
different classes of the population, and this in a sense marks the beginnings of the 
popularization of politics. Moreover, while the rentier state literature renders such 
movements as particularistic or undemocratic in nature, the movements of the 1950s had 
democratic reform at the core of their demands. Therefore, at face value at least, the 
assumptions of the reniter state model seems to lose even more credence in Kuwait’s 
case.  
It is these apparent inconsistencies that sparked the initial interest in this research. The 
resulting questions are: if democratization was genuine and took place side by side with 
‘distributive’ policies, then what was the purpose of such distribution in the first place, 
given the literature’s assumption that it would be designed precisely to avoid political 
reform? Moreover, why did political and social activity rise with the increase in oil 
revenues? Did the increase in revenues have to do with the rise in activity and in what 
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way? Importantly, why did political reform take place in parallel with Kuwait’s oil boom 
and in what ways did the surge of oil revenues influence such reforms?  
It is clear that cutting across these inconsistencies is a lack of sufficient answers to the 
why question. Thus, generally, in the context of Kuwait’s oil boom, why were the policies 
that seem ‘distributive’ in nature and which created the ‘distributive state’ undertaken? 
Moreover, why were the political policies, which were crowned with the framing of the 
1962 Constitution, undertaken concurrently? These questions, therefore, relate directly to 
understanding the post-oil transformation of Kuwait from a primitive economy with an 
autocratic style of government to a rentier constitutional state, that is, a country holding 
both the economic features of a rentier state combined with a constitutional form of 
government in which citizens, as demonstrated later, are directly involved in the decision-
making process and are able exert direct and explicit pressure to influence policy in 
specific ways.  
Answering these questions begs an examination of the ideas, perceptions and attitudes of 
policy-makers and civil society, which would in turn require a stress on archival 
research. This would constitute a shift of focus in the study of the post-oil formation of 
rentier states that seeks to go beyond the preconceived assumptions put forward by the 
literature regarding the reasons behind post-oil economic and political policy choices. In 
a sense, then, the research tests whether the assumptions of the rentier state literature, 
such as the stress on political utility as an explanation to distributive policies, are 
sufficient to understand why oil producing countries choose certain paths of 
development. 
 
1.2. LOCATING THE RENTIER STATE NATURE OF KUWAIT 
 
Kuwait is referred to as a ‘rentier state’ mainly due to the structure of its economy which 
renders the country almost completely dependent on oil. As reflected in the Table 1.1, oil 









Table 1.1. Revenue Structure, 2007-2010 
(Million Dinars) 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Revenues         
   Actual Revenues 16927.4 24016.1 15481.3 20150.4 
   of which: Oil 15748.2 22674.6 14482.1 18785.5 
Oil Revenues as Percentage of Total 
Revenues 93.00% 94.40% 93.50% 93.20% 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, 2011. 
 
 
During the same period, oil exports averaged about 93% of total exports: 
 
 
Table 1.2. Oil and Non-Oil Exports, 2007-2010 
Exports 
Oil Exports Non-Oil 
Exports 
Period -1 -2 
Total Exports Oil 
Exports/Total 
Exports 
2007 16780 990.2 17770.1 94.4 
2008 22200.1 1281.4 23481.6 94.5 
2009 13415.2 1456 14871.2 90.2 
2010 17680.7 1514.2 19194.9 92.1 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, 2011.   
 
 
In addition, more than half of the country’s GDP derives directly from oil. As reflected in 
the table below, if other oil-related sectors are taken into consideration, such as the 
refined products industry, the importance of oil and gas would be further magnified.  
 
 
Table 1.3. National Accounts 
National Accounts:       2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP (at Current Prices) 23593.2 29469.6 32580.5 39990.5 
Crude Oil & Natural Gas Sector   12232.8 16478.3 17347.6 23608.1 
Non-oil Sectors  11186.8 12804.5 15317.2 16165.3 
Of which: Petroleum Products  970.2 829.4 906.6 837.8 
Crude Oil & Natural Gas Sector/GDP 51.85% 55.92% 53.25% 59.03% 




In fact, much of the rest of economy depends on opportunities created by oil income, 
either directly or indirectly. Indeed, it is estimated that around 50% of the non-oil 
Kuwaiti economy is created entirely by demand generated from high oil revenues (Blair, 
2009: 25).  
Deficiencies in the country’s economic structure are also reflected in its labor market. 
82% of the Kuwaiti workforce relies on government jobs, resulting in extremely 
overstaffed government departments. Meanwhile, the number of Kuwaitis requiring such 
jobs continues to grow at an alarming rate. For instance, between 2002 and 2008, the 
average yearly increase of the Kuwaiti workforce was around 4.3%, from 258,540 
workers to 332,516 (Supreme Council for Planning and Development, 2009: 27). This 
situation has naturally been shaping a constant drain on Kuwait’s financial resources, 
since spending on wages constitutes a major portion of public expenditure. In fact, most 
of the budget increases over the past years have been primarily a result of increases in 
wages, salaries and government subsidies. Consequently, in the four years to 2008, total 
government spending jumped 2.64 times (Blair, 2009: 111). 
Thus, current expenditure as opposed to capital and development expenditure has been 
increasingly eating up Kuwait’s budget. As seen in the table below, current expenditure 
grabbed 67.5% of total government expenditure in 2010, while capital and development 
expenditure constituted, together, a mere 13.3%. This clearly reflects an unproductive 
pattern of spending and allocation of the country’s resources.  
 















2006/07 57.3 3.5 0.7 6.1 32.4 
2007/08 70.1 2.8 0.9 9.7 16.5 
2008/09 51 1 0.7 6.5 40.9 
2009/10 72 0.1 2 9.5 16.4 
2010/11 67.5 0 1.288 12 19.3 




Moreover, the population demographics are also troubling. Total population has risen 
from 2.2 million in 2000 to 3.4 million in 2008, a 55.3% increase. Worryingly, most of 
this increase was due to the rise in the number of expatriates, further decreasing the 
percentage of the Kuwaiti population. While the latter increased at an average rate of 
3.3% during the period 2000-2008, the non-Kuwaiti population increased at an average 
rate of 6.6%. The result has been that in 2008, Kuwaitis constituted only 31.4% of the 
total population (Supreme Council for Planning and Development, 2009: 26).  
 
 




(mln) Kuwaiti (%) 
Non-Kuwaiti 
(%) 
2002 2.42 37.43 62.57 
2003 2.547 36.77 63.23 
2004 2.754 35.65 64.35 
2005 2.991 33.95 66.05 
2006 3.183 33.03 66.97 
2007 2.31 31.21 68.79 
2008 3.443 31.44 68.56 
Source: Supreme Council for Planning and Development, 2009: 26. 
 
 
These numbers are certainly unsustainable and do indeed give serious cause for alarm. In 
the meantime, however, Kuwait’s per capita GDP is among the highest in the world. 
Citizens lead a comfortable life without indulging in much productive activity. They are 
exempt from paying taxes, whilst enjoying things like free healthcare; free education; 
marriage bonuses; housing loans; token charges for utility services; heavily subsidized 
staple foods; and a constitutionally guaranteed job. Thus, Kuwait, in terms of the 
conditions portrayed above, carries almost all of the economic and socioeconomic 
features characterizing a ‘rentier state’. 
 
1.3. AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This research aims to explore the development of Kuwait into a rentier constitutional 
state by particularly focusing on the process – and the reasons behind the process –
leading up to it.  In other words, the study aims to explore and locate the underlying 
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reasons for the development of not only the rentier but also the constitutional nature of 
Kuwait. 
It is important to stress that the research is concerned with the transformation of the 
country into a rentier constitutional state from its pre-oil primitive nature. Therefore, the 
focus will be on the period 1950 to 1962; that is, from the beginning of the first major oil 
boom till the adoption of a constitutional form of government and the acquiring of the 
main features of the rentier distributive state as will be subsequently seen. The research 
does not address how the political economy of Kuwait developed after this 
transformation. In other words, the concern here is not to analyze Kuwait as a rentier 
constitutional state, but to explain how and why it became one within the relevant 
historical context. 
In responding to the identified aim, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) developing a thorough understanding of the way in which ‘rentierism’ and the 
‘distributive’ state were actually articulated in rationalizing economic policy beyond 
rentier state theory’s stress on ‘political utility’; 
(ii) contextualizing such ‘rentierism’ in its historical, traditional, and cultural context; 
(iii) understanding the role of external powers or colonialist states in the post-oil internal 
development of oil producing countries; 
(iv) assessing the different ways in which oil booms instigate new political dynamics 
beyond the assumptions of rentier state theory that may lead to political reforms and 
democratization; 
(v) developing a critical perspective on the ‘rentier state’ theoretical framework by 
referring to the experiences of Kuwait and the nature of its political economy; 
(vi) utilizing primary sources to locate the historical legacies of the current Kuwaiti 
political economy. 
 
In light of the above, the following research questions are developed: 
(i) What factors are responsible for the development of the rentier state in Kuwait? 
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(ii) What were the ideas, perceptions, and attitudes behind the institution of welfare and 
distributive policies? 
(iii) In what various ways did oil influence or shape the political dynamics of the 1950s 
and early 1960s? 
(iv) In what ways did oil push policymakers to institute reforms leading up to the framing 
of the 1962 Constitution? 
(v) Were these reforms genuine steps in the process of democratization, or were they a 
façade as the rentier state literature would suggest? 
(vi) What was the position and role of the ‘opposition’ during the oil boom in 
transforming the country into a constitutional state? 
(vii) Is rentier state theory a satisfactory enough theoretical framework to explain the 
nature of ‘rentierism’ in Kuwait? 
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is based on qualitative research focused mainly on primary archival documents 
to develop a discursive understanding of the economic and political development of 
Kuwait.  The research, as such, should also be considered unobtrusive, mainly related to 
document and content analysis as well as discursive.  However, as a research design it is 
very much historical in terms of locating the sources of a current issue in the historical 
political economy of the country. 
The research heavily utilizes a variety of archival documents, including material from the 
British Records Office, such as those of the India Office, Colonial Office, Foreign Office, 
and Cabinet Office. Access to these documents is facilitated by the invaluable available 
volumes of archival collections, most notably those published by Cambridge Archive 
Editions, including Records of Kuwait 1899-1961; Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf 
1904-1958; and Persian Gulf Administration Reports 1873-1957; and Annual Records of 
the Gulf. Other material from British sources includes newspaper and magazine articles 
from the concerned period. Moreover, archives of Kuwaiti official institutions are 
utilized, including the Minutes of the Development Board that coordinated and 
supervised development; Minutes of the Constituent Assembly and Constituent 
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Committee which framed the 1962 Constitution and prescribed the Kuwaiti political and 
economic system; and publications of the Department of Social Affairs that was 
responsible for providing social welfare services. Material from Kuwaiti and Arab 
sources also includes newspaper and magazine articles, lectures, and various other kinds 
of writings from the period of study such as petitions, declarations, etc. 
As suggested, emphasis is made so that secondary material utilized for the study would 
be dated within or very close to the time-frame focused on in this study to gain a more 
real-time feel as to the mindset and directions in the thinking of policymakers. 
In addition, an attempt was made to provide primary data in the form of interviews.  
However, due to the subject matter of the study, interviews were not stressed, as material 
dated from the period of study was clearly of greater value. The limited interviews 
conducted were largely aimed to provide general direction and open up potentially 
overlooked areas of study. Therefore, the interviews are limited to three political leaders 
and policy makers from the Constituent Assembly of 1961 and the subsequent National 
Assembly. These include Ahmad Al Khateeb, leader of the democratic movement, 
Deputy Speaker of the Constituent Assembly and former member of several 
parliamentary sessions; Ahmad Al Nafisi, democratic leader, former Member of 
Parliament and former Editor-in-Chief of Al Taleea, the historical opposition newspaper; 
and Abdulla Al Naibari, democratic leader and former member of several parliamentary 
sessions. The data gathered from the interviews were utilized in developing the 
arguments in various parts of the research, as the opinions and perspectives expressed by 
the interviewees related to diverse aspects of the subject covered in this study. All 
interviews were conducted in Kuwait during June 2011. 
It should be finally noted that due to having only three interviews, there was no case for 






1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
After this introductory chapter, the next chapter reviews the literature on rentier states 
with a special focus on oil abundant countries. The goal is not only to highlight the scope 
of the available studies and the assumptions and notions that are put forward, but also to 
point out the limitations and gaps that this research seeks to address.  
Chapter 3 provides a historical background to the pre-oil political and economic 
development of Kuwait. This is of great importance, as the arrival of oil wealth had to 
contend with the existing structures of economy and government that had been 
developing for decades if not centuries. As will be seen, many of these historical 
experiences naturally had a great influence on how things eventually evolved. 
Chapter 4 examines the British role in the post-oil economic development of Kuwait. The 
need for this is clear. During the oil boom, Kuwait was still under British protection and 
had not yet gained independence. This gave Britain great influence on both the 
international and domestic affairs of Kuwait. Thus, while this research shows that the 
notion of a state ‘autonomous’ from its local population in the shaping of policy is 
misleading, it is also apparent that such autonomy is even more misleading in that it does 
not take into account the fundamental role Britain played in formulating Kuwait’s post-
oil development schemes. The British played this role in light of their interests. As such, 
the idea of a ‘personal’ ruler undertaking policies for his own advantage does not provide 
a complete picture of the situation. The chapter, therefore, seeks to untangle the extent 
and kind of British influence. In a sense, the aim is to establish responsibility for the 
policies undertaken during the post-oil era. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the post-oil development schemes adopted by the Kuwaiti 
government that transformed the country into a rentier state. The main aim is to 
understand the ideas and perceptions behind these schemes, and the goals policymakers 
sought to achieve. In addition, the chapter seeks to provide a well-rounded understanding 
of the process of development, and assess the different outcomes these policies 
eventually produced. 
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The issues covered in Chapter 6 were born out of the findings reached in the preceding 
chapters. The documents revealed a distinction between a ‘welfare’ state, which was part 
of the official development schemes that the British had played a primary role in 
devising, and what was called a ‘super-welfare state’. The latter embodies what gives the 
Kuwaiti rentier economy its distinctive features, such as the lack of taxation combined 
with the abundance of free public services. The research showed that while the British 
supported and in fact played a role in devising the welfare state, they were very much 
against the ‘super-welfare’ state Kuwaitis were determined to create. The British were 
against the super-welfare policies despite their continued stress on the need to distribute 
income for societal content. Interestingly, contrary to the general assumptions in the 
literature, the super-welfare policies were viewed as dangerous not only for the 
sustainability of the economy, but also in that they would create social agitation and 
unrest. Thus, these policies were not part of the official programs and plans adopted. In 
light of this, the goal of the chapter is to examine the mindset behind the Kuwaiti 
determination to undertake such policies despite it being clear that they were potentially 
dangerous as the British had continued to warn and point out. 
While the previous chapters focus on the economic aspects of the Kuwaiti rentier state, 
the corresponding political dynamics of the post-oil era are examined in Chapter 7. The 
chapter seeks to understand how and why, contrary to assumptions of the rentier state 
literature, the oil boom of the 1950s was coupled with a rise in political activity and the 
institution of crucial reforms that were crowned with the framing of the 1962 
Constitution. While the literature generally dismisses such developments as discussed 
above, the chapter aims to investigate the matter more thoroughly by examining the 
ideas, perceptions and motivations behind such developments in the context of the oil 
boom.  
Chapter 8 analyzes the rentier constitutional system of the resultant Kuwaiti state. The 
first aim of this chapter is to examine the thought processes that went into drafting the 
constitution in light of Kuwait’s experiences. The chapter traces how and more 
importantly why the peculiar political system adopted by the constitution was formulated 
in the way that it did. Moreover, the chapter aims to confirm whether the new adopted 
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system can be considered a genuine step in the process of democratization with 
implications for rentier state theory or, as the literature would suggest, a mere façade. 
Being the last substantive chapter of the thesis, Chapter 9 brings the argument to an end 
by providing an interpretative discussion in which critical perspectives on the evolution 
of the rentier constitutional state in Kuwait are provided as a synthesis of the entire 
research. 
Finally, Chapter 10, the conclusion, provides a brief recap of the study, highlighting its 
potential limitations and the contributions it hopes to have provided for future research 


















RENTIER STATE THEORY: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the political and economic development of Third World nations has 
provoked much scholarly debate for many decades now. Theoretical perspectives 
have varied over the years attempting to draw a framework for understanding such 
development. Contributors in this debate studying the Persian Gulf oil-producing 
states have been part of this dynamic movement. In the 1950s and 1960s, these 
scholars utilized insights mainly from the modernization literature that posited a linear 
historical progression from tradition to modernity in a process instigated by capital 
and cultural contact. They drew direct connections between “capital accumulation, 
economic growth, social mobilization, and increased participation” (Crystal, 1992: 3). 
According to this perspective, natural resource abundance is seen as advantageous for 
development. As Ginsburg argued in the 1950s, “[t]he possession of a sizable and 
diversified natural resource endowment is a major advantage to any country 
embarking upon a period of rapid economic growth” (Ginsburg, 1957: 211). 
“Diversification”, he went on to say, “may be less important than the dimensions of 
one or more resources, if their reserves are large enough and long-run demand is 
steady and strong” (Ginsburg, 1957: 211). To the same effect, development theorist 
Walter Rostow argued that “natural resource endowments would enable developing 
countries to make the transition from underdevelopment to industrial ‘take-off’” 
(Rosser, 2006: 7). To the Persian Gulf countries, therefore, “oil would bring needed 
capital which would finally spark sustained growth, and ultimately participatory 
political stability” (Crystal, 1992: 6). 
These views came increasingly under attack in the 1960s and 1970s by dependency 
theorists, who proposed a distinction between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ nations. 
“Whereas modernization studies tended to argue that the salvation of the periphery 
lay in closer investment and trade ties with the core nations, the dependency approach 
highlights the exploitative potential of these relationships for the periphery” (Gereffi 
and Fonda, 1992: 424). With regards to developing countries reliant on natural 
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resource exports, these writers argued that the “structure of the global economy and 
the nature of international commodity markets” put them “at a serious disadvantage” 
(Rosser, 2006: 7). They were therefore less optimistic in predicting the future of oil-
producing nations, as they stressed the underlying similarities between oil and other 
commodities. Moreover, “oil was a single export, a depletable raw material, and a 
commodity as dependent on unpredictable markets as any other”; therefore, oil would 
ultimately bring “dependency and decline” (Crystal, 1992: 6). Thus, this perspective 
clearly introduced variables ignored by modernization writers, namely, the 
international geopolitical and economic system. As Crystal points out, “[t]he power of 
this literature lay in the connections it drew between the world economic system, 
domestic economic structure, and form of rule” (Crystal, 1992: 3).  
The insights of dependency theorists made great contributions to the study of Third 
World underdevelopment. With regards to the Persian Gulf, they enhanced the 
understanding of the forces that shaped the region during the colonial era and later 
drew attention to the importance of oil, the commodity mediating the region’s 
integration into the world economy. However, there was a growing realization that 
different types of capital inflows on developing countries do in fact matter (Chaudhry, 
1989: 102). Moreover, the rigid categorization of states (center/periphery) “into which 
the Gulf states do not neatly fit” (Crystal, 1992: 4), brought the theory further into 
question. As Crystal (1992: 4) notes, “[t]he dependency literature’s teleological stress 
on economic dependency renders it less applicable to developing states with problems 
of excess capital”.  
2.2. THE RISE OF THE RENTIER STATE LITERATURE 
In trying to explain the unfolding events in the oil producing Middle East especially 
during the oil price hikes of the 1970s, scholars gave rise to the concept of the ‘rentier 
state’. Unlike modernization theorists, these writers saw natural resources wealth as 
having negative consequences for development. However, the reasons they put 
forward were different from those generally suggested by dependency theorists.  
The idea of ‘rentier states’ was first put forward in 1970 by Mahdavi in his study of 
Iran (Mahdavi, 1970; Wilson, 1998: 239). It was scholars like Beblawi and Luciani, 
however, who further developed the analysis in the 1980s with respect to the oil-
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producing Arab Gulf states. These scholars were interested in the impact of the 
“windfall of wealth of unprecedented magnitude in such a short time” on the nature of 
these countries (Beblawi, 1987: 50). The result, they concluded, is negative, and their 
study resulted in the development of a large body of knowledge in the literature. The 
notion that natural resources are bad for development is now widely accepted by 
officials and researchers at the major international financial institutions including the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As Rosser (2006: 7) points out, “so 
influential has this literature been that the conventional wisdom now is arguably the 
exact opposite of what it was prior to the late 1980s”.  
2.2.1. What Does it Mean? 
The idea of the rentier state is built on much earlier concepts of ‘rent’. Going back to 
classical times, Adam Smith made a clear distinction between rent and other sources 
of income. According to Smith (1904), “[r]ent enters into the composition of the price 
of commodities in a different way from wages and profit”. While “high or low wages 
and profit are the causes of high or low price”, Smith contends, “high or low rent is 
the effect of it” (Smith 1904). In other words, as Ricardo points out, “[m]ines, as well 
as land, generally pay a rent to their owners; and this rent, as well as the rent of land, 
is the effect, and never the cause of the high value of their produce” (Ricardo 1821). 
Generally, therefore, “a rent is not merely an income for landlords, but a reward for 
ownership of all natural resources” (Belawi, 1987: 49), which implies, as Alfred 
Marshall puts it, “the income derived from the gift of nature” (quoted in Beblawi, 
1987: 49).  
Given its nature, rent has been attacked for being effortless and unearned. In the 
words of Adam Smith, it is “the income of men who love to reap where they never 
sowed” (Smith 1904). In this sense, a ‘rentier’ is emphasized to be a social function 
rather than an economic category, for a rentier is “a social agent who does not 
actively participate in the production process yet still shares in the fruits of the 
product” (Yates, 1996: 17). 
Stemming from this concept is the idea of a ‘rentier state’, which in its crudest sense 
simply refers to “countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of 
external economic rent” (Yates, 1996: 11). However, Beblawi fine-tuned this broad 
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notion to what has become accepted as the standard definition of a rentier state. 
According to this understanding, the features of a rentier state are: (i) there is a 
reliance on substantial external rent; (ii) the rent accrues directly to the government, 
and (iii) “only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority 
being involved in the distribution or utilisation of it” (Ross, 2001; Herb, 2003; 
Beblawi, 1987: 51-52).  
2.2.2. The Rentier State and Development: A Negative Relationship 
The rentier state literature looks at the effect of many different types of natural 
resource wealth on development. As this study is about Kuwait, the following 
discussion focuses on the specific impact of oil on development as per the literature. 
Here, oil-dependent countries are said to suffer from what economists call the 
‘resource curse’, a term used to highlight the negative relationship between natural 
resource dependence and economic growth.  
The first way in which oil is said to negatively affect development is through what has 
been coined as the ‘Dutch disease’. According to this model, new discoveries or price 
changes in one sector of the economy (oil in this case) are said to cause distress in 
other sectors (Auty, 2001: 195). More precisely, as a country experiences an oil-
export boom, the consequent appreciation of the state’s real exchange undermines the 
competitiveness of sectors unrelated to oil. A booming oil sector tends to draw capital 
and labour away from manufacturing and agriculture, for example, raising their 
production costs. “Together, these effects can lead to a decline in the export of 
agricultured and manufactured goods and can inflate the cost of goods and services 
that cannot be imported…” (Ross, 1999: 306). In addition, as Schubert points out, 
“high oil revenues promote adverse balance of payments on the cost of imported 
goods when prices fall, boost wages for skilled labour – ultimately pricing them out of 
the international market – and reduce incentive to risk investment in non-oil sectors” 
(Schubert, 2006: 6). This ultimately reinforces dependence on oil, which can result in 
a permanent loss of competitiveness (Karl, 2005: 6). 
The Dutch Disease model has given rise to some scepticism as to its general validity. 
Here, Ross’ (1999: 306-307) point is noteworthy. Ross notes that the model assumes 
full and fixed employment of an economy’s capital and labour before a boom takes 
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off. In this scenario, capital and labour are drawn away from agriculture and 
manufacturing by a booming resource sector, therefore raising their production costs. 
However, Ross points out that in developing countries there is usually a surplus of 
labour, and resource booms attract foreign capital and labour which offsets any local 
scarcities. In addition, the model assumes that foreign and domestic goods are perfect 
substitutes. “If this is eased – reflecting the fact that manufacturers in developing 
states often import intermediate goods, which become cheaper when the exchange 
rate appreciates – then the Dutch Disease may not damage the manufacturing sector’s 
competitiveness” (Ross, 1999: 307). 
Other scholars have focussed on the way in which oil’s high price volatility forms an 
impediment for effective fiscal planning. As Karl states, “oil price volatility exerts a 
strong negative influence on budgetary discipline and the control of public finances as 
well as state planning” (Karl, 2007: 6). Thus, the spending problems and waste that 
arise ultimately lead to financial disaster when oil prices collapse (Shubert, 2006: 6). 
Oil price volatility has also been attributed to poor investment patterns, income 
distribution and poverty alleviation.  
Another way in which oil is said to be bad for development is due to the enclave 
nature of the industry and its capital-intensity. This tends to foster weak linkages to 
the rest of the economy and does not create much employment. It therefore limits 
opportunities for technology diffusion and infrastructural development (Karl, 2007: 6-
7). 
Finally, oil is said to have a negative influence on development as a consequence of 
replacing the need of governments to extract surplus from their own population. In 
contextualizing this notion, rentier states are defined as ‘distributive’ rather than 
‘extractive’ states (Smith, 2004: 233). The consequences of this are more complex in 
that the line between ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’ becomes somewhat blurred. 
This line of argument is explored in more detail below, as it is at this point where the 
interaction between politics and economics becomes more visible in the literature.  
2.2.3. Taxation and the Political Economy of Oil States: A Discussion 
As mentioned above, oil frees governments from the need for domestic extraction of 
surplus, or in simpler terms, taxation. The political-economic consequences of this are 
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deemed to be significant. The first result would be the elimination of the institutional 
capacities of the state (or the development of these capacities) that are required for 
such extraction. “Institutional mechanisms for extraction and redistribution are not 
merely arrested; they actually decline” (Chaudhry, 1989: 113). Instead, bureaucracies 
designed exclusively to distribute revenues take their place (Chaudhry, 1989: 113).  
This decline of extractive institutions is said to have negative effects for the long-term 
development of all parts of the bureaucracy. This argument stems from the analysis of 
early Western Europe, whereby it is concluded that states not relying on domestic 
extraction of revenues must lack very crucial capacities, since extractive institutions 
are the base of administration, without which regulation and redistribution are 
impossible (Smith, 2004: 233). As Chaudhry asserts, “setting up an extractive 
apparatus is the most ‘intrusive’ and first economic act of the state” (Chaudhry, 1989: 
114). It involves “the centralization of the fiscal apparatus, territorial control, political 
and economic decisions about target groups, the acquisition of information, and the 
design and implementation of collection mechanism and enforcement procedures” 
(Chaudhry, 1989: 114).  
The political dimension of the process includes “setting long-term economic and 
fiscal priorities and codifying legal obligations” (Chaudhry, 1989: 114). Extractive 
institutions also spin off related agencies that lead to a diversification of the tools 
available to decision-makers. “In developing countries in which there are large 
parallel markets in goods and currencies and in which monetary tools are limited, 
taxation and the data collected through this process compromise one of the few means 
to regulate the private sector and guide the economy” (Chaudhry, 1989: 114).  
Unlike extractive states, distributive states are therefore denied crucial information 
generated by a strong and vigorous tax bureaucracy (Smith, 2004: 233), as “[t]he 
fiscal needs of the state affect not only what the government does but also what it 
knows” (Chaudhry, 1989: 114). Without sufficient information, state spending would 
more probably be inefficient and would not be based on economic rationality. The 
absence of basic data on the economy, therefore, undermines the quality of local 
investments and the business environment as a whole.  
Moreover, even if it were assumed that these governments actually have sufficient 
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information, the nature of the rentier state would render it uninterested in developing 
the economy. When a state needs to rely on taxation, Luciani points out, it has a 
natural interest in expanding the income base on which taxes can be levied. Unlike in 
‘allocation states’, economic growth is the primary goal of the policies that all 
‘production states’ adopt (Luciani, 1987: 73). “The only relevant problem to an 
allocation state”, Luciani asserts, “is extracting the maximum potential revenue from 
the rest of the world: this, however, has little to do with the domestic economy” 
(Luciani, 1987: 74).  
A complementing argument in this regard is that the nature of rentier wealth denies 
governments “the incentives for innovation within a civil service that stems from 
scarcity” (Karl, 2007: 16). In contrast, it is argued that in resource poor countries 
population pressures on scarce resources decrease the tolerance for inefficiency and 
predation, and the economy is naturally unable to support extensive protection or an 
over-expanded bureaucracy (Auty and Gelb, 2004: 128). 
As suggested, domestically, it is the political dimension of government spending that 
is more dominant in the literature. It is asserted that when states are not dependent on 
domestic taxation to finance development, “they are not forced to formulate their 
goals and objectives under the scrutiny of citizens who pay the bills”, and are 
permitted at the same time “to distribute funds among sectors and regions on an ad 
hoc basis” (Karl, 1997: 190). Governments in this situation do not need democratic 
legitimation and can simply buy consensus by distributing income in exchange for 
little or nothing (Luciani, 2001: 132). As Anderson puts it, oil “releases the state from 
the accountability ordinarily exacted by domestic appropriation of surplus… the state 
may be virtually completely autonomous from its society, winning popular 
acquiescence through distribution rather than support through taxation and 
representation” (Anderson, 1987: 10). In such an environment, the weakening 
“agencies of restraint” encourage “the expansion of states into new arenas while 
weakening opportunities to strengthen administrative capacities… merit-based civil 
services, and the rule of law” (Karl, 2007: 16). The state ultimately becomes over-
centralized, over-extended, inefficient, and lacking accountably (Karl, 1997: 190). 
It must be noted here that Ross (1999) has pointed out some contradictions in Karl’s 
empirical analysis in relation to this line of argument. For example, despite the fact 
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that in Paradox of Plenty Karl argues that oil revenues weaken states by withering 
their extractive capabilities (p.160), she later says that the oil booms of the 1970s had 
little effect on the non-oil taxes of the major oil exporters (p.201). In addition, while 
Karl suggests that “oil wealth can produce ‘cognitive disorders’ among state official”, 
rendering them “‘habituated’ to fiscal policies that weaken state capacity, fall prey to 
a ‘rentier psychology,’ and suffer from bouts of ‘petromania’ (pp.16, 57, 66-67)”, her 
case studies, however, “are almost wholly populated by state officials who respond to 
oil booms with self-interest and cunning” (Ross, 1999: 317). 
2.2.4. The Development of Democracy 
In any case, the arguments presented above are directly related to the relationship 
between oil rents and regime type in rentier states. In fact, the effect of oil on 
democracy has been an essential component of the theory. It is suggested that 
“governments use oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to 
demands for greater accountability” (Ross, 2001: 332). The mechanisms by which 
this is achieved are diverse. They mainly concern how governments receive their 
revenues and how they eventually spend it. As per the former, by relieving them from 
having to pay taxes, the public “will be less likely to demand accountability from – 
and representation in – their government” (Ross, 2001: 332). As per the latter, an 
influx of oil wealth leads to greater spending on patronage, which in turn dampens 
pressures for democratization (Ross, 2001: 333). As Huntington explains, 
broad-based economic development involving significant industrialization 
may contribute to democratization but wealth resulting from the sale of oil 
(and, probably, other natural resources) does not. Oil revenues accrue to the 
State: they therefore increase the power of the State bureaucracy and, 
because they reduce or eliminate the need for taxation, they also reduce the 
need for the government to solicit the acquiescence of its subjects to 
taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for publics to 
demand representation. ‘No taxation without representation’ was a political 
demand; ‘no representation without taxation’ is a political reality (quoted in 
Ayubi, 1995: 400). 
In addition, Luciani asserts that the economic system of allocation states, unlike that 
of production states, increase the incentive for individuals to get away from political 
life. Because allocation states normally pay well, “[e]xit normally involves a 
considerable loss of income;” therefore “voice becomes a dangerous proposition” 
(Luciani, 1987: 74). Thus, even though “a lot of scheming may be expected to go on 
 21 
in allocation states along the time-honoured pattern of court politics … this will 
seldom, if ever, develop into a truly political debate” (Luciani, 1987: 74). Although 
states may find it expedient to set up representative bodies to vent and control some 
resistance, the debates that go on are followed with indifference by the public and the 
ruler can disband them without meeting any resistance whatsoever (Luciani, 1987: 
74).  
If social and political activity does in fact arise, suggests the literature, its aim would 
be to get more money out of the state. In this regard, Luciani distinguishes opposition 
groups who demand democracy from those who oppose the government with the sole 
aim of enlarging their share of rent. Rentier states  
may experience power struggles and factionalism, but is unlikely to 
experience a popular demand for democracy. While individuals, groups and 
factions, both within and outside the ruling elite, will constantly fight to 
enlarge their share of the rent, they will seldom advocate the adoption of 
democratic norms or an enlargement in political participation. In such a 
state, there is always an opposition, but the opposition will not be any more 
democratic than the ruler. Democratic methods will not appear as the most 
promising means to achieving the desired goal, simply because all groups 
will have a particularistic agenda, which is not conducive to the 
organization of consensus and majority support (Luciani, 1994: 132). 
Another angle in establishing the importance of taxation for democracy is the fact that 
taxation, especially direct taxation of individuals, requires compliance that will 
doubtfully develop under dictatorial rule.  
The need to widen the fiscal basis of the state is…an inducement to 
democratize…A state resorting to increased taxation, especially if direct 
taxation is involved, is bound to meet a demand for control through 
democratic institutions, as most forms of modern taxation require 
widespread compliance, which can be obtained only under conditions of 
democratic legitimation (Luciani, 1994: 132-133). 
The literature also suggests that government largesse can effectively prevent the 
formation of social groups independently from the state, thereby eliminating what 
some believe to be a necessary precondition for democracy (Ross, 2001: 334).  
It must be stated that even though it is generally agreed that oil does indeed hinder 
democracy in the literature, many of the underlying assertions are not only too 
general, but are also contradictory. Sweeping claims about the effects of oil are made, 
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often without evidence. For instance, in trying to analyze the problems of political 
development in rentier states, Luciani states that the fact that benefits are distributed 
unequally is irrelevant for political life. “Inequality of distribution”, he states, “is not 
an issue”, as there is little or no objective ground to claim more benefits since one’s 
contribution is dispensable anyhow (Luciani, 1987: 74-75). On the other hand, Karl 
contends the exact opposite in stating that while inequalities created by oil-led 
development are about the same levels as non-oil states with similar incomes, “people 
in oil-exporting countries may experience these inequalities very differently because 
they occur in what is widely to be a rich country. The sheer visibility of oil wealth 
compounds the problem” (Karl, 2007: 15). According to Karl, this may be grounds 
for a “potent political mix” (Karl, 2007: 16). 
Likewise, when Luciani claims that in rentier states, “[e]xit normally involves a 
considerable loss of income” and therefore “voice becomes a dangerous proposition”, 
it can be equally logical, speaking in this general manner, to argue that many 
‘production states’ with functioning free markets may also inhibit political 
participation. Bowles and Gintis argue, for instance, that markets intrinsically 
minimize the cost to the individual of not participating in democratic political 
practices because they promote exit (from political life) over voice by insuring “that 
the option of exit is always present, thus undercutting the commitment to voice” 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1986: 135).  Markets, in this logic, “prioritize individual 
decisions over collective ones”, and their “logic of private self-interest tends to 
colonize the public sphere, and to corrode the formation of a public interest, and ethos 
of public service” (Beetham, 1997: 35).  Thus, “extensive reliance upon markets … 
undermines the conditions conducive to a high level of participation and a vibrant 
democratic culture” (Bowles and Gintis, 1986: 135).  
This has led some to attack the rentier state model as being too general and 
incoherent. “The idea of the rentier state has come to imply so much that is has lost its 
content” (Okruhlik, 1999: 308). It has, in other words, “suffered from a bad case of 
conceptual overstretch: assertions about the influence of oil on Middle East politics 
have become so general that their validity has been diluted” (Ross, 2001: 331). 
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2.2.5. The Rentier State and the Question of Autonomy 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the idea of state autonomy features 
prominently in the explanation of rentier state development. Oil revenues give rentier 
states financial autonomy, and this autonomy, in turn, is argued to have negative 
consequences for development.  
The fact that autonomy is viewed in a negative light seems to be in contrast to the fact 
that it is usually seen as favourable in the general political-economic literature. It has 
in fact been seen as a symptom of or a prerequisite for strength, as “[u]nfettered by 
narrow class interests, ‘autonomous’ states are deemed capable of making decisions 
that favour the long-range vision of technocrats over the short-term interests of 
‘dominant’ social groups” (Chaudhry, 1989: 111). For example, many scholars 
studying the Asian ‘tigers’ conclude that the key to their superior economic 
performance was the autonomy of the state “with its ‘insulation’ from particularistic 
pressures, particularly those originating from large firms or unions” (Przeworski and 
Limongi, 1993: 56). Indeed, there is a consensus among them that a state “must be 
insulate from societal pressures and empowered to pursue policies it finds best” 
(Przeworski and Limongi, 1993: 57).  
Auty and Gelb partly address this issue by drawing on Lal’s work on the political 
state. In Lal’s view, there are two basic criteria to distinguish between types of states: 
“the restraint upon state’s action, and the aim of the state” (Auty and Gelb, 2004: 
127). With regards to the first criterion, Lal distinguishes between autonomous states 
and factional states. While an autonomous state “can formulate and pursue its own 
objectives so that it can implement a coherent economic policy”, a factional state 
“must appease political groupings” and thereby risk “compromising the coherence of 
its economic policy” (Auty and Gelb, 2004: 127). With regard to the second criterion, 
the distinction is “between long-run welfare maximization and the service of sectional 
interests” (Auty and Gelb, 2004: 127). By linking these distinctions to resource 
abundant countries, Auty and Gelb (2004: 127) conclude that “a resource-poor 
endowment tends to engender autonomous benevolent states that place a premium on 
investment efficiency whereas resource-abundance tends to foster factional and 
predatory states that relax market constraints and depress investment efficiency”. 
Thus, to Auty and Gelb (2004), resource abundant countries are usually not 
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autonomous.  Nevertheless, in their analysis, Gulf oil monarchies and other countries 
like Brunei, do fall under ‘autonomous benevolent states’.  
Chaudhry, for her part, addresses the issue of autonomy by emphasising the 
importance of looking at the type of capital accrued by the state and at what stage of 
state-building. Much of the literature assumes that state bureaucracies and stable 
borders are already present as a point of departure. “The focus has been on the ways 
in which institutional structures influence policies and institutions or regenerate the 
conditions for their existence, not on the confluence of exogenous and endogenous 
forces that forge bureaucracies and delineate the scope of their operations” 
(Chaudhry, 1989: 118).  
In the rentier state case, the influx of external capital coincides with the forging of 
fundamental state institutions. Her findings suggest that the financial “autonomy of 
the state” in these cases is in fact counterproductive, pointing back to the previous 
idea that oil revenues reverse any “previous gains in institutional entrenchment and 
state penetration” as they “diminish the extractive and regulatory capacities of the 
state” (Chaudhry, 1989: 119, 143). Thus, “despite their structural autonomy from 
society, bureaucracies based on external capital inflows are exceptionally brittle” 
(Chaudhry, 1989: 114). Although not apparent during the boom period, these 
problems are in fact accentuated. In times of bust the hidden problems come to the 
surface quite vividly. The result is administrative crisis, where the state does not have 
the capacity to pursue the policies that are required. In sum, then, it is important not to 
confuse structural autonomy with the power to realize policy preferences. As 
Chaudhry sums up, “[w]hen it is based on external resources, structural autonomy has 
little to do with efficacy in times of crisis” (Chaudhry, 1989: 118).  
However, other scholars have attacked the premise of autonomy itself. Okruhlik for 
example, points out the tendency “to reify the state and to impose an artificial rigidity 
on relations between the ruler and ruled” (Okruhlik, 2001: 296). The boundaries 
between state and society are, unlike what rentier state theory suggests, “permeable” 
and “fluid”, as state and society in fact penetrate each other (Okruhlik, 2001: 308). 
Okruhlik extends this argument, contending that the rentier state literature also 
“overemphasizes state resources and autonomy from the social consequences of 
expenditures” (Okruhlik, 2001: 297). For this reason, he asserts, the rentier 
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framework has proven inadequate in elucidating the rise of dissent in oil states such as 
Saudi Arabia.  
Unfortunately, even though Okruhlik (2001) makes these points, his analysis repeats 
the very issues he tries to address. He argues, for instance, that “the determining 
variable in the creation and convergence of opposition is the choices of a personal 
regime in distributing money inequitably for political reasons”,  and that “wealth 
generated through oil receipts is a catalyst for opposition to the state, rather than a 
tool to placate dissent” (Okruhlik, 2001: 297; emphasis added). Although he makes 
this point as oppossed to the generally accepted notion that oil dampens opposition, 
he still clearly separates state from society in terms of the political choices 
governments make. He disputes the outcome of government expenditure; it is, 
nevertheless, the state that distributes, and the society that, in turn, reacts. At most 
then, the state-society relationship has an action-reaction dynamic as understood by 
social-interactionism theories: state acts, society reacts, and possibly vice versa. In 
this way, Okruhlik and others do not view society as an integral part of the decision-
making process itself or, in other words, they do not conceptualize society in 
government. 
It is also argued that development priorities are different in oil-abundant countries 
than they otherwise would be in resource-poor nations. The reason is that, in rentier 
states, economic decisions become increasingly ‘politicized’. Private interests would 
have strong incentives to influence public authorities, and groups would vigorously 
pursue particularistic agendas, each having its own ‘special interests’ (Karl, 2007: 
17). The resulting ‘favouritism’ in government policies undermines efficiency, 
responsibility and accountability. This is in contrast to industrial nations, where there 
is an emphasis on “depoliticization”, so that the “effectiveness of government would 
not be undermined by overloading produced by the combination of increased political 
demands with cross-pressures of group interest” (Karl, 1997: 63). 
There are two main issues coming out of this discussion. First, is the mentioned 
‘particularism’ emphasized in the literature really unique to rentier states? As Herb 
rightly points out, “fiscal politics in Western democracies … also have highly 
particularistic nature. Indeed, it is difficult to think of fiscal issues that are not 
particularistic” (Herb, 1999: 258).  The entire literature in ‘public choice’ in general, 
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and ‘political business cycles’ provides plenty of evidence for this. 
Therefore, politics and favouritism in economic decision-making should not be seen 
as distinctive of rentier states. Stiglitz, for one, has written extensively about the 
‘special interests’ that influence Washington’s economic planners (see for example 
Stiglitz 2007; Stiglitz 2002). Likewise, when Luciani writes that in rentier sates 
“democratic methods will not appear as the most promising means to achieving the 
desired goal, simply because all groups will have a particularistic agenda, which is not 
conducive to the organization of consensus and majority support”, it is not easy, as 
Herb points out, “to conceive of why it is that divvying up oil revenues is less 
conducive to ‘the organization of consensus and majority support’ than the divvying 
up of tax revenues” (Herb, 1999: 258). 
In this sense, there clearly seems to be an exaggerated and partly artificial theoretical 
separation of rentier states from other nations. In addition, when Karl speaks of the 
need for ‘depoliticization’ in rentier states, she refers to Huntington to support her 
argument both in describing the ‘ideal’ depoliticized situation in industrial nations and 
in proposing solutions for rentier states. It is therefore worth looking, albeit briefly, at 
Huntington’s analysis in this regard.  
In a report produced to the Trilateral Commission in 1975, Huntington pointed out 
that while in the past “Truman had been able to govern the country with the 
cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers” 
(Huntington, 1975: 98), the problem arising in the 1960s and 1970s was “a sharp 
increase in political consciousness, political participation, and commitment to 
egalitarian democratic values” (Huntington, 1975: 106). This created what Huntington 
called an “excess of democracy” (Huntington, 1975: 113): “Marginal social groups”, 
like blacks and women, “are now becoming full participants in the political system”, 
and thereby causing an “overload”, given that “marginality on the part of some 
groups” has been “one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function 
effectively” (Huntington, 1975: 114).  
In effect, Karl’s suggestion that there is a need to depoliticize therefore seems to mean 
the need to marginalize certain social groups, a view that is quite anti-democratic in 
any meaningful sense of the word. More importantly in this regard, the argument 
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implicitly assumes that existing ‘stable democracies’ pursue neutral un-politicized 
economic policies. This is hardly the case as noted above. When Huntington speaks of 
the instability caused by increased participation of social groupings, it is essential to 
understand what system is being destabilized in the first place: an already 
particularistic economic system – if one were to assert that market players are in fact 
an integral part of the state itself. As Underhill notes, “[t]he private interests of the 
market”, like the Wall Street lawyers and bankers, are “integrated into the state, 
asymmetrically in accordance with their structural power and organizational capacity, 
through their close relationship to state institutions in the policy decision-making 
process and in the ongoing pattern of regulatory governance of market society” 
(Underhill, 2000: 821). It is therefore not surprising that, in 1980, for example, 80 
percent of Fortune 500 companies had public affairs offices in Washington (Korten, 
2001: 145). The decisions of the state are thus hardly neutral. In this sense, there is an 
unfair comparison that places the political systems of rentier states against something 
that does not exist. 
Such ‘unfair’ views and comparisons have in fact hindered a fuller understanding of 
rentier state political systems. For example, the stress on the Euro-centric notion of 
‘no taxation without representation’ has led to a dismissal of all policies that have 
resulted in genuine political liberalization. These are rendered by the literature to be 
schemes designed by governments to allow people to vent off steam, or to enable 
rulers to realign their alliances within society. In addition, by juxtaposing the these 
systems against an ‘ideal’ conceptualization of democracy, which in reality is non-
existent, and then dismissing them completely, the literature has impeded a closer 
examination of genuine processes of democratization in rentier states, such as the one 
witnessed in Kuwait. 
As Niblock (1998: 226) correctly points out,  
[t]he ideal-laden conceptualization of democracy has...had a negative impact 
on empirical research on Middle Eastern political systems. Having written off 
the political systems of the area as being congenitally undemocratic, 
researchers have clearly felt that it would be a waste of time to examine or 
analyse the participative or representative aspects of the systems. There has 
consequently been very little empirical research on either the elections or 
parliamentary/consultative bodies of the Middle East. 
In any case, the literature seems to be fixated on the idea that fiscal and economic 
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policies undertaken by the government, particularly those that seem distributive in 
nature are driven predominantly, if not solely, by the aim of buying the loyalty and 
quiescence of society. In this way, the ‘why’ question is already answered, and seems 
to often be pre-conceived. 
This stress on the ‘political utility’ of economic policy has in fact sometimes extended 
to areas of policy that are not distributive in nature as well. For instance, international 
investments are seen as schemes designed to perpetuate the rentier nature of the state. 
Instead of investing a country’s surplus revenues in indigenous industrialization, 
states will opt to invest abroad, because industrialization has “the disadvantage of 
setting the conditions for future class conflicts, the outcomes of which can only be 
deleterious of the existing elite” (Delacoix, 1980: 15-16). Investing abroad, on the 
other had, would export “potential class conflict” and prolong “the distributive role of 
the state beyond the exhaustion of its resource base” (Delacoix, 1980: 15-16).1 
 
Ayubi speaks in similar terms, and suggests that the goal of exporting class conflict 
has been a reason behind the lack of serious efforts towards economic diversification 
in rentier states. “A move in the direction of ‘industrial deepening’”, he notes, “could 
eventually result in more pronounced class differentiation and political consciousness 
that might ultimately challenge the very basis of the system”, whereas “a move 
towards ‘financial deepening’ (as in the case of Kuwait’s extensive international 
investments in the late 1980s)…enables the state to ‘export class conflict’” (Ayubi 
1995: 226).  
In these various forms as described above, therefore, the ‘particularistic’ nature of 
social activity, and the ‘political utility’ of government economic policy constitute 
core features in the arguments put forward by the rentier state literature. 
 
2.2.6 The Rentier State and the Nature of Opposition Forces 
 
As suggested, scholars generally view social and political activity in rentier states 
from a purely materialistic angle. The stress is on the particularistic motivations of 
such movements, which centre on the desire to get a bigger share of the oil wealth. In 
such a context, opposition to a regime would usually rise after the state becomes 
                                                 
1 Delacroix suggests that this was the reason behind Kuwait opting to invest its surplus abroad. 
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unable to fulfill its part of the ‘bargain’ in times of scarcity or busts. Some scholars 
have also argued that oil receipts themselves may in fact be a “catalyst for 
opposition”, as this opposition would be provoked by the lack of equitability in 
distribution (Okruhlik, 1999: 279). Nevertheless, in both cases there seems to be 
materialistic underpinnings acting as the main instigator of dissent. 
There are other important studies, however, that attempt to better understand the 
nature of opposition forces that may potentially develop in rentier states. These 
scholars contextualize opposition forces within rentier state theory. They find that 
while opposition movements may indeed develop in rentier states, these would be 
dominantly based on ideological and cultural grounds, such as Islamism. Like the rest 
of the literature, however, they view these movements as unmotivated by a desire for 
democracy or greater political participation. Again, this notion is tied to the European 
experience. As Anderson (1987: 14) points out,  
[t]he legitimacy of the state in the West, with its notions of secular 
patriotism, citizenship, and the various rights of citizens, was intimately 
tied to the taxing powers of the state and the popular participation which 
developed as a consequence. Where those powers are not exercised, and 
where popular participation is occasional at best, the formulae for 
legitimacy are less a reflection of the contemporary political economy of 
state-society relations than of historical, cultural, or religious conceptions 
of the obligations of governors and leaders and the rights and 
responsibilities of subjects and followers.  
In analyzing the nature of opposition during oil booms, rentier state scholars generally 
link resource structure to class dynamics. As a starting point, the relationship between 
a ‘distributive’ state and the rest of the population is deemed not to be class-based. In 
his important piece, Delacroix (1980: 9) notes that societies in such states diverge 
from the Marxian idea of societies, which “wrench their subsistence from nature, 
through agriculture and manufacturing”. The latter are founded on class exploitation, 
and a coercive state ultimately emerges to “organize and regulate” this exploitation 
(Delacroix, 1980: 9). 
In contrast, it is possible for a distributive state, which gets the bulk of its money from 
the outside world, “to be under the control of an elite which does not exploit the 
population within the jurisdiction of the state because it does not need to” (Delacroix, 
1980: 9). When domestic surplus extraction is absent, the relation between the elite 
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and the rest of the population would not be a class relation. “[A] redistribution of 
value not extracted from the state’s own population”, notes Delacroix, “is simply 
distribution” (Delacroix, 1980: 9). 
The nature of opposition and challengers to the rentier state system is therefore 
conditioned in this context. The result is twofold. First, “challengers will not be able 
to claim a monopoly of rationality. They will not be able to present themselves as 
representatives of progressive forces of history, bent of freeing production from the 
shackles of a mode of production that has become mired in its own contradictions” 
(Delacroix, 1980: 11). Thus, for them to credibly draw inspiration from ‘scientific 
socialism’ would be difficult, as “[d]isputes over the distributions of surplus not 
derived from work can bear only a superficial resemblance to class conflict” 
(Delacroix, 1980: 11). Instead, notes Delacroix (1980: 11), 
they will have to find legitimizing ideology in strictly moral 
considerations. Such considerations tend to find their strongest support in 
Golden Age myths, usually of religious origin. Revolutionary movements 
in distributive states will thus have strong reactionary ideological 
components. In their purest forms, they will be completely reactionary. 
The second result that is connected to this is that ‘class’ cannot be the organizational 
base of challengers. Hence, “other structures of social solidarity will have to be 
activated”, and “[a]lternative structures are, by default, traditional structures” 
(Delacroix, 1980: 11). Naturally, “[t]he more recently incorporated into the world 
economy a society, the more available are its traditional social structures”; thus, 
concludes Delacroix, “a distributive state ruling a recently incorporated society will 
experience a maximum of tribal, ethnic, and religious challenges” (Delacroix, 1980: 
11). 
Some scholars examining the rise of opposition forces in the Persian Gulf region have 
utilized this understanding of the nature of internal political conflict to their rentier 
state case studies. Expectedly, possibly the important of these studies look at the rise 
of religious opposition in Iran leading up to the Islamic revolution of 1979. In this 
regard, Shambayati (1994: 308) has argued that the responsibility for the emergence 
of such a social movement based on moral considerations was the rentier nature of 
the Iranian state. Shambayati (1994) explained this to be a result of the fact that the 
relations between citizens and the rentier sate are defined in non-economic terms. 
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Like Delcroix, he points out that the rentier nature of the state changes the nature of 
the challenges it faces. “The state and its clientele are not engaged in the economic 
exploitation of the domestic population”; thus, “no conflict arises over the ownership 
of the means of production”, but instead, “strictly moral and cultural considerations 
become the legitimizing ideology of groups opposing rentier states” (Shambayati, 
1994: 308).  
Moreover, in Iran, as Najmabadi (1987: 224) points out, workers viewed the source of 
social inequality to be result of “state favouratism towards the rich, rather than owners 
exploiting the profits from their labour”. Like Shambayati (1994), Najmabadi (1997) 
emphasized the fact that oil revenues are derived from a natural resource, not capital 
investments and productive employment of labour. Thus, these resources, claim both 
scholars, seemed to the people to be a God-given blessing that equally belonged to all. 
“That the benefits distributed themselves in such a skewed and inegalitarian pattern 
under the Shah was attributed to conscious state policies, acting against God’s 
intentions and depriving the people of their ‘natural’ rights. In such a context, 
corruption, precisely because it is one of the primary distributive levers, becomes the 
explosive issue” (Najmabadi, 1987: 224).  
As mentioned, while these scholars shed light on different factors shaping the nature 
of opposition forces in rentier states, they share with the rest of the literature the view 
that movements would not be driven by a desire for democratic reform. As Najmabadi 
(1987: 223) clearly points out,  
the legitimacy of the late Pahlavi state became linked to whether it was 
dispensing its favours in a just and fair manner. In a society with a strong 
work ethics, the state is often criticized for being unproductive, parasitic 
and wasteful of social resources. In a rentier state, the distinction between 
productive civil society and a parasitic state becomes irrelevant, since the 
source of national wealth is largely external rent, not domestic labour. 
Thus, in the 1970s in Iran, politics became polarized around questions of 
wealth distribution, not control over production; around moral decadence 
and conspicuous consumption, not political participation and rational 
decision-making. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the forms of opposition that may develop in rentier states are 
generally believed to be either particularistic, driven by the aim of gaining a bigger 
share of the oil wealth, or ideological. In fact, as suggested, scholars concentrating on 
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the latter also place significant weight to materialistic issues, such as the inequality of 
wealth distribution, as being major provocations that give rise to dissent. In all cases, 
it must be stressed again, democratic demands do not feature in the literature as a 
driving force behind social and political movements in rentier states. 
 
2.2.7 Kuwait and the Arab Gulf States 
The political-economic approach of rentier state theory is a dominant base upon 
which studies of the Arab Gulf states are contextualized. The arguments mainly center 
on the way in which oil money has enabled the continuity of the traditional and 
patriarchal regimes of the region. In other words, the focus is on the socioeconomic 
relationships that oil income has nurtured, and the methods by which oil has 
“reinforced existing social structures and provided a buffer for the ruling families” 
(Ehteshami, 2003: 58). In this way, oil is seen to have “consolidated” the role of the 
“traditional elites” (Ayubi, 1995: 225).  
This was made possible as consequence of the state’s oil induced ‘autonomy’ that 
enabled rulers “to create new classes and/or dismantle and reassemble existing ones” 
(Ayubi, 1995, 225). In practice, this was achieved by “(i) general public expenditure; 
(ii) employment in the large bureaucracy; and  (iii) specific public policies such as 
those pertaining to economic subsidies and land allocation” (Ayubi, 1995: 229).  
Therefore, using such methods, the rulers “bought off” their populations. As 
Ehteshami (2003: 58) notes, the influx of external rent “had enable the traditional 
elites of the Gulf Arab monarchies to ‘buy off’ their population, to distribute largesse 
and to depoliticize them, to the point of dulling their political instincts”. This formed 
the basis for what is referred to as an ‘implicit social contract’ whereby political rights 
are substituted for ‘state-provided welfare’. This ‘contract’ also helped “to conserve 
socio-political norms in Arab societies and polities, such as the patrimonial nature of 
interactions and primordial loyalties” (Schwartz, 2004: 26).   
These policies have in effect transformed different segments of the population into 
being state clients. As Ayubi (1995: 247) notes, “[t]he abundance of oil revenues 
accruing directly to the state enables it to clientelise existing groups (e.g. merchants in 
the Gulf) and to create new ones (e.g. the ‘new entrepreneurs’ in the Gulf) that may 
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be functionally differentiated but structurally dependent on the state”. A predominant 
part of the latter group is sometimes referred to as a ‘new middle class’.  In a sense, 
therefore, the policies of the elites were “a form of social engineering” that created 
“state-reliant modern middle classes totally reliant on the states’ largesse for their 
survival (let alone prosperity)” (Ehteshami, 2003: 59). In the Kuwaiti context, for 
instance, this was achieved by the Al Sabah’s move “to neutralize the political 
ambitions of the founding families and set up an advanced welfare state, which won 
them the loyalty of the Third Estate outside the oligarchic families” (Salame, 1994: 
94-95). 
This process is sometimes called “statising”, as it created “new wants that are closely 
linked to new dependencies on the state for their satisfaction” (Ayubi, 1995: 229). 
However, because of the traditional patriarchal nature of government in the region 
which renders private funds of the rulers and public funds of the state 
indistinguishable, “statising” was at the same time “privatising”. Therefore, as Ayubi 
(1995: 229) points out, “[j]ust as the etat providence is also etat famille, the raison 
d’etat is not easily distinguishable from the raison de famille”. Because of this, “as the 
financial resources of the state expanded in the boom years, so too did the social 
solidarity within, and the political stature of, the ruling family and a whole network of 
families and tribes connected to it…” (Ayubi 1995: 229).  
It is these ideas that dominate the writings on countries of the Arab Gulf. The writings 
on Saudi Arabia, for instance, bring up many of the themes described above. For 
example, Chaudhry (1997: 315) concludes, “[w]here previously the king’s need to tax 
had precipitated the creation of a consultative council dominated by Hijazi merchants, 
the withdrawal of taxes coincided with the de-politicization of the old merchant elite 
and led to the abrogation of their hard-won legal rights”. In this sense, the state 
handed out selective privileges, financed by oil, against loyalty and support (Herb 
2002).  Therefore, the distributive state became an important element of what is 
termed as “the Saudi social contract”: this incorporates the Al Saud strategy of the 
“legitimacy of largesse”, which has consistently allowed the regime “to buy off any 
potential hostility long before it has time to develop into anything like a serious 
threat” (Lackner, 1978: 216; Champion, 2003: 82). In sum, “[o]il revenues have 
allowed the regime to assert its control over the country as they have enabled it to 
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consolidate hegemony by paying subsidies to the tribes and buying off any potential 
opposition” (Lackner, 1978: 81).  
In her highly acclaimed and widely cited book on Kuwait and Qatar, Crystal does not 
move away from this framework in contextualizing the political and economic 
developments of both countries, and in fact uses the very same terms prevalent in the 
literature (Crystal 1992).2  Her argument centres on how revenues oil revenues 
“preserved continuity at the apex of the political system” (Crystal, 1992: 1). The 
process resembles the notion of “social engineering” discussed above. Indeed, the 
way in which oil was utilized caused the merchants to withdraw from politics in 
exchange for wealth, and this was accompanied by “new ties between the ruler ... and 
members of the ruling family through new political and bureaucratic roles, and 
between the ruler and the national population, through social services and benefits” 
(Crystal, 1992: 1). Thus, continuity was achieved “only by forcing the breakdown of 
the old ruling coalition and catalyzing the formation of a new pattern of political 
control” (Crystal, 1992: 1). This was “not the result of idiosyncratic local factors”, 
Crystal asserts, “but a patterned, recurring response to oil” (Crystal, 1992: 1-2). 
Therefore, her analysis seems to be based on the same notion prevalent in the rentier 
state literature that policies undertaken by rulers are predominantly designed to 
reinforce their position. “The rulers”, Crystal contends, “have been careful to 
distribute revenues in politically useful ways. The benefits of oil have tickled down to 
all nationals, even the poorest. They are today healthier, better housed, better 
educated, and better fed than ever before, and they know that the state is directly 
responsible” (Crystal, 1992: 10).  
In relation to Kuwait, Crystal attempts to demonstrate how Abdulla Al Salim, 
Kuwait’s Ruler during the oil boom of the 1950s,  “exacted” “political quiescence” as 
“a price” for his “economic largesse” (Crystal, 1992: 9). He calculatedly did so with 
the different segments of society, whether they were members of his family, 
merchants, or the general population. With the merchants, the Kuwaiti ruler reached a 
“tacit arrangement”: a  “trade of formal power for wealth” (Crystal, 1992: 9). The 
mechanism the Ruler used to augment the merchants’ wealth with the purpose of 
limiting their political power was through “the preservation of the private sector” and 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of the thesis, I will focus on her analysis of Kuwait. 
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by agreeing “to distribute revenues through the local market and to legitimate the 
merchants’ position through a free enterprise ideology” (Crystal, 1992: 75). Among 
other policies the Ruler instituted for the same purpose, was that “[f]oreign companies 
wanting access to state or private business had to go through Kuwaitis” (Crystal, 
1992: 76).  
However, notes Crystal (1992: 78), “[t]he arrangement with the merchants was a 
temporary solution, an armistice imposed by the Shaikh while he tried to develop 
other allies and broaden his support base”. To this end,  
Abdalla first tried to buy support or at least acquiescence of the poorer 
Kuwaitis through mass-based distributive policies...in the early 1950s 
development focused on infrastructure and basic services: roads, water, 
electricity, hospitals, schools. The 1951 plan, for all its faults, guided the 
city’s growth for a decade. Under it the first distillation and power plants 
were built, as well as many roads, schools, mosques, and other projects 
begun. These benefits were directed at and indeed reached the poorest 
Kuwaitis. Health care, and education, provided without charge, became 
accessible to all families (Crystal, 1992:, 78).  
Moreover, “a social affairs department was established, providing low income 
housing and job programs for the unemployed” (Crystal 1992, 78). While these were 
all significant, it was state employment that was “the most important distributive 
mechanism...” (Crystal, 1992: 78).  
Nationals are also guaranteed state jobs and preferential treatment in salaries 
and position. Consequently, most nationals work for the state...State 
employment is but another means for distributing income to nationals 
(Crystal, 1992: 11). 
As suggested, therefore, the preferential treatment of Kuwaitis is seen in the context 
of the Ruler seeking to reinforce his position. The government in fact went on “[t]o 
maintain an aura of privilege around these new entitlements” by institutionalizing 
such preferential treatment through a series of nationality laws. To this end, “[t]he 
government enacted stricter nationality laws to regulate the special treatment of 
Kuwaitis” (Crystal, 1992: 79). By the end of the 1950s, concludes Crystal, the Ruler 
achieved success: “He had bought the merchants’ support and the general 
acquiescence of the population through distributive policies” (Crystal, 1992: 83). 
Finally, in line with the general literature, the political liberalization process 
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witnessed in Kuwait are dismissed by Crystal. The National Assembly’s “first 
function”, she asserts, “was to reinforce the division in Kuwaiti politics between the 
ruling family and the rest of the population”, and its “second function was to draw a 
distinction between the merchants and other politically important groups and to serve 
as a vehicle for balancing and, in part, replacing them with new, more controllable 
allies” (Crystal, 1992: 85).  
2.3. CONCLUSION 
This study contends that the rentier state literature’s framework of understanding the 
political and economic development of rentier states is extremely narrow and fails to 
capture the deeper and more complex reasons behind policy decisions in the oil rich 
Arab Gulf. What is needed is a shift in focus. Indeed, a closer examination of the 
perceptions and ideas behind post-oil economic and political policies in their cultural, 
traditional, and historical context is very much called for. This context would not only 
include domestic but also international factors that had played a significant role in 
shaping the attitudes of policy-makers towards the importance of undertaking certain 
decisions. Understanding these different dimensions can be achieved through an 
analysis of the available documentation not only of the British government which was 
itself deeply involved in the policy-making process – and indeed has the most 
thorough archive documenting the daily progression of events – but also of Kuwaiti 
official institutions together with an examination of the writings and discussions of 
Kuwaiti policy-makers. Examples of the latter include the Minutes of the Constituent 
Assembly which prescribed the Kuwaiti economic and political system, the Minutes 
of the Development Board which coordinated and supervised development, reports by 
the Department of Social Affairs, and various independent writings by Kuwaiti 
contemporaries. In sum, while this research does not dismiss political interests behind 
post-oil policy decisions, it presents a new and deeper dimension to the development 
of Kuwait into a rentier constitutional state.  
Before examining the policies undertaken during the oil boom of the 1950s, however, 
it is essential to look at the background against which oil revenues started to pour into 
the state. Oil did not arrive in a vacuum, and pre-existing structures and experiences 
naturally had a fundamental effect on how its revenues were eventually utilized. The 




CHAPTER 3  




Kuwait is a state situated on the northwestern shore of the Arab Gulf. Little is known 
about the ancient history of the area that became Kuwait. In fact, little is known about 
Kuwait’s early days of existence as well. Accounts from travelers and oral traditions 
are the main sources of reference. Therefore, much speculation goes on in writings on 
the topic. However, it is largely accepted that sometime during the seventeenth 
century settlers of the Utubs, a sect of the tribe of Aniza that included the Al Sabah, 
arrived in Kuwait. During the time of their arrival, the Bani Khalid clan enjoyed 
dominance over the area. Due to both regional and intra-tribal factors, this dominance 
slowly dwindled. The Bani Utub, meanwhile, were able to gradually establish their 
independence.  
During the seventeen-fifties, the Bani Utub chose Sabah I as Shaikh. Scholars differ 
over the reason why Sabah was chosen as ruler. Moreover, it is not clear exactly why, 
even though Sabah I was chosen as ruler on an individual level, the Al Sabah emerged 
as a hereditary ruling family. This is only subject to judgment. All that is clear is that 
the Sabah rise to rule was peaceful, which makes Kuwait a unique case in the region.  
Until 1886, the succession of Al Sabah shaikhs was peaceful as well. However, in 
May of that year, Mubarak assassinated his two brothers and declared himself Ruler. 
There is no evidence to suggest that there were explicit objections or effective 
opposition to Mubarak’s actions by Kuwaitis, except inner-family feuds resulting 
from the assassination. This may be seen to reflect the fact that the business of ruling 
was by now a family issue. In 1899, Mubarak consolidated his rule by signing a 
protection agreement with Britain.1 According to the Treaty, Mubarak agreed that 
neither he nor his heirs and successors would “receive the agent or representative of 
                                                 
1 For details on the Agreement, see Slot, 2005: 88-115. 
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any Power or Government at Koweit, or any other place within the limits of his 
territory”, and agreed “not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for 
any other purpose, any portion of his territory” to any other power without prior 
British authorization (see Appendix 3.1 for full text of Agreement). The British, in 
return, promised their good offices towards him and his heirs, and agreed to pay him 
15,000 Rupees on the condition that he abide by the agreement and keep it secret.  
Arguably, this Treaty was the principal factor by which Kuwait was able to survive as 
an independent entity under Al Sabah rule. Not only did the Treaty protect Kuwait 
from hostile foreign powers, it also significantly bolstered the strength of the Ruler 
vis-à-vis the people. Thus, while the Treaty did not stipulate Britain’s interference in 
domestic affairs, it naturally gave it great influence in the internal dynamics of 
Kuwaiti society as is clearly reflected below.  
It should be noted that the discussion in this chapter (and the following chapters) is 
primarily based on research of archival documents of the British Public Records and 
citations are made accordingly. 
3.2. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 
Since its beginnings, Kuwait was already oriented towards trade and the sea. Its 
natural harbor, strategic location, and poverty of land made the sea Kuwait’s major 
lifeline. Its location enabled it to benefit from caravan trade to Baghdad and Aleppo, 
from Shatt al-Arab trade, and smuggling trade into the Ottoman territories (Crystal, 
1992: 19).   
In 1760, the German traveler Carteten Niebur described Kuwait as a thriving 
commercial port of around 10,000 inhabitants sustaining itself on pearling, trading, 
and fishing with about 800 boats (Ismael, 1993: 22; Bowen, 1951: 3). By the early 
1800s, the traveler Buckingham described Kuwait as “chiefly inhabited by mercantile 
and trading people, who engage in all branches of commerce throughout the Gulf. The 
port sends out, at least, a hundred sail of vessels, large and small; and the people who 
navigate them…have the highest character for probity, skill, firmness, and courage” 
(quoted in Crystal, 1992: 19). 
In 1863, the British Political Resident described Kuwait as “a clean town, with a 
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broad and open main bazaar, and numerous solid stone dwelling houses stretching 
along this strand, and containing some 20,000 inhabitants, attracting Arab and Persian 
merchants from all quarters by the equity of its rule and by the freedom of its trade” 
(quoted in Crystal, 1992: 19). 
Pearling and trade were by far the dominant economic activities. Generally, the main 
pearling season would start from May or early June to about September, and then 
again for a shorter period during the winter months. Pearling was Kuwait’s major 
source of capital and attraction of labor. In 1905 for instance, the Administrative 
Report noted that almost half the population went to pearl fishing.2 As Lorimer 
pointed out in 1915, “[p]earl fishing is the premier industry of the Persian Gulf; it is, 
besides being the occupation most peculiar to that region, the principal or only source 
of wealth among the residents of the Arabian side. Were the supply of pearls to fails, 
the trade of Kuwait would be severely crippled…” (quoted in Carter, 2005: 139-40).3 
In winter long-distance trading was the main economic activity. Boats would start off 
the season in autumn by heading to the region of Basrah, where Kuwaitis would 
usually buy dates and then proceed to sell them in India. The money made would be 
used to purchase and trade in diverse commodities, such as timber, rice, sugar, spices, 
etc. A report on shipping described the industry in 1928 as follows:  
The carrying trade is chiefly confined to India, but Kuwait vessels also 
sometimes visit Zanzibar, Aden, Jibuti, the Red Sea ports, etc. Long 
voyages are only made during the winter months. During the summer, when 
the monsoon would render it dangerous for them to leave the Persian Gulf, 
the large cargo vessels are laid up in Kuwait, either in the various niq’ahs, 
or tidal harbours, or at Bandar Ash-Shuwaikh to the west of the town. The 
smaller vessels are employed in the coasting trade within the Persian Gulf, 
the smallest plying almost exclusively between Kuwait and the Shatt al-
Arab.4  
 
Around this activity a vibrant boat construction industry boomed, and Kuwaiti built 
                                                 
2 ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency’ for 1905-1906, p. 87, in The Persian 
Gulf Administration Reports, vol. VI. 
3 It must be said, however, that unlike other Gulf countries, Kuwait reliance on pearling as a major 
source of currency was tamed by its strategic location on the route between the Gulf and Basra, being 
Mesopotamia's leading entrepot, and thus had an important carrying trade (Carter, 2005: 181). 
4 IOR/R/15/1/504: Political Agency report on shipping, c. 1928, p. 13. 
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ships became renowned for their superior quality. They were the best boats built in 
the Gulf.5 Many other activities that developed were also intimately connected with 
pearling. These included sail-making, manufacture of shark’s oil, import of wood, 
etc.6  
Kuwait’s orientation towards the sea both reflected and reinforced the social hierarchy 
and power structure of its society. The system progressively concentrated wealth in 
the hands of a few merchants and placed much of the population under their 
influence, and many times, their control. This is primarily a result of the finance 
structure of its major economic activities, especially pearling, combined with the way 
in which earnings were shared amongst the various beneficiaries.  
As Carter states, “[t]he industry operated on borrowed capital. Pearl-divers, captains 
and crew were advanced money to equip the boats and provide for themselves until 
the proceeds of the dive were allocated at the end of the season, when they were 
expected to repay the debts…A bad season inevitably led to the debts being carried 
forward” (Carter, 2005: 142). If the indebted person died, his heirs would inherit the 
debt (Al-Ghanim, 1998: 27).  
The distribution of the pearling proceeds was based on a share system, most common 
of which was the System of Fifths. The financier and owner of the boat each got one 
fifth. The financier would get, depending on source, 20 or 30 percent interest on the 
capital he advanced, and the captain was still indebted for the principal.7 Only after 
their earnings were given out does the cost of the whole expedition be taken into 
account. After deduction of these costs, the shares are distributed to the captain and 
the crew according to occupation. The taxes, furthermore, would fall upon the crews’ 
share (Al-Rushaid, 1978: 77; Ismael, 2005: 61).  
The system kept the merchants at the very top (see Al-Ghanim, 1998: 23). These were 
wealthy families who were generally of the same background. They mainly 
intermarried amongst themselves and with the ruling family. Tied to merchants by the 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1932’, p. 52, in The Persian Gulf 
Administration Reports, vol. IX; ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1933’, p. 61, 
in The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, vol. IX. 
7 IOR/R/15/5/97: Political Agent, Kuwait, to Political Resident, Bushire, 11 April 1924; 
IOR/R/15/5/96: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Agent, Bahrain, 3 March 1923; also see Al-
Ghanim, 1998, 27. 
 42 
finance structure were the ‘nakhudas’, or captains, who in the same way had pearl 
divers and sailors under their wing. The different periods of the year in which pearling 
and seafaring are carried out combined with the structure of finance meant that the 
labor for both industries was not mutually exclusive. Thus, a pearl diver who is tied to 
a captain by pearling debts, for example, may be recalled to join the latter’s seafaring 
voyage as well.   
This concentration of wealth and these social dynamics had clear effects on the power 
structure between the Ruler and the people. Put simply, the relationship amongst the 
various groups of society placed some check on the Ruler’s power. This took place in 
two fundamental ways. First, the material wealth of the state and the Ruler depended 
to a large extent on the monies derived from the merchants’ trade through customs, 
taxation, levies, etc. Secondly, a major portion of the population itself was under the 
influence of the merchants, which made their negotiating power vis-à-vis the ruler 
much more powerful.  
3.2.1.… Put to the Test… 
The dynamics of this relationship was put to the test in 1910. For years, Mubarak had 
been increasing all sorts of demands on the population. Forced levies for service 
against Bedouin tribes, enhanced custom’s dues, heavy exactions on Hajj pilgrims, 
and a House Tax were all imposed on a disgruntled population. Money was also 
sometimes extracted from the people to finance private Ruling family luxuries such as 
inter-Sabah wedding celebrations.8 In 1910, however, the patience of some of the 
merchants reached its limits. The chief reason was Mubarak’s heavy exactions to 
finance his raid on the Sadun al Muntifik tribe. In doing so, the Administration Report 
noted,  
The contributions required from the Kuwait towns-people were increased 
and even the prostitutes were called up to contribute bedding, coffee-pots 
and the like. The wealthier merchants had to supply tents, camels, arms, and 
men and maintain them pending further orders...there is no doubt that a very 
                                                 
8 See ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency for 1906-1907’,p. 76 in The 
Persian Gulf Administration Reports, vol. VI.; Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political 
Residency for 1907-1908’, p. 107, in The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, vol. VI.; 
‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency for April-December 1908’, p. 102, in 
The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, vol. VI.; ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf 
Political Residency for 1910’, p. 97, in The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, vol. VI. 
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large amount of Kuwait capital has been destroyed in these preparations. 
The force was kept out in the desert all through the hot weather and winter, 
their upkeep being a constant drain on the merchants’ pockets.9 
Moreover, the requirements to maintain the force “absorbed all local stocks of camel 
equipment, arms and clothes with the result that prices rose quite 20 to 30 per cent. It 
was estimated that, apart from the initial cost of fitting out, the force was costing the 
Kuwait public some $60,000 a month in wages and food”.10 To make matters worse, 
the pearling season was postponed, as Mubarak stopped for a while “all work on boats 
and impressed al Nakhudas and divers for his raid against the Muntafik”.11 The few 
complaints that were made to Mubarak by the merchants were only met with even 
more severe reactions, and only months later were the pearlers permitted to return to 
work, “their places in the raiding force being taken by hired men”.12 
Therefore, reaching a state of hopelessness in changing the Shaikh’s ways, three of 
the richest pearl merchants decided to emigrate. After quietly moving their valuables 
from Kuwait, they let it be known that “they would not return themselves…and that 
also probably some 200 boats with their crews would be missing from the returning 
fleet”.13 Their grievances were, as suggested, predominantly of a financial nature. As 
two of them (“the richest and perhaps most important in Kowiet … who said they 
spoke for themselves and two other Towashes or pearl merchants, also amongst the 
most important, the nakhudas and crews of their own boats and of those dependent on 
them for financial support”) explained to the Political Agent,  
having to find a large number (more than fair proportion) of fighting men, 
camels, tents, rifles, ammunition, and food for the Sheikh’s raid in March 
last… what bore most hardly on them was the continued expense of 
maintaining these for months on end (more than six months already) with no 
visible prospect of an early cessation.14  
They said “they were at the end of their tether and unless some alleviation was 
forthcoming bankruptcy was their certain end”. 15  Having reached Bahrain, the 
                                                 
9 ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency for 1910’, p. 97, in The Persian Gulf 




13 IOR/R/15/5/18: Note on tour along pearl banks to Bahrain by Political Agent, Kuwait, 2 September 




merchants agreed not to return to Kuwait unless Mubarak accepted their conditions: 
“they should be relieved of the indefinitely continued expense of keeping up a force 
for reprisals on Sheikh Sadun, as the drain on capital was seriously crippling their 
industry”.16 
From the above, the hold the pearl merchants had not only on material capital, but 
also on the lives of ordinary people, is clear. The merchants had to provide not only 
material support, but also “fighting men” to Mubarak’s force. When the merchants 
left, many of these men followed, and others would have eventually done so. To gain 
support, Hilal Mutairi, the richest pearl merchant, is said to have also promised some 
of them that he would have their debts dropped provided they remain with him, and 
also “to build new houses for them at his own cost before he builds one for 
himself'”.17  
While it is true that they were not able to change the Shaikh’s ways and therefore 
were forced to emigrate, the merchants’ importance to the viability of the Kuwaiti 
state soon became evident. The British recognized that the incident was extremely 
serious, as “the whole of the available wealth and capital in Kowait is derived from 
the pearl industry”. “The four towashes concerned represent some 25 to 50 lakhs of 
rupees in capital and probably have some financial hold direct or indirect over some 
250-500 boats and perhaps 6000 to 8000 men”, explained the Political Agent.18 “It 
can be imagined”, he noted, “what effect the displacement of this large amount of 
capital and population (for the men would follow their leading towashes very shortly) 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 1. 
17 IOR/R/15/5/18: Kuwait news for week ending 31st August 1910. Interestingly, one of the early 
documented problems regarding the granting of oil concessions was its perceived clash with this 
economic system in which merchants yielded power over much of the population. In 1925, Anglo –
Persian Oil Company (A.P.O.C.) sent A F Williamson (Hajji Abdulla al-Musulmani) to Kuwait, to 
investigate why there was objection to granting them a concession (see IOR/R/15/5/238: More, 
Political Agent, Kuwait to Prideaux, Political Resident, Bushire, 17 January 1925). In his report, 
Williamson's results included the following: 
One party (the smallest) are against the giving of any oil concession to any Company, 
A.P.O.C. or another. There consist of rich pearl merchants such as HILAL al UMTAIRI, 
whose whole fortune was made through the pearl fisheries. These consider that at present 
the Kowiet diving class are unable to earn any large monies in the intervals between the 
pearl-diving seasons and are forced to borrow from the merchants long before the season 
opens and therefore are always in debt and under the thumb of these merchants and that if 
the A.P.O.C. or another Company opens up oil fields at Koweit or near by the diving class 
would be enabled to earn money between seasons and so get out of debt and command their 
own prices (IOR/R/15/5/238: Report on Kuwait by Williamson, 22 January 1925). 
18 IOR/R/15/5/18: Note on tour along pearl banks to Bahrain by Political Agent, Kuwait, 2 September 
1910, pp. 4-5. 
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would have on the commercial prosperity of the port of Koweit”.19 Indeed, the 
Political Agent urged Mubarak to compromise. For his part, Mubarak realized “how 
their staying away would damage him and his town”, and therefore decided to do so, 
while the merchants only agreed to return after definite guarantees that he would not 
harm them or their property.20 
The results of the merchants’ actions were soon evident, as soon after he spoke with 
Mubarak, the Political Agent wrote, “I hear the Sheikh is now most gracious in 
returning salutes of passers-by and things are like mother’s milk generally. I only 
suggested it would be politic to go easy with all a bit and he seems to have cottoned to 
that”.21 Likewise, another report noted that the “Shaikh is said to have become very 
tame and courteous after the trouble of the Towashis and pearlers and is now ever 
ready to listen to reason and to help”.22 As for the people, it was reported that there 
were “heartily glad and say that the time has at last come for the Shaikh to learn a 
lesson and to put a stop to further injustice and tyranny”.23 
The events of 1910 are often cited to show how much influence the merchants 
wielded before oil. However, whereas the events do indeed reflect the value of the 
merchants to Kuwait, they also reflect the fact that they did not have a direct or formal 
say in how things were run. Their only choice was, therefore, exit – leave the country 
with their belongings in fear Mubarak’s reprisals. In other words, the value of the 
merchants did not translate itself into an evolution of administrative channels through 
which their voices would be effective in formulating policy. Moreover, the 
merchants’ actions could not be described in any meaningful sense as a movement for 
political reform. Their concern was primarily of a financial nature, and their goal was 
predominantly to be relieved from certain heavy exactions. 
It is open to discussion why such a potentially reformist movement did not actually 
take shape. His autocratic rule may have been offset by the stability Kuwait and it’s 
boundaries witnessed during Mubarak’s rule. He was respected amongst regional 
powers and much of his rule saw vibrant economic activity. As the Political Agent 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20 IOR/R/15/5/18: Political Agent, Kuwait to MacKenzie, Bahrain, 12 September 1910; 
IOR/R/15/5/18: Bahrain diary for week ending 9 September 1910. 
21 IOR/R/15/5/18: Political Agent, Kuwait to MacKenzie, Bahrain, 12 September 1910. 
22 IOR/R/15/5/18: Bahrain diary for week ending 9 September 1910. 
23 IOR/R/15//5/18: Kuwait News for week ending 31 August 1910. 
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noted, it was Mubarak “who raised Kuwait from a place of little importance to a 
flourishing principality. Under his strong rule it became a most attractive place to live 
in to the Arab mind, and the population of the town nearly doubled itself…”.24  
It nevertheless must be noted that the British support afforded to Mubarak was 
probably the major factor allowing him to Rule in the way that he did. In fact, the 
outcomes of the merchants’ actions of 1910 seem to have been short-lived. Under 
British protection, Mubarak was able to continue his despotic rule and place increased 
demands on the population. In 1912, towards the end of Mubarak’s rule, the Political 
Agent wrote, 
The old system under the iron rule of Sheikh Mobarak is rapidly breaking 
down and the wheels turn rustily. The merchant Sheikhs are things of the 
past and the few old survivals dare not call their souls their own. This would 
not signify if the Sheikh himself was beyond reproach. But a good year or 
two in the pearl trade and the sudden increase of revenue from the 
importation of arms have revealed in him a hitherto unsuspected taste for 
luxury and ostentatious display. The taxes are still low but have increased 
rapidly of past years and new extortionate demands have been levied on the 
people…At present the people, who complain continually, look to us as 
their deliverers. It will be an unpleasant moment for us when they arrive at a 
justed view of the situation and realize that it is our support chiefly that has 
enabled and will enable Sheikh Mobarak’s despotism to flourish and taught 
him that he need no longer re(p)ly on the affections of his people and their 
confidence in his strength, wealth and justice.25 
 
3.3. THE CHANGING NATURE OF POLITICS  
In 1915, Mubarak was succeeded by his son Jabir, who he had nominated before his 
death. The succession was largely an internal Sabah matter, the process of which was 
helped by Khazaal of Muhammareh, close friend of Mubarak.26 Salim then succeeded 
Jabir in 1917, promptly taking command on his own initiative upon his brother’s 
death.27 In both cases, ‘recognition and support’ by the British Government was the 
primary concern, which was afforded after promises of obedience to the British and 
                                                 
24 CO732/33/10: Note on the Principality of Kuwait prepared for Political Resident, Bushire by More, 
Political Agent, Kuwait, 1927, p. 2. 
25 IOR/R/15/5/18: Political Agent, Kuwait, 25 April 1912. Emphasis added. 
26 IOR/R/15/5/59: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 3 December 1915; 
IOR/R/15/1/512: Political Resident, Bushire to Government of India, Foreign Department, 5 December 
1915; IOR/R/15/5/59: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 11 December 1915. 
27 IOR/R/15/5/19: Political Agent, Kuwait to Sir Percy Cox, Basra, 6 February1917, p. 1. 
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commitments to all agreements reached between Britain and Mubarak.28  
It was Salim’s reign that prompted the beginnings of a serious and concerted political 
reform movement in Kuwait that was to have a lasting resonance with the people up 
to the present day. Local feeling had turned against Salim from different sectors of 
society for diverse reasons. These included economic, social and political issues.  
By 1918, the Political Agent noted that there seemed to be “widespread dissatisfaction 
with Shaikh Salim’s method of Government”.29 Salim, according to the Agent, was 
“hated” for reasons including his negative attitude towards the merchant’s problems 
in relation to their trade, “his culpable neglect in investigating and punishing crime, 
even murder, the futility of his general methods of Government and his boorish 
manners towards his people”.30  
Ill feelings towards Salim only increased with time as problems resulting from his 
“incapacity as a ruler and great lack of tact” compounded.31 The British themselves 
started having problems with him. The chief reason was Salim’s policies regarding 
the control of arms being smuggled via Kuwait to Turkey and British/Saudi enemy 
lines. The British, greatly displeased, therefore instituted a blockade on Kuwait for a 
while, and gave Salim strong warnings, stating to him that their protection was based 
on his cooperation.32  
Salim’s domestic and foreign policies, thus, caused discontent among his local 
population, the British, and, importantly, Ibn Saud. Salim’s numerous quarrels with 
the latter resulted in a loss of trade with Saudi controlled territories, desert raids, and 
later an armed attack on Jahra, a Kuwaiti town, in which the state barely survived.33 
                                                 
28 IOR/R/15/5/59: Political Agent, Kuwaity to Political Resident, Bushire, 3 December 1915; 
IOR/R/15/5/59: Translation of letter from Ruler of Kuwait to Lord Hardinge, 23 March 1916; 
IOR/R/15/5/59: Letter from Viceroy to Ruler of Kuwait, 26 February 1916; IOR/R/15/5/19: Shaikh 
Salim as Subah, Ruler of Kuwait to Political Agent, Kuwait 9 February 1917; IOR/R/15/1/513: Letter 
from Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Shaikh Salim as Subah, 28 February, 1917.  
 
29 IOR/R/15/5/102: Political Agent, Kuwait to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 19 September 1918, p. 1. 
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 IOR/R/15/5/94: Political Agent, Kuwait to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 28 August 1920. 
32 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1918’, pp. 58-61, in The Persian Gulf 
Administration Reports, vol. VII. 
33 IOR/R/15/5/25: Political Agent, Bahrain to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 6 April 1920; 
IOR/R/15/5/25: Political Agent, Bahrain to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 21 April 1920; for more 
details of problems between Ibn Saud and Salim also see Khazaal, 1962: 189, vol 4; Al-Rushaid, 1978: 
244. 
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Were it not for British intervention, it is arguable that Kuwait would have not made it. 
Salim soon died on February 22, 1921. Reflecting on his reign, the Political Agent 
wrote that Salim “was almost entirely to blame for his quarrel with Ibn Sa’ud and all 
the sorrow that it brought Kuwait, and in short he did nearly as much harm to the 
State, as his father had done good. He died suddenly… to the undisguised joy of 
nearly all his subjects”.34 
One important result of Salim’s rule was that it sparked the beginnings of a politically 
conscious reform movement in the country. Before his death, the Political Agent 
reported that he believed “much revolutionary talk” was “going on, all wanting to be 
rid of Salim”, and a majority favoring Ahmad as successor.35 In fact, several people 
approached the American Mission doctor for private advice as to the possibility of 
getting Salim deposed.36 The situation was grave enough for the Agent to have 
thought that it was “quite probable” that Hamad Al Sagar, the influential merchant 
who “had a very bitter hatred against the late Shaikh Salim on account of the needless 
wars he had inflicted upon Kuwait…would have brought about a revolution before 
long if Shaikh Salim had not died when he did – he had already sounded the Political 
Agent as to the possibility petitioning Government to depose him”.37 Likewise, noted 
Laithwaite in 1928, “it would appear that a coup d’etat was more than a possibility 
had not the Sheikh died at a critical period of the Koweit-Nejd boundary negotiations 
on 23rd February 1921”.38  
3.3.1. The Rise of Political Participation 
In this context, leading merchants initiated the first concerted effort in demanding 
political reform immediately after Salim’s burial. The Political Agent described the 
situation at the time as follows: 
Immediately after the burial of Sheikh Salim which took place 
yesterday, a large number of leading inhabitant collected and decided 
                                                 
34 CO732/33/10: Note on the Principality of Kuwait prepared for Political Resident, Bushire by More, 
Political Agent, Kuwait, 1927, p. 3; also see Khazaal, 1962: 317, vol. 4. 
35 IOR/R/15/5/94: Telegram from Political Agent, Kuwait to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 28 August 
1920. 
36 Ibid. 
37 CO732/33/10: Note on the Principality of Kuwait prepared for Political Resident, Bushire by More, 
Political Agent, Kuwait, 1927, p. 3. 
38 IOR/L/PS/18/B395: Koweit, 1908-1928 by Laithwaite, India Office, 1 October 1928, p. 13. 
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to stop any factious fighting among members of the Subah family or 
other troubles which might arise. They also decided on insisting on 
there being a Medglis, and that they would not accept another absolute 
ruler. This afternoon they proceeded to the palace and informed 
Abdulla, Hamad al Mubarak and others of the family that they were 
determined to have some say in affairs in future, and they are not going 
to be driven in to wars against their will as have been in the past. The 
al Subah apparently agreed to this.39    
Then, they presented a document to the Al Sabah family in which they laid out their 
demands, including the formation of an elected Advisory Council over which the new 
Ruler, chosen out of the three candidates, would preside.40 Ahmad Al Jabir arrived 
one month after Salim’s burial, on March 24, 1921, and was accepted as Ruler only 
after reaching an agreement with the ‘notables’ of Kuwait whereby he had to form a 
council as a condition of his election to the position.  
The council that was formed, however, did not function properly and died very 
quickly mainly as a result of internal disputes amongst its members. Although short 
lived, this council set a precedent, and opened the door for a new era of Kuwait’s 
historical development in which formal participation in government was now part of 
the political conscience. Although the state of affairs went back to personal rule, a 
vibrant intellectual, cultural and political environment started to develop among the 
elite. In 1921, a new school was established with an aim to modernize Kuwait’s 
education. The following year a public library was founded; the merchants also 
created a Literary Club in which numerous lively public events took place.  
Importantly, in 1930, the Ruler accepted the merchants’ request for an elected 
Municipality, which became very active in bringing about improvements to the Town. 
The Kuwait Administration Report for 1933 noted that “[t]he general improvement 
and high standard of cleanliness and sanitation which the Municipal authorities set 
themselves to bring about three years ago, has been maintained in remarkable fashion 
during 1933. Kuwait today is believed to be the cleanest Town in the whole of the 
Persian Gulf, and is well ahead of Basra and Mohammerah in this respect”.41 
                                                 
39 IOR/R/15/1/513: Political Agent, Kuwait to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 24 February 1921. 
40 The three candidates were Hamad al Mubarak, Abdulla Al Salim, and Ahmad Al Jabir  See 
IOR/R/15/1/513: Telegram from High Commissioner, Baghdad to Secretary of State for India, 1 March 
1921. 
41 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1933’, p. 60, in The Persian Gulf 
Administration Reports, vol. IX. 
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Moreover, elections for a second council, the Education Council, took place in 1936, 
which aimed at modernizing and supervising education. In fact, this may be seen as 
the beginnings of public schooling in Kuwait. The budget allocated for the purposes 
of both the Municipality and the Education Council, it must be noted, was through an 
agreed increment added to the customs tax that was to be dedicated specifically for 
them.42   
These were the first elected councils Kuwait had experienced, albeit elections limited 
to certain merchant families. They proved to be of great importance in creating the 
kind of political consciousness that eventually led to an effective reformist movement. 
They involved the merchants in the daily issues of the town, and placed them in a 
position where they had to deal, compete, and wrestle with entrenched interests and 
different power centers in Kuwait (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 10). Ultimately, 
leading members of these councils clashed with the Ruler. In protest over certain 
decisions by the latter, they decided to resign from all official posts they had held, and 
eventually began an effective campaign calling for more general and serious reforms 
(Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 18-20).  
By March 1938, writings on the walls started to appear harshly attacking the Ruler 
and his administration.43 These developments led to the brutal public flogging of 
Mohammad Al Barrak, member of the movement, only to increase tensions further. 
As the Political Agent noted, “[t]he dislike of the Ruler and his administration has 
crystallized in the last few days, as a result of flogging… of… al Barrak, guilty of 
anonymous wall writings, ante-autocratic propaganda and intrigues”. 44 These 
circumstances prompted the group of merchants to form a secret party that led a 
concerted and effective reformist campaign. Most important of the merchant’s 
demands was the formation of an elected legislative council (Khaled Al Adsani, 
undated: 25). This, they achieved. 
                                                 
42 The increments to the customs tax were agreed by the merchants. The merchants used the fact that 
the Ruler would not have to pay for such public services from the state budget already in his possession 
as a way to convince him to agree to setting up these councils (Khalid Al Adsani, undated: 15). 
43 This was believed to be a result of the Ruler’s ‘propaganda’, through an Italian radio station (Bari 
Radio Station), which broadcasted news about the ‘great conditions’ existing in Kuwait, sparking a 
sharp angry reaction. In fact, the writings on the wall followed a long and detailed article in an Iraqi 
newspaper, Al Kifah, responding to what were deemed fabrications and ‘lies’ by the station, and 
expressing great anger at this propaganda. See IOR/R/15/5/205: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political 
Resident, Bushire, 4 March 1938. 
44 IOR/R/15/5/205: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 19 March 1938. 
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3.3.2. Sources of Political Change 
The strength and effectiveness of the merchants’ campaign was a result of different 
factors. The first was regional. Most importantly, the developments in Iraq with the 
crowning of King Ghazi and his ‘progressive’ politics inspired many elements in 
Kuwait. The merchants involved, after all, were dedicated Arab Nationalists, and they 
have had for many years deep ties with Iraq.45 Members of the movement visited Iraq, 
met officials and politicians, cultural societies etc., and also campaigned for support. 
King Ghazi openly supported the movement, and the Iraq media played a crucial role 
in boosting the standing and morale of the merchants. Iraqi media was in fact the 
main outlet through which the Kuwaiti opposition could effectively voice their 
opinions.46 The significance of the Iraqi position to the success of the merchants’ 
campaign had led the Political Agent to comment: “What stands out is that Iraqi 
propaganda working on the minds of merchants and town youths of necessarily 
limited vision (many of whom have been in increasingly poor circumstances, owing 
to the Saudi Blockade and the drop in the pearl market) is mainly responsible for what 
occurred”.47 
The second important source of strength, as hinted above, was economic. Shortly after 
Ahmad assumed power, Ibn Saud imposed a crippling embargo on Kuwait, whereby 
none of the subjects under his control was to purchase anything from the country. 
This was due to disputes relating to customs. The embargo was maintained 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in what the Kuwait Administration Report for 1931 
described as a “process of strangulation”.48 This, combined with a dampening pearl 
trade and a depressed world market towards the end of the 1920s, caused Kuwait’s 
economy to suffer and eventually swirl down into a state poverty.  
In fact, signs of the hard times were already being seen in the early 1920s. In 1926, 
for instance, pearl divers held a strike due to low advances by the merchants after “an 
extremely bad season in 1925”.49 The pearling season of 1926 “was quite one of the 
                                                 
45 Ibid. Many Kuwaiti merchants had for many decades vast areas of agricultural land in Southern Iraq 
and had therefore frequented the country on a regular basis. 
46 IOR/R/15/5/205: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 19 March 1938. 
47 IOR/R/15/5/206: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 12 March 1939. 
48 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1931’, p. 55, in The Persian Gulf 
Administration Reports, vol. IX. 
49 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf for 1926’, p. 39, in The Persian Gulf Administration 
 52 
worst on record”, and “the pearl market too is extraordinarily bad, and at the end of 
the year the biggest merchant in Kuwait had two years’ stock of pearls in hand”.50 
Although the problems were not acute, and although the pearl market improved in 
1927 and 1928, the Kuwait economy soon crashed into a dire state of depression. 
In 1931, the Kuwait Administration Report noted that the “closeness” of the Saudi 
blockade, “coupled with the complete failure of the 1931 Kuwait Pearl Season, for the 
third year in succession, has reduced Kuwait to… a state of poverty and economic 
distress”.51 Revenues to the state were again “disastrous” for the country.52 In 1935, it 
was reported that the pearling boats which went out to sea were about 250, a marked 
contrast from about 750 “in the hey day of pearling in the years just after the Great 
War of 1914-1918”.53  
A depressed pearl market, Kuwait’s major industry, naturally had spill-over effects 
onto other sectors of the economy that were “sympathetically affected” by its 
prosperity, such as boat-building, sail-making, and manufacture of shark’s oil.54 This 
also applied to “a dozen other industries such as rope making, copper nail 
manufacture, and the import of wood, spars, etc…”.55 
For instance, in 1934, the boat building industry remained stagnant “almost entirely 
due to the continued depression in the pearl trade”.56 Out of some 700 boats able to go 
to sea, only 277 were reported to have actually gone to the banks.57  Likewise, in 1935 
the boat building industry was still being reported to have “remained very low owing 
to the slump in the pearl market and resultant decrease in pearl diving”.58  
The consequences of these economic conditions on the population were extremely 
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painful. By 1932, a marked increase in the number of pearl bankruptcies were 
witnessed. The poorer classes of the population, however, were the hardest hit. 
“Among those,” noted the Administration Report, “Bedouin elements as opposed to 
Townsmen who were immediately dependent on the prosperity of the Town, and who 
had usually provided about 30 per cent of the divers, the conditions were worse than 
the writer has even known them before. A few literally died from starvation, and with 
the general lowering of stamina all round tuberculosis to which the tribal man is 
particularly susceptible, made great inroads carrying off many”.59 Among the lower 
classes of the Townmen, “[s]uffering and acute want… was a new and pathetic 
feature, and showed itself in the form of gangs of beggars, who began to roam the 
town”.60 Poverty continued to be “a feature of the Towns life” for some years.61 These 
conditions, coupled with much corruption that was being witnessed, naturally fed the 
opposition movement with disgruntled supporters.  
The third major source of the success of the opposition in achieving a legislative 
council was the role of the British. The British had realized the seriousness of the 
situation Kuwait was going through. The Political Resident described it as a “popular 
movement” against the Ruler’s administration, indicating “a definite and general 
discontent” with his rule.62 He later expressed his belief that “the movement against 
the Shaikh” was “overpowering, and a trial of strength between the popular party and 
the Ruler, in which the former were certain to have won…whether now or in the 
immediate future”.63  
 
The British therefore became concerned about the effects such a movement would 
have on their interests. They viewed the trouble as potentially having repercussions on 
their reputation and standing in other countries as well as in Kuwait. In fact, one of 
the main reasons for such concerns was the connection the merchants had with Iraq. 
For example, the Political Agent noted the following: 
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There is already an influential group inclined towards progressiveness as 
represented in Iraq, if not to Iraqi government. And it is relevant to say that 
two of the leading Kuwaiti families, owning large estates in Iraq, have, I 
hear, recently come to some sort of understanding with the Iraq government 
about their nationality, and that of their children, in order to safeguard their 
property, in the protection of which they had, as Kuwaitis found themselves 
at a disadvantage.64  
 
Thus, as Peel of the India Office suggested, “[t]here is a risk that if we do nothing to 
remove existing grievances some of the malcontents will look increasingly to Iraq for 
sympathy and encouragement to the detriment of our position in Koweit”.65 Likewise, 
the Political Agent wrote,  
I think to be considered whether silence and inaction on the part of His 
Britannic Majesty’s Government will not be considered, in and outside 
Kuwait, as tantamount to an abdication of our especial position, and 
encourage Iraq and the pro Iraq party in Kuwait, to such an extent that we 
should in face of public opinion soon be unable to maintain our especial 
position.66 
Moreover, in a letter to the Political Agent ordering oral representation to be made to 
the Ruler along its lines, the Resident noted that the British Government “cannot be 
indifferent to serious incidents occurring in that State since owing to their special 
relations with its Ruler, they are in some measure held responsible by the public 
opinion of other countries for the way in which such incidents are dealt with (the 
Ruler will doubtless understand this important point)”.67 
Therefore, the Agent, with instructions from the Resident and in the name of the 
British Government, met with the Ruler to explain the position of the British. The 
Agent first criticized the treatment of Al Barrak, speaking “firmly” that “there was to 
be no repetition of this kind of beating to extract information”.68 More importantly, 
because “[e]xperience has shown that the best way to deal with such movements is 
not mere repression which cannot be continued indefinitely as the movement gets 
stronger”, the Agent suggested to the Ruler that “any new democratic movement 
should be drawn by him into useful channels” of activity, and that he must “associate” 
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himself more both with his family and people in administration.69 
To place further pressure, and to turn the general ideas suggested by the Agent into 
specific actions, the Resident subsequently wrote the Ruler the following: 
  The most important part of this [Agent and Ruler’s] conversation was the 
advice which Captain Degaury gave to your Highness on behalf of His 
Majesty’s Government that you might associate yourself more both with 
your family and with your people in your administration…. It seems to me 
personally that Your Highness might carry this advice into effect by the 
formation of a Council such as your grandfather, the Great Shaikh Mubarak, 
used to have.70 I understood that this Council was formed of some members 
of the Subah Family and some of the heads of the leading families in 
Kuwait…71 
The position of the British was leaked to the merchants, who in turn seized this 
golden opportunity to come out and press the Ruler directly for the formation of a 
council (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 26).72 In a matter of few days, three leading 
merchants presented a letter to the Ruler reminding him that his selection as Ruler 
was “consequent on his agreeing to be advised by a Council” and asking for a 
legislative one to be formed (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 27).73 
It must also be noted here that Abdulla Al Salim, the second most influential member 
of the Ruler family and next Ruler, supported this movement. In fact, even before the 
merchants met the Ruler, Abdulla called on the Political Agent and brought him a 
copy of the original agreement whereby Ahmad had to form a council as a condition 
of his election. He repeated to the Agent that “that an indecisive policy would be 
dangerous and that underground agitation was not lessening”.74 Abdulla, believed the 
Agent, foresaw that the “agitation may turn not only against Sheikh Ahmed but 
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against the whole Ruling family”.75 He was, in the words of the Resident, “shrewd 
enough to trim his sails to the rising wind”.76  
In addition, other members of the ruling family had at the time been very dissatisfied 
with the Ruler due to his ‘stinginess’. As the Political Agent noted,  
...the Subah family are intensely dissatisfied with tiny allowances which the 
Sheikh gives them – in some cases as little as that received by an Agency 
Farrash – and they have in this the sympathy of the notables, since the 
Sheikh allocated to the State or Municipality for public services extremely 
little of his income, which is identical with that of the State. He has saved a 
very large sum and bought estates abroad, and his parsimony is a by-word in 
Kuwait.77 
 
Succumbing to all the pressure, the Ruler agreed to a council, and elections amongst 
certain leading families of Kuwait were held.78 The results were overwhelmingly in 
favor of the opposition, who right away chose their ally, Abdulla Al Salim, as the 
Council’s President. The Ruler was then pressed into signing a law governing the 
powers of the Council (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 32). This law gave it extensive 
legislative powers, basically stripping away all authority from the Shaikh in all areas 
of government.79 
 
3.3.4. The Council and the Shift in the Sources of Power 
The Council commenced its work very actively. It appointed from amongst its 
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members ministers of Finance, Defense, and Works. Among other achievements, it 
eradicated many taxes and duties, cancelled several monopolies, some of which were 
held by the ruling family, and dismissed many officials deemed corrupt. Expectedly, 
therefore, the Council very soon clashed with entrenched interests; most significant of 
all was the Ruler’s Secretary, who had continued his efforts to undermine the Council 
even after its formation (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 43-48).80  
The members were determined to get rid of him, and the Ruler eventually bowed to 
pressure. The Secretary was sent on long leave and left to Iraq.81 The incident, 
however, led to an even bigger rift between the Ruler and the Council members. As 
the Political Agent put it, “any genuine rapprochement between the Sheikh and 
Council… seems very far off, if not quite impossible”.82 There was also growing 
opposition from certain sectors of the population, such as the Ruling family members; 
tribesmen; the Shias, who were not represented in the Council, and who felt, with 
good reason, discriminated against; and those who had lost the privileges they had 
enjoyed prior to the Council’s existence.83  
The Ruler, encouraged by and encouraging such opposition, decided to dissolve the 
Council and call for new and wider elections. The British, for their part, did not 
object. They had expressed their annoyance with the Council’s actions, particularly 
regarding the fact that it had taken control over the arms reserves, which was 
“undesirable” as gave it “far too much power”.84 Moreover, the Resident described the 
“Majlis” as having been “corrupted”, as “at least half of the population of Kuwait 
must be against them”.85 He concluded that the Shaikh, who had “continually” 
expressed “dissatisfaction with the Council, should dissolve the present Council if he 
wishes to do so...That some 20,000 Kuwaitis, a third of the Kuwait population has in 
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fear of the Council asked for foreign nationality is sufficient cause for the Sheikh to 
order dissolution”.86 
Nevertheless, when the Ruler first told the Agent of his intention to dissolve the 
Council, the latter noted that they considered the matter internal. The Agent, however, 
warned the Ruler that if he decided to go ahead, “he should risk no failure” as “his 
position would be infinitely worse, and the prestige of the Subah might be irreparably 
damaged”.87 As the situation got tenser, the Ruler repeatedly appealed to the Agent for 
help. While the British did not actively respond to the Rulers’ appeals, the latter was 
able to successfully dissolve the Council, and new elections with slightly wider 
representation were called.  
Upon dissolving the first council, the Political Agent took the opportunity to “confirm 
and so keep [the Ruler] upto mark about the Arms Reserve remaining under close 
control; that there would be a new Council, and that he would retain a right of veto on 
the new Council’s decisions”.88 “That accursed Council,” responded the Ruler, “has 
taught us a useful lesson”.89 
Thus, consulting the British, the Ruler drafted a constitution that would basically take 
away the powers of the first Council and turn it into an advisory rather than executive 
one. 90  The British viewed the constitution as “reasonable” and “satisfactory”. 91 
However, upon being handed this constitution, the Council firmly rejected it, holding 
on to their own version. Therefore, the Ruler decided, with British support, to dissolve 
the second Council and nominate a new one.92  The affair ended in bloodshed. Two 
pro-Council members were killed and opposition members either fled the country or 
were thrown in prison. On March 12, 1939, an Advisory Council was formed by the 
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Ruler consisting of 14 members: nine notables and the rest members of the Ruling 
Family.93  
As seen, the major source of power in Kuwait, the British, had turned against the 
merchants’ movement. In fact, the British soon aimed to restore the standing of the 
Ruler. As the Political Agent wrote, “I devoted such influence as I possessed to 
restoring the authority of the Shaikh, and to enabling him to regain the confidence of 
the people without alienating him from his Council though to some extent this 
involved influential men of the anti-Shaikh party…”.94 The British, through their 
officials, “made it abundantly clear that they regard the Shaikh of Kuwait as the sole 
source of authority within his State, thus correcting the almost disastrous impression 
allowed to gain prevalence at an unfortunate period of local history”.95  
Moreover, other sources that granted strength to the merchant movement also soon 
disappeared. Circumstances in Iraq, which was the biggest moral booster to the 
movement, suddenly changed.96 The same year the Council was dissolved, King 
Ghazi died. In addition, the Iraq Prime Minister began suppressing pro-opposition 
broadcasts by the Iraqi media, which had been the merchant’s most effective 
campaigning method. In his memoirs, Khaled Al Adsani, Secretary of the dissolved 
council, noted that this had had a most significant impact in breaking the morale of 
the movement (Khaled Al Adsani, undated: 125). 
In addition, regional and international developments soon altered the economic ills 
Kuwait had faced. In this regard, the British and Ibn Saud came to realize the 
importance of lifting the blockade, which had undermined the Kuwaiti economy over 
the years. The Political Agent, noting his belief in the “economic basis for the Kuwait 
agitation against the Shaikh”, insisted that “the removal of the Saudi Blockade will 
relieve matters, while on the contrary, its continuance will adversely affect the local 
political situation…even weeks and days are now important; important to us, and to 
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many merchants, who are at the end of their financial tether…”.97 
Ibn Saud, for his part, was alive to his own interests. In fact, right after the Ruler 
dissolved the first Council, Ibn Saud congratulated him and showed support, as the 
Saudi King “had regard askance the power of the Kuwait Council, since it was, he 
thought, ominous of encroaching, and uncontrolled, democracy in Arabia…”. 98 
Therefore, Ibn Saud shifted his attitude towards the Ruler and Kuwait. He assured the 
British of “his desire for the maintenance of the Shaikh’s position and dignity”, and 
asked to hasten the conclusion of the Saudi-Kuwait Agreement.99  
Indeed, a few months later, in 1940, the blockade was lifted, and “a rapid revival of 
trade followed”.100 This, together with the start of the Second World War, boosted 
Kuwait’s economy not least by the use of local labor for the war effort (including 
building boats, reconstructing barges, etc.), and caused all classes to benefit.101  
The political situation soon turned quiet. By 1941, the Kuwait Administration Report 
described the domestic scene as follows: 
Kuwait politics have been remarkably quiet…The war brought 
prosperity to the Kuwait merchants and they have become more and 
more concerned with their own affairs and have taken less and less 
interested in the domestic politics of the house of Subah. This does 
not mean that the anti-Sheikh elements have been entirely idle, far 
from it, but it does mean that they have been unable to obtain any of 
the influential support so necessary to a successful opposition.102 
 
Likewise, in 1942, there was no political activity worthy of mention. Money was 
plentiful, more than there had been in Kuwait for many years previously.103 Trade was 
“remarkably good” and “the attention of the merchants has been engaged exclusively 
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in their own affairs”.104  
Regarding the nominated Advisory Council, it was reported to have “met at irregular 
intervals” with “their deliberations” causing “no stir”. “[I]t almost seems as if they 
had ceased, like so many democratic institutions, to carry any weight at all during the 
present days of war”.105 By 1945, the year before the start of Kuwaiti oil production, 
the Administration Report commented that “‘Progressive’ elements appear to have 
been too pre-occupied with their own progress in profiteering to have had time for 
politics”.106 In fact, the Council did not meet throughout that year, and it was even 
thought to have “passed away”.107 
3.4. INTO THE OIL AGE 
It was these circumstances that Kuwait was experiencing as it crossed the threshold of 
the oil age in 1946. The political and economic changes that took place had a huge 
impact on the way the state would eventually deal with the new era. While the 
political scene had soon turned quiet in the 1940s, the events of the 1930s, which 
resulted in the creation of a short-lived legislative council had lasting significance on 
post-oil development. Psychologically, the events ingrained the idea of formal 
participation in the Kuwaiti political conscience. “People have established that for 
good or evil”, noted the Political Agent in 1938,  “there is to be a Council”.108 The 
events also formed an inspiration to the next generations of reformist movements and 
elevated the respect these movements carried towards the merchants of Kuwait. The 
merchants are seen as pioneers in the struggle for democratic reform. In a sense, the 
movement of 1938 became legendary, and Kuwaitis still refer to it in their political 
rhetoric, as an example of sacrifice in the struggle for freedom. This is clearly 
reflected later when discussing post-oil political development. 
Moreover, as mentioned, the movement of the 1930s expanded the role of the ‘state’ 
in providing public services, welfare or otherwise. This began with the elections of 
the Municipality and more significantly the Education Council of 1936, the functions 
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of which were later entrusted to the Education Department under the Legislative 
Council. This, as discussed later, formalized the states’ role in providing free 
education. 
However, on a more fundamental level, one of the most important and ironic 
ramifications of the experiences of the Legislative Council was that it prompted the 
Ruler to involve ruling family members in the affairs of state. Prior to the Council, 
ruling family members were generally not allowed to take any part in Administrative 
affairs, and were kept in the background socially.109 In fact, just prior to the events of 
1938, a report on the Administration of Kuwait described the concentration of 
administrative authority as “[t]he most remarkable feature of the administration”.110  
However, prompted by the events of 1938, the Sabah family took up “superior posts 
in all departments of the Government, including security, sea and shore police, the 
control of the arms reserve, the City Police, etc.”.111 This marked an ‘official’ 
diffusion of power amongst the Al Sabah, taking a more complete form after the 
dissolution of the Council in 1939, and proving to have lasting effects on the political 
and economic development of post-oil Kuwait. With the coming of oil revenues, the 
central authority that Kuwait had been accustomed to faded away even further. Each 
shaikh, with huge amounts of funds, created an ‘empire’ over which he presided and 
started to act increasingly independently of any central authority. With time, the 
shaikhs became increasingly difficult to control, and this in turn undermined most 
efforts during the 1950s towards not only administrative efficiency but also political 
reform, giving rise to great discontent. 
Indeed, the 1950s saw a rise in efforts for reform and calls for political participation, 
which naturally clashed with the shaikhs in power. By then, the Advisory Committee 
which was formed in 1939 and which “never functioned properly” had “died a natural 
death”.112 However, in 1951, the first round of elections was held under the new 
Ruler, Abdulla Al Salim, to committees which under the shaikhs, administered the 
                                                 
109 IOR/R/15/5/206: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 6 January 193, p. 19. 
110 IOR/R/15/5/205: Administration of Kuwait, unsigned, 8 July 1938, p. 1. 
111 IOR/R/15/5/206: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 6 January 1939 p. 1; 
Kuwait Intelligence Summary for the Period 16th to 31st December 1938, p. 2, in Political Diaries of 
the Persian Gulf, vol. 13, p. 232. 
112 FO371/91334: Political Agent, Kuwait to Rupert Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain, 21 April 1951. 
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various departments of government.113 Due to clashes with the shaikhs, particularly 
Fahad, the elected members resigned. Again in 1954, another round of elections took 
place, and the elected members of the various committees handed a petition to the 
Ruler demanding reforms and a consultative council to help administer the country. 
These attempts also failed, as members of the ruling family “apparently showed 
themselves opposed to any reduction in their personal power”.114 Instead, the Ruler 
disappointed the merchants and formed what was known as the Higher Executive 
Committee (HEC). It consisted of three young sheikhs and three pro-Sabah citizens. 
While the HEC was created in light of the growing criticism regarding the 
inefficiency of the Government, it fell way short of meeting the people’s demands for 
more representative rule, and therefore prompted another round of resignations from 
the elected committees.  
However, even this conservative body failed and reached a state of paralysis, due to 
the refusal by senior shaikhs heading government departments of any interference in 
their territory, even by other ruling family members. The Committee, as the Resident 
noted, had “its instructions contemptuously ignored by Shiakh Abdullah al Mubarak”, 
and “[w]hen Shaikh Fahad returned from Europe at the end of 1954 he reversed many 
of the decisions which the Committee had made relating to the development 
programme and other matters”.115 Thus, “[a]fter several attempts to obtain the Ruler’s 
support the Committee elapsed into ineffectiveness and the Shaikhly members ceased 
attending”.116 
However, “conscious of growing popular criticism”, the Ruler set up in its place what 
was known as the Supreme Council. It consisted of the Shaikhs formerly sitting on the 
HEC and senior Shaikhs who headed the governmental departments.117 This “was an 
expedient devised by the Ruler to co-ordinate the views and activities of the various 
shaikhly heads of departments rather than an attempt to broaden the basis of the 
Administration”.118    
 
                                                 
113 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, p.4.  
114 FO371/109810: Logan, Kuwait to Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 July 1954, p. 1-2. 
115 FO371/114576: Political Resident’s Annual Report for the year 1954, April 15, 1955, p. 4; 
FO371/120540: Political Resident’s Annual Report for the year 1955, May 7, 1956, p. 2. 
116 FO371/120540 Political Resident’s Annual Report for the year 1955, May 7, 1956, p.2. 
117 Ibid. 
118 FO371/126869: Political Resident’s Annual Review for 1956, April 15, 1957, p. 4. 
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Meanwhile, the demands for representative government did not cease, and renewed 
calls for reform and elected representative bodies were witnessed throughout the 
coming years. It was in 1958, however, that the final attempt for representative rule, 
prior to the elections of the Constituent Assembly of 1961, was made. It was 
described as follows: 
 
After the complicated negotiations between citizens and sheikhs…56 
citizens originally nominated by the family as a council became a sort 
of steering committee whose task it was to elect from amongst 
themselves and from outside 500 persons who would form an 
“electoral College”. This college was duly constituted and met on the 
evening of March 28 to elect 56 council members. The names of the 
56, together with a further 18 persons who are to be regarded as 
“alternative” candidates (i.e. available in case of resignations, deaths 
and so on) have been published in local newspapers which have 
generally welcomed this, at least as a first step on the road to a 
representative government.119  
 
However, again, this attempt failed, as the Ruler “struck out two of the names put 
forward...and the rest of the members had thereupon declined to sit”.120 
As a result of these developments, the reformist movement began demanding for 
more fundamental changes. As the Resident noted, “an appeal began to be voiced in 
the press for a single council, elected by one free popular vote…”.121 ‘Al Fajr’, a 
newspaper representing the movement, now “rejects all idea of a compromise 
solution”, noted the Resident, “even were the Supreme Council willing to accept one, 
of the problem of the proposed governmental councils or committees…and re-affirms 
that nothing but free popular elections will satisfy the will of the people. Thus the 
Ruler’s...deletion of two of the 56 names submitted for his approval in April is made 
the pretext for nullifying the whole issue”.122 
The public pronouncements of the reformist movement’s radicalized views reached 
their heights in 1959, as opposition leader Al Qatami finally called for the end of the 
“tribal system of government” and demanded a proper system of popular democratic 
                                                 
119 Persian Gulf Monthly Report for the period April 2 to April 29 1958, p.1, in Political Diaries of the 
Persian Gulf, vol. 20, p. 615. The elected members were to sit on the various departmental committees. 
120 Persian Gulf Monthly Report for the period April 30 to June 2, 1958, p.1, in Political Diaries of the 
Persian Gulf, vol. 20, p. 629.  
121 Annex to Kuwait Diary No.5 Covering the Period April 29-May 18, 1958, p. 2, in Political Diaries 
of the Persian Gulf, vol. 20, p. 636. 
122 Confidential Annex to Kuwait Diary No.6 Covering the Period May 19 to June 19, 1958, p. 1, in 
Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 20, p. 655. 
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rule.  While this prompted a swift backlash by the Ruler leading him to ban all forms 
of public freedoms, he was very soon pushed to call for the election of a Constituent 
Assembly to draw a modern constitution for the country in 1961. As discussed in 
detail later, while this constitution was clearly a major step in the democratization 
process, the important point here is that the peculiar system of government it adopted 
was a direct consequence of the position of the Al Sabah in government posts, which 
was prompted by the developments of the 1930s. In sum, understanding the history of 
Kuwait prior to oil it is of great importance to make sense of many of the 
developments that took place after it. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The chapter attempted to provide a background to the political and economic 
development of Kuwait. Examining the major events that took place during the pre-oil 
period highlighted the different factors that shaped the social and political dynamics 
of the era. While the structure of the pearling and seafaring economy had played a 
huge role in influencing the balance of power within society, it is clear from the 
discussion that such a structure is insufficient in explaining the characteristics of the 
system of rule or the development and effectiveness of reformist pressures. 
As seen, the expression of discontent by the merchants in 1910 took a completely 
different form than it did in the 1930s. Unlike the 1930s, the discontent did not 
produce a concerted effort or significant pressure for political reform, nor was it 
intended to. In addition, both the events of 1910 and the 1930s indicate that prior to 
oil, Kuwait was an autocracy despite the fact that the merchants controlled most of the 
country’s wealth. While the events of the 1930s are indeed significant, the whole 
episode of ‘democratic’ governance lasted less than a year. The first Legislative 
Council was elected on the 28th of June 1938, and was dissolved by the end of 
December, less than six months later. The second Legislative Council never really 
functioned, and its members either fled or were imprisoned upon it being dissolved. 
Thus, it a sobering fact that the rule of an elected council was less than six months out 
of decades of autocracy, instituted at least since 1886, when Mubarak murdered his 
brothers and assumed power.  
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Furthermore, it is even arguable that the very creation of the Legislative Council with 
the extensive powers it possessed was avoidable but not for the way in which the 
Ruler had dealt with the demands of the merchants. This view was certainly held by 
the British. As was discussed earlier, the British had tried to convince the Ruler to set 
up an advisory council to contain the agitation. This he ignored. The Agent and 
Resident therefore blamed the Ruler for the resulting situation in which the Council 
was able to strip him from his powers. They believed that this had happened as a 
result of the Ruler’s stubbornness and ‘obstinacy’.123 As the Resident wrote reflecting 
on the situation: 
 
The difference that in Kuwait the powers of the Council have been so 
extensive, and reduced to writing, is entirely due to the gross stupidity – I 
can use no milder term – of the Shaikh. Even after he had agreed to the 
Council as elected, the Shaikh persevered in futile intrigues to undermine 
the Council, which merely served to exacerbate both of them, and public 
opinion generally.124 
The point here is to highlight the fact that although the merchants possessed much of 
Kuwait’s wealth, and although people, including the merchants themselves, paid 
taxes, this situation did not translate into increased political participation in 
government nor was it sufficient to produce calls for such participation. As seen, 
unlike the situation in 1910, there were many factors influencing the development of a 
reformist movement in the 1930s such as certain ‘progressive’ regional currents with 
their significant effect on the educated merchant youth of Kuwait.  
Therefore, the stress on economic structure to explain political development, reflected 
in notions such as ‘no taxation without democratization’, seems to be very much 
narrow. Not only are such notions insufficient in explaining the development of 
demands for change and indeed change itself, in Kuwait’s experience, they also 
become of low value as the country’s post-oil democratization clearly demonstrates. 
This is discussed in detail later. However, before doing so, the next chapter examines 
the British role in the post-oil development of Kuwait. As seen in this chapter, the 
British had a great influence on the affairs of Kuwait, and with the coming of oil, 
Britain tried to further this influence as its interests became increasingly at stake. 
While the rentier state literature ignores such a role in post-oil development, it is the 
                                                 
123 IOR/R/15/5/205:Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 6 July 1938, p. 4. 
124 IOR/R/15/5/205: Political Resident, Bushire to Peel, India Office, 18 July 1938, p. 5. 
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aim of the next chapter to understand the extent and kind of British influence on the 




ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND THE LIMITS OF BRITISH INFLUENCE  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is no way of fully understanding the economic and political development of 
Kuwait without looking at British influence. This influence is sometimes exaggerated, 
particularly by Kuwaiti political circles that had perceived Britain (and indeed the oil 
company) as having dominant power over the affairs of state. However, in the rentier 
state literature, the role of Britain and its influence are often completely ignored. The 
reason may largely lie in the fact that the rise of the literature was a consequence of 
the oil boom of the 1970s. Thus, much of the studies begin with that era i.e. after the 
British decolonized the region. However, the importance of understanding the British 
role in the transformation of Kuwait into a rentier state stems from the fact that this 
process had taken place during the period in which Kuwait was under British 
Protection. As suggested in the previous chapter, this had given Britain great 
influence not only on Kuwait’s international affairs, but also on its domestic politics.  
The aim of this chapter is therefore to analyze the extent of this influence on the 
decision-making process during the formation years of the 1950s. The chapter 
concludes that that while the British had played a very influential role in the shaping 
of the political economy adopted by the Kuwaiti government, their influence was in 
no way commanding, and ultimate responsibility lies primarily on the Kuwaitis 
themselves. 
4.2. THE BRITISH BEFORE THE OIL BOOM OF 1951 
Although oil royalties started to pour into Kuwait in 1936, it was not until 1946 that 
oil was produced and commercially exploited due to the advent of the Second World 
War. Throughout the 1940s, elaborate ideas of how Kuwait should utilize these 
royalties were starting to be discussed amongst British officials.  
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There were three dominant themes in the discussions regarding the problems Kuwait 
potentially faced, and the way in which oil wealth ought to be handled. Concerns 
mainly focused on the following inter-related problems: (a) lack of proper 
administration and budgeting; (b) lack of a development plan; and (c) the need to 
make Kuwaitis feel they are benefiting from the new-found wealth in order to avoid 
the dangers of social upheaval.  
In 1940, for instance, the Political Resident noted that with its vast royalties, the 
“State has to emerge from its position of being really a private estate, and the only 
way he [the Ruler] will command the public confidence will be by framing some sort 
of budget, so that the public, even if they don’t see it, will know that they are getting a 
square deal”.
1
 The concern was that the Ruler had no scheme whereby Kuwaitis 
would receive benefits from the increase in wealth. “Unless he does something”, 
warned the Political Agent in 1940, “he is only storing up trouble for himself and his 
family”.
2
 The Resident agreed, noting,  
though at the moment there is no agitation in Kuwait ... it will sure 
come as the news spreads that very large sums are being received, and 
that he [the Ruler] would be well advised to meet it in advance by 
earmarking a substantial proportion for public purposes … and if he 




Proposals to this end were already being put forward to the Ruler. For example, the 
Political Agent asked the Ruler in 1940 to “consider instituting some work which 
would demonstrate openly his interest in the public welfare”, such as medical 
facilities and starting a technical college.
4
  
The concern for social welfare to avoid social tensions and danger in general 
resonated throughout the next period. In 1949, Burrows told the Ruler that “the 
presence of large sums of money in a small State like Kuwait in the midst of a world 
racked by poverty and insecurity would give rise to an increasing volume of criticism 
                                                 
1
 IOR/R/15/1/545: Political Resident, Bushire to Galloway, Political Agent, Kuwait, 25 April 1940, p. 
2. 
2
 IOR/R/15/1/545: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 18 April 1940, pp. 1-2. 
3
 IOR/R/15/1/545: Political Resident, Bushire to Galloway, Political Agent, Kuwait, 25 April 1940, p. 
1. 
4
 IOR/R/15/1/545: Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Bushire, 20 June 1940, p. 1. 
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and jealousy from His Highness’ neighbors and others”.
5
 The only way to avoid that 
would be to show that the Ruler “was making exemplary use of his money on social 
and other services designed to better the lot of the ordinary man”.
6
 Here, the fear of 
Communism was among British concerns. Oil money was seen as an effective tool to 
fight it off. As Burrows pointed out to the Ruler, fighting communism effectively 
would require “social reform designed to remove conditions of poverty, squalor, and 




As oil revenues started to increase, there was a growing realization of the pressing 
need for a proper development plan. In 1946, the Political Resident suggested to the 
Shaikh that “in view of the greatly increased revenue the State was now expecting to 
receive the time had come to put its finances on a proper footing”.
8
 In 1947, Hallows, 
of the Commonwealth Relations Office wrote, “we agree … that a Development 
Scheme is necessary in order that the State should obtain the maximum benefit from 
oil payments in the fields of improved administration, public amenities and services 
and other benefits”.
9
 Likewise, Donaldson wrote to the Political Resident that, as oil 
royalties are estimated to continue to rise to substantial proportions, “it seems clearly 
desirable that a large proportion of these revenues should be ‘ploughed back’ into the 




One of the first suggestions made to the Ruler was to set aside funds for investment as 
reserves. This idea was repeatedly put forward throughout the 1940s. As early as 
1940, the British suggested that in order to avoid criticism, a budget should be 
devised whereby, as in Bahrain, the Shaikh would only retain one third of the 
royalties, while the rest would be split between a reserve fund and public welfare. The 
Political Resident suggested that “[a]t least one-third of the money should be placed 
to Reserve, in some reliable bank in India and England, and not … in a bank in 
                                                 
5
 IOR/R/15/5/213: Note on Burrow’s interview with Ahmad al Jabir, Ruler of Kuwait, on 14 May 




 Ibid., p. 1. 
8
 FO371/52247: Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for India, 7 July 1946, p. 1. 
9
 FO371/61414: Hallows, Commonwealth Relations Office, to Pyman, Foreign Office, 13 October 
1947, p. 1. 
10




 Likewise, in 1946, the Resident pointed out to the Shaikh that “surplus 
funds belonging to the State should be invested and not left idle”.
12
 In 1949, Burrows 
told the Shaikh that “it was the feeling of the Foreign Office that expenditure of 
capital and income should be planned over a number of years and reserves 
accumulated in such a way that, if the price of oil were to fall or any other 
circumstance arise to limit His Highness’ income, the standards of administration at 
that time attained could be maintained out of income from reserve funds”.
13
  
An impediment towards realizing these goals was that there was no one from the 
Shaikh’s family or indeed Kuwait who was capable of handling and administrating 
such a task. The Ruler acknowledged this fact too.
14
 Thus, the British realized that 
their interests were increasingly at stake in light of the situation. In 1948, Burrows 
wrote the Political Resident that “there is no doubt that with the expansion of oil 
interests the deficiencies of the State administration will become both more apparent 
and more the object of criticism inside and outside the State” against both the Shaikh 
and Britain. “The overriding consideration … is the need for efficient 
administration”.
15
   
The British consequently increased their pressure on the Shaikh to appoint a British 
financial advisor. “It would seem … that without the assistance of a competent 
Financial Advisor of integrity and experience, the Koweit Government might find it 
difficult or impossible” to undertake a development scheme successfully, Hallows 
wrote the Foreign Office.
16
 There was “a serious risk”, he stressed, “that disastrous 
consequences might follow from this sudden acquisition of wealth, should the Sheikh 




Expressing similar concerns, Donaldson asserted that it might be impossible for the 
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Kuwaiti Government to successfully undertake required large-scale development 
“without the guidance of a capable administrator possessing a sound knowledge of 
finance”.
18
 “Further”, he noted, “the disastrous consequences which might ensue from 
this sudden acquisition of wealth, should the Shaikh remain without the assistance of 
an advisor of integrity and experience are obvious”.
19
  
Donaldson pointed out other considerations that highlight the importance of 
appointing financial advisor. For example, it was seen important to avoid 
“maladministration, especially corrupt or wasteful practices, which might lead to a 
revival of agitation against the Shaikh, and perhaps the activities of communist agents 
in the territories”.
20
 Also, “the influx of foreign labour on a large scale may demand a 
substantial improvement in some branches of the administration…”.
21
 
Notwithstanding such pressure, Shaikh Ahmad did not appoint a financial advisor 
throughout his reign, and the administration continued to be conducted on primitive 
lines.
22
 Such unprofessional line of governance did not give much confidence that the 
handling of the post-oil Kuwaiti economy will have a robust foundation. The 
following sections, hence, explore the issues further. 
4.3. THE REAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE ‘NEW CONCEPTION’ OF 
BRITISH INVOLVEMENT 
It could be argued that it was not until 1951 that the real transformation of Kuwait 
actually began. With a new Emir, Abdulla Al Salem, inaugurated in February 1950, 
Kuwait began to see a huge and unprecedented surge in its oil revenues (see El 
Mallakh, 1966: 426). A combination of two events contributed to this increase. First 
was the conclusion of what became known as the ‘50-50 agreement’ between the 
Kuwaiti government and the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), according to which profits 
were split equally between the two parties. Second was an expansion of Kuwaiti oil 
production to offset the loss of Iranian oil as a result of its nationalization by the 
Musaddeq government in May of 1951. As the Administration Report for 1951 noted, 
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 Ibid.; also see FO371/74935: Political Resident’s ‘Annual Report’ for 1948, January 1949 p. 1. 
22
 FO371/74935: Political Resident’s ‘Annual Report’ for 1948, January 1949, p. 1. 
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In April the Kuwait Oil Company broke three of its own previous 
records. For the first time it produced over half a million barrels of oil 
in a day, exported two million tons (roughly seven barrels to a ton) of 
crude oil in a month and drilled a well in 24.8 days. As Abadan 
production fell, that of Kuwait grew. In June it was over 600,000 
barrels per day, in August, 700,000 and in December, 800,000. At the 
end of the year nearly 28 million tons had been exported as against 17 
millions in the previous year.
23
  
Kuwait, hence, suddenly assumed a new level of importance. As The Times 
correspondent wrote at the time, “Kuwait … after some centuries of quiet existence as 
an Arab trading centre has suddenly emerged as the fifth oil-producing country of the 
world”; its oil deposits being “fabulously rich”, and with “their combination of great 
volume with easy production and ready access to the sea, they are probably 
unequalled …”.
24
 The table below illustrates the huge rise in Kuwait’s oil production 
and revenues during the period. 
 
Table 4.1.: Growth of Oil Production and Revenues 1946-
1965  





Increase % Million $US 
Annual 
Increase % 
1946 5.9   0.76   
1947 16.2 174.58 2.07 172.37 
1948 46.5 187.04 5.95 187.44 
1949 89.9 93.33 11.52 93.61 
1950 125.7 39.82 16.09 39.67 
1951 204.9 63.01 18 11.87 
1952 273.4 33.43 57 216.67 
1953 314.6 15.07 169 196.49 
1954 349.7 11.16 194.2 14.91 
1955 402.7 15.16 281.7 45.06 
Source: Khoja and Sadler 1979, 26   
 
To the British, Kuwait’s newly acquired importance cannot have been overstated. In 
1953, a letter from the Prime Minister’s Office noted the following: 
During the last three years Kuwait has become of prime 
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 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, p.5. 
24
 Quoted in Ibid. Also see Monroe, 1954: 275. 
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importance to the United Kingdom and to the sterling area as a 
whole. It is now a major source of oil supplies and an important 
element in our balance of payments. The expenditure of its large 
sterling revenue unless properly directed is capable of inflicting 
the most serious damage on the sterling area.
25
  
The British interests in Kuwait were diverse. However, for the purpose of this 
chapter, it is important to distinguish the interests that are relevant to Kuwaiti oil 
policy and revenue utilization. In 1955, these specific interests were spelled out by the 
Political Agent in the following order:  
Firstly, an unbroken supply of oil. Secondly, that the payment for oil 
remains in sterling, and that as much of this sterling as possible is 
either channeled back by expenditure on sterling area goods and 
services, or invested in sterling securities. Thirdly, the encouragement 
of British commercial enterprise in Kuwait.
26
 
Apart from these, the Agent also pointed out that the British government “accepted a 
moral responsibility for seeing that a reasonable standard of administration and good 
order is maintained in Kuwait, and that the wealth of the State is in general used to the 
benefit of its people”.
27
 These combined aims are reflected in a Brief prepared for 
Churchill’s meeting with the Ruler in 1953: 
Her Majesty’s objectives in Kuwait are, in order of importance:- (a) to 
maintain our position and influence; (b) to ensure that her investment 
and as much as possible of Kuwait’s expenditure takes place in the 
Sterling Area and that other expenditure does not harm the Sterling 
Area; (c) to ensure that Kuwait’s wealth is wisely used and that the 
benefits from it are genuinely shared by all the  people of Kuwait; (d) 
to secure as much of Kuwait’s trade as possible for British firms…
28
  
The Foreign Office also added that the British Government should ensure the 
following:  
(i) the continued reliance of Kuwait on British industry; (ii) that the 
rate of expenditure by Kuwait is kept at a rate which does not impose 
undue demands on our own economy, or on our ability to take 
advantage of opportunities elsewhere; (iii) that any investment made 
by Kuwait outside its own borders shall be in accordance with the 
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 FO371/104272: Office of Winston Churchill to Pelly, Political Agent, Kuwait copied to Political 
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 FO371/104327: Brief for British Prime Minister with two annexes, May 1953. 
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general interest of the Sterling Area…
29
  
To achieve these interests and to avoid potentially significant harm on Britain, it was 
concluded that the British “can no longer afford to confine themselves to the role 
authorized by the treaties and agreements in force and sanctioned by usage but must 
also interest themselves in all matters which affect the political and economic stability 
of Kuwait or which may affect interests of the United Kingdom in the widest sense”.
30
 
This was called a new conception of the role of Britain in Kuwait – it required “a 
change in the nature of the advice to be tendered to the Ruler and in the channels 
through which that advice is communicated”.
31
 In sum, British declared policy, noted 
the Foreign Office, was “to increase our [British] influence in the internal affairs of 




4.4. ATTEMPTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE 
The first way in which the British attempted to gain influence was by trying to ensure 
the appointment of a British Senior Advisor with executive authority to handle the 
affairs of the state. These attempts were made before oil. After oil, however, they 
gained increased importance. In fact, even before assuming formal power, the British 
pressed Abdulla Al Salem to accept a British Advisor.
33
 However, the British soon 
suggested the appointment of ‘experts’, since an ‘advisor’ was clearly unacceptable 
to the Ruler, and political difficulties may arise if they pressed further.
34
 In fact, 
attached to the letter of recognition of Abdulla Al Salem by Britain was a note from 
the Political Agent. In it, under instructions from the British Government, the Agent 
wrote that the increase in Kuwait’s population and revenues, and the need to utilize 
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 FO371/114588: Confidential annex to Kuwait Diary No 9 by Political Agent, Kuwait, covering 
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 Resident’s Summary of Events during February 1950, p. 4, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, 
vol. 18, p. 548; in fact, there was even discussion amongst British officials that recognition of Abdulla 
Al Salim should be conditional upon his acceptance of such an advisor; however, this condition was 
never officially put forward.  
34
 The Ruler successfully resisted appointing a senior advisor despite continued pressures on him by 
the British to do so in the years to come, including pressure by Churchill himself. Caught between such 
British pressure and difficulties arising from ruling family members’ behavior, the Ruler had 
threatened to abdicate. 
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these revenues in a best way possible, “involves new and heavy burdens on an 
administration that is untrained to face such complex problems”; therefore, the 
British Government considers that the Ruler “should not hesitate to accept the 
technical assistance that their experience of these problems can afford … His 




The Ruler assured the British that any experts he may engage would be from Britain, 
but said he needed six months to think about the matter. Indeed, in October, “without 
further prompting”, he “spontaneously” agreed to employ British experts in Finance 
and Customs.
36
 As a result, in 1951, Colonel Crichton and Roper were appointed to 
take over the Finance and Customs departments respectively.
37
 In the same year, 
Crichton, who became the ‘Controller of Finance’, gained the consent of the Ruler to 
appoint a British State Engineer.
38
 Thus, in January 1952, General Hasted arrived in 
Kuwait, and was named the ‘Controller of Development’.
39
      
Therefore, there were now “two channels” through which the British Government 
“exercised persuasion”, noted a Foreign Office Brief to the British Prime Minister: the 
first was “through the relations of confidence existing between her Majesty’s 
representatives in the Persian Gulf and the Ruler”, and the second was “through two 
British advisers employed by the Ruler, Colonel Crichton, employed at the head of 
the Finance Department and General Hasted, the State Engineer”.
40
 
As to the former, the British considered different ways to strengthen official British 
Government representation in Kuwait. These included making Kuwait an independent 
post, not under the Political Residency in Bahrain, and reporting directly to the 
Foreign Office.
41
 They also included moving the headquarters of British political 
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representation in the Persian Gulf to Kuwait.
42
 For practical and other reasons, these 
ideas were dismissed.  
In the end, the British Government moved to enhance the position of the Political 
Agent and “to bolster up his prestige” in order to make his influence in Kuwait more 
effective.
43
 Because the British intended “to enlarge the range of subjects on which 
advice will be tendered to the Ruler of Kuwait”, noted Churchill to the Political 
Agent, and because they “cannot now disinterest themselves from such features of 
Kuwaiti’s internal affairs as may directly or indirectly affect their wider interests”, it 
was decided that his standing would be “enhanced by a higher grading and by 
appropriate additions to your [his] staff”.
44
 “The prestige of the Political Agent in the 
eyes of the Ruler and of all persons with whom you will come into contact”, asserted 
Churchill, “will be further strengthened by the knowledge of the fact that in all 
matters you speak in the name of H.M.G.”.
45
 Whereas in the past the Agent would 
receive instructions from and reported to the Residency, now, “[o]n matters relating to 
the internal affairs of Kuwait, particularly administration, finance, development and 
security”, he would receive instructions from and report to the Prime Minister, 
“direct”.
46
 The message to the Resident and Agent was clear: “You [the Political 
Resident] and the Political Agent will rely on patient, firm and tactful pressure to 
secure the Ruler’s acceptance of the advice of H.M.G.”.
47
  
The second British channel of influence, the advisors, should be scrutinized with 
caution. There seems to be a tendency in the literature, and indeed in Kuwaiti political 
circles, to view these advisors as British Government representatives. Indeed, the line 
between the two parties was sometimes blurred, as these experts were closely 
connected and in contact with British officials.  
As reflected in the next section, however, it cannot be asserted that they were working 
for the British Government. They were ultimately employees of the Kuwaiti 
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government. Although they formed a “channel” by which the British government was 
able to “exercise persuasion”, they were “employed by the Ruler”, emphasized the 
Foreign Office, and were “in no way responsible to Her Majesty’s Government”.
48
  
4.5. THE ADVISORS AND ENTRENCHED POWERS 
As mentioned, the first British experts, Crichton and Roper, arrived in the summer of 
1951 to take over the Finance and Customs departments. The main issue they 
confronted was an extremely primitive administration that must handle vast amounts 
of money.  “After they had had time to look around both were appalled at the prospect 
of trying to introduce orderly administration”.
49
 As a result, Crichton right away 
decided more British assistance had to be imported. In particular, Crichton wanted a 
state engineer, an assistant to his department, and a government auditor.
50
 Thus, State 
Engineer Hasted later arrived and was appointed as Controller of Development.
51
  
The advisers clashed almost immediately with entrenched powers in the Kuwaiti 
bureaucracy. Very early on, for instance, they had a problem with Abdulla Al Mulla, 
State Secretary and contractor. According to the British advisers, Al Mulla placed 
obstacles in the way of “any attempt at administrative reform”; he had a “parallel 
organisation” that they had to counteract.
52
 Describing the situation, the Foreign 
Office wrote, “[t]he situation which is developing in Kuwait is not healthy. There is a 
great deal of money, no real financial control and too much power in the hands of 
Abdulla Mulla over whose actions Col. Crichton has no control”.
53
 The British 
therefore became increasingly concerned, and viewed the matter as one of urgency: 
In the first place the oil revenues of Kuwait are shortly to be increased 
from about 4.5 million in 1950 to about 60 million in 1952. In the 
second place it seems clear that unless a strong administration is built 
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up quickly in support of and under the control of Crichton he will find 
it progressively less easy to counteract the growing influence of 
Abdulla Mulla and his nominees…Thirdly, we get the impression that 
the Ruler is only too ready to divest himself of the responsibilities of 
administration and therefore unlikely to interfere in Crichton’s interest 
unless prompted by us to do so.
54
  
It was under this context that Crichton’s idea of a Development Board “to supervise 
and coordinate development” was born.
55
 The aim was clearly to increase the British 
advisors’ influence over the development of Kuwait. As a Foreign Office document 
noted, the Development Board was “Col. Critchton’s own solution to the 
problems…”.
56
 “In theory”, its function would be to “provide local authority, in the 
person of the Chairman of the Board, for the considerable administrative changes 
which were going to be necessary; this would strengthen the hand of the British 
advisers in the face of Kuwaiti opposition and in particular that of Abdulla Mulla”.
57
 
Thus, the Development Board was envisioned as “the only adequate counterbalance 




The British Government supported the idea. “We feel it necessary”, explained Pelly, 
“that some form of Board or Council is necessary in order to give Crichton and other 
British officials sufficient local support to overrule Abdulla Mulla, when the latter’s 
activities come into conflict with Crichton’s plans”.
59
 The British also “hoped that the 
association of leading Kuwaitis with economic development through such a Board 




In 1951, Crichton suggested the establishment of such a Board to the Ruler. To this, 
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the Ruler agreed, and Hasted assumed its Chairmanship.
61
 Along with Hasted as its 
Chair, this institution consisted of the Kuwaiti Directors of the Departments of 
Finance, Education, Municipality, Health, Public Works, and Muslim Endowments. 
In addition, its members included Addison (Chief Engineer of the Electricity 
Department), Halaby (Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department), McGregor 
from the Finance Department, and of course Crichton (the Controller of Finance). 
This original Board met from February 5th to April 16th. It was then reconstituted to 
include three members from the Municipality Committee, all prominent merchants: 
Elsadah Abdul Aziz Al Sagar, Abdulatif Thunayan, and Humood Al Zaid.
62
 This 
reconstituted Board met from June 16th to November 1952 under the Chairmanship 
of Hasted. It was during this period that the main outlines of the Development 
Program were agreed. Moreover, contracts with Five British Companies, with local 
Kuwaiti partners, were signed, monopolizing the major development projects, and 




While the British were successful in creating the Development Board, there remained 
major impediments towards gaining greater influence over Kuwaiti affairs and 
achieving their wishes in certain administrative and financial reform. These 
impediments included Kuwaitis’ firm resistance to foreign interference, and ruling 
family politics that prevented the Ruler from undertaking action against powerful 
family members who were clearly undermining efforts for such reforms. 
While this issue will be discussed later, it is suffice to say here that the British 
advisers confronted ruling family members that were unwilling to have anyone 
overlook their spending. Fahad, the Ruler’s half-brother, was the main target of 
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concern at the time. His character and actions had caused resentment by both British 
and Kuwaiti members of the administration.
64
 Fahad, who was at the time the head of 
the Municipality, Health and Public Works Departments (PWD), also started directly 
interfering in the work of the Development Board and preventing it from meeting.  
The British became increasingly concerned as their interests were at stake. In May 
1952, the Political Agent intervened. Although the Development Board was 
reconstituted under Hasted in June, Fahad continued to interfere.
65
 Therefore, the 
British government decided to urge the Ruler to take action against Fahad, even 
suggesting his banishment from the country. In a note by the Political Agent 
suggesting the points to be made to the Ruler, he wrote, 
Her Majesty’s Government views with increasing concern the 
retention of the Sheikh Fahad in the Kuwait Administration. It is well 
known that he has disturbed the working of the Health Department as 
a result of which its Committee, which was doing valuable work, 
resigned. His preventing the Development Board from meeting by 
forbidding (as he has recently done) the three Directors of Health, the 
Municipality and Public Works Department from attending it, has 
hamstrung work in which Her Majesty’s Government has a particular 
interest. His highly objectionable interference with the hospital staff 
brought them to the point of resignation. It is understood that similar 
activity on his part resulted in his dismissal or resignation from the 
Ministry of Health before the Ruler’s visit to Baghdad but as he was 
reinstated immediately on his return it is clear that his merely leaving 
the Ministry is not the remedy, and it is therefore Her Majesty’s 
Government’s wish that he should be banished from the State of 




Indeed, in July, under instructions from the British Government, the Political 
Resident pressed the Ruler to: “(a) restrain Fahad;
67
 (b) to employ an experienced 
British officer as Personal Assistant; and (c) to delegate sufficient authority to his 
Finance and Public Works Departments to enable them to function properly”.
68
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All these efforts, however, failed. By November 1952, it was clear that the Ruler 
would not take effective action against Fahad. The British advisers, therefore, decided 
to change their policy towards him. As the Resident noted, Crichton, Parry of the 
Health Department, and Hasted were all now trying to keep on good terms with him 
and make friends. Moreover, “[a]s, in his capacity as head of the Municipality and 
Public Health Department, he [Fahad] is in a position to interfere with all branches of 
development work, Crichton is in favour of making him Chairman of the 
Development Board. I have since heard that the Ruler has agreed to this”.
69
 Indeed, on 




4.6. HASTED AND THE DECREASE IN BRITISH INFLUENCE 
It soon became apparent that Hasted wanted to have almost total control and 
executive authority over development matters. When he arrived, Hasted’s position, 
and indeed that of the other advisers as well, was not clear to define. In 1953, the 
Political Agent described the situation as follows:  
a year ago the Kuwait administration was about as organized as that of 
medieval England. There was no close definitive of functions and very 
little delegation of power. The introduction of British advisors into 
such a set-up was a step in the dark. No one knew how it would work 
out. It was impracticable, even if the Arab’s dislike for doing so could 
have been overcome, to define closely, a priori, the functions and 
powers of Hasted or of any of the new advisers. They had to establish 
their positions step by step.
71
  
In this existing vague administrative situation, Hasted first attempted to get the Public 
Works Department under his control. “This the Ruler would not (repeat not) 
sanction”, stressed the Political Agent. “He thereupon went a long way towards 
creating a parallel executive organisation” which came to be known as the 
Development Department.
72
 This Department was completely under his control, he 
brought in British engineers, and started working in parallel with the Public Works 
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 Hasted also “maintained consistently, if not disingenuously”, that he 
had good hopes that his Department would absorb the PWD.
74
 
In the meantime, his financial irresponsibility was starting to surface, and his 
department started quickly to distribute contracts on the basis of cost plus 15% to five 
British firms, known as the Big Five. The contracts, admits a Brief to the British 
Prime Minister, were “exceptionally favourable” to the contractors.
75
 “There was 
virtually no restriction on the amount of the costs which these firms may incur, and no 
limit to the commitment of the Kuwait Government at the time when the projects are 
put in hand”.
76
 It soon started to become evident that serious abuses were taking 
place, and that the cost of the projects were much higher than Hasted’s estimates, 
sometimes by as much as 200-300%.
77
 As a result, the cost of many projects was 
trebled by architects and contractors.
78
  
Hasted, in addition, continued to quote estimates “long after experience should have 
warned him that they were hopelessly wrong”.
79
 As a consequence, the Kuwaitis were 
shocked and enraged. For instance, the 1954 Administration Report noted that “[t]he 
allocation in November, 1953, of new work in the school building programme on the 
basis of out of date estimates led to a shock for the Kuwaitis when actual costs 
became known and to charges of extravagance and deception against contractors”.
80
 
Although Reilly was not in doubt that Hasted had no deliberate intention to mislead 
Kuwaitis, he noted that it seemed as though “his desire to have his programme 
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accepted unconsciously influenced him in the direction of underestimating”.
81
 
Nevertheless, Reilly also noted an incident whereby Hasted continued to quote lower 
estimates although having been warned by the Technical Sub-Committee of the 
Development Board that they were wrong. This action “looked like a deliberate 
attempt to get more work for the British contractors by misrepresentation of the facts 
and has tended to shake faith in the objectivity of British advice”.
82
  
The hope that with General Hasted’s arrival development would “be properly 
supervised and co-ordinated” were therefore thwarted.
83
 Crichton, for his part, 
complained about “Hasted’s tendency to go ahead with schemes and incur 
expenditure without proper authority”, and bemoaned “alleged particular instances of 
financial irresponsibility and extravagance”.
84
 The Political Agent viewed the issue in 
similar light. Hasted, he wrote, viewed the Development Scheme with “an almost 
fanatical enthusiasm”, and felt he had “a single mission to provide Kuwait with 
buildings, as many as possible and as large as possible in the shortest possible time”.
85
 
Suggestions that revenues should be set aside for other purposes were dismissed by 
him “to be no more than typical Treasury ‘fussing’ and in order to achieve what he 
regards as a noble end he is inclined to be careless as to the means employed”.
86
  
The Ruler was naturally outraged, and for some time had even refused to see 
Hasted.
87
 Moreover, opposition to Hasted grew among Kuwaitis “by their seeing five 
of their fellows drawing fat dividends from the cost plus 15% contracts without any 
risk”.
88
 Reilly noted that “Kuwaitis were disturbed by the power and patronage which 
appeared to rest in General Hasted’s hands and were determined to curb it”.
89
  
In March 1953, therefore, Fahad, in agreement with the Ruler, and “bending to the 
pressure of those Kuwaitis who were not sharing in the profits of the British 
contractors and irritated by General Hasted’s high pressure approach, appointed a 
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Syrian, Majduddin Jabri … to the post of Chief Engineer in the Public Works 
Department”.
90
 The Ruler then engaged Crichton, as well as Izzat Jaafar, to negotiate 
between Jabri and Hasted as to their respective roles. It was agreed that Hasted 
“would hand over his executive staff to Jabri and confine himself to giving technical 
advice”.
91
 “After considerable skirmishing between him and General Hasted and 
Colonel Crichton”, noted the 1953 Administrative Report, “Jabri emerged as, in 
practice, the head of the Public Works and Development Organisation, while General 
Hasted was relegated more and more to a technical advisory role”.
92
 Therefore, 




Finally, in March 1953, it was ordered that Hasted’s Department  be “assimilated in 
the P.W.D”, and “[t]he technicians who will work with Hasted will be reckoned as 
secretaries to him and will be considered P.W.D. employees just like any other 
P.W.D. officials”.
94
 It was also ordered that the employment of British and other 
foreigners “be limited to technical grades which the Arab states cannot supply”.
95
 
Reflecting on the developments, Crichton took the view that “Hasted was engaged as 
an advisor, not an executive. He should not have set up his own department, the State 
Development Department, in opposition to the P.W.D. He should have operated 
through the P.W.D. from the beginning”.
96
 As the Political Resident noted, Crichton 
believed that the steps “will result in Hasted at last coming under financial control, 
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that his patronage of five or six big British contractors and their local partner … has 
created great opposition to him … He urges that Hasted should try to work the new 
arrangement as soon as its implementation is agreed by Fahad. So do I …”.
97
  
In fact Crichton openly stated his position to Hasted in a frank letter:  
It has never been His Highness’s intention, as far as I am aware, that 
you should have any executive authority; and indeed it is my personal 
belief that it is just because you got into a position, by the organization 
of the Development “Department”, which enabled you to exercise a 
very large measure of executive authority and patronage that the Ruler 
was impelled by public opinion and the pressure of his family, notably 
Shaikh Fahad, to intervene personally in the matter. He has been 
noticeably ill at ease about your anomalous position for some time; and 
you are aware of the misgivings this has caused my in recent months. 
Frankly, as far as your personal position is concerned I do not see that 
any question of broken promises arises.
98
  
Thus, Hasted’s role as per these steps were “entirely in accord with His Highness the 
Ruler’s policy of leaving the executive functions of Government to Kuwaiti Ministers 




British officials were in fact understanding for similar and broader reasons. While the 
Political Agent admitted that he had found it “difficult to resist Hasted’s argument 
that the Development Department should absorb the Public Works Department”, he 
had turned against the idea after Crichton and Loombe exposed Hasted’s 
“irresponsibility and extravagance in money matters”.
100
 He also thought that 
Hasted’s actions together with some of the companies he brought in would do British 
interests major damage.
101
 For example, one of these firms was described by the 
Political Agent as “one of those which has not [sic] been pilloried (and in its case 
perhaps with justification) for being here in order, with Hasted’s help, to get 
everything possible out of Kuwait without caring much what they give in 
return…Given a free hand they would do our interests quite as much harm as any 
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 At least one company, seeing its positions threatened, campaigned 
against the steps taken by the Kuwaitis against Hasted, and also tried to mislead the 
British Government into taking a firm stance by their side, to recall Crichton, and to 
support Hasted.
103
 These efforts, however, were all but dismissed. “The spectacle of 
one’s own countrymen setting in motion a campaign of lies and slander because their 
greed has been baulked in a state under our protection”, complained the Political 
Agent, “is not a pleasant one; as seen from here at any rate, if the contractors and 
Hasted had their way, the investment arrangements [of surplus revenue] would have 
been made inoperative”.
104
 In 1954, Hasted resigned.  
While these events clearly reflect Kuwaitis’ firm refusal to be controlled by 
foreigners, they also show that attempts to gain such control only produced an 
opposite effect. Meanwhile, while Crichton and the British were understanding of 
Hasted’s demotion, the consequent rise of Fahad’s power rendered the position of 
Critchton himself increasingly weak. Fahad, with all his newly acquired powerful 
positions, was one of the two main Ministers who had throughout the years refused to 
submit any budgets and were known to be extravagant in their demands and spending 
(the other being Abdulla Mubarak). Now, he was in charge of the Health Department, 
Public Works Department, Municipality, and of Development. The situation was 
summed up as follows: 
The result is that Shaikh Fahad’s power has been increased 
enormously. Until now he has been in control of the expenditure of the 
Health Department and the Municipality Department and has refused 
to submit any budgets or accept any control from the Finance 
Department. All the recent purchases of land at inflated prices were 
effected through the Municipality. Now all expenditure on 
development is to pass through the P.W.D. under his presidency.
105
  
This, it was rightly feared, “opened up a new uncontrollable outlet for state money”, 
as it was “doubtful whether there will be any adequate financial check on him”.
106
 
Indeed, the subsequent years saw the problems only increase as budgetary control 
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became almost impossible. As Reilly noted in 1956, 
A large variety of new development works are under 
consideration…No attempt is being made to discuss with the Finance 
Department the phasing of this work so that heavy expenditure does 
not fall at the same time. The function of the Finance Department as a 
co-ordinator of the State’s expenditure is being whittled away and the 
Department reduced to nothing more than an accounting section.
107
  
In fact, Fahad subsequently added to his ‘empire’ the Administration and Housing 
Department and the Department of Telegraph and Telephone. In addition, he took 
over the responsibility for determining salary scales, terms of contracts of 
employment, and other administrative issues. Fahad’s “untutored ebullience and lack 
of talent for administration”, the 1956 Administration Report noted, “contributed in 
no small measure to the continuing lack of order in State development”.
108
 This 
increase in Fahad’s power was described as “Shaikh Fahad’s Increasing 
Stranglehold”.
109
   
By 1956, Reilly reported that Crichton was very depressed about the general state of 
affair in Kuwait. “The Finance Department is rapidly being deprived of those 
responsibilities which are hitherto exercised and its opportunity for exercising some 
kind of control and co-ordination is being whittled away”.
110
 The 1956 
Administration Report asserted that Critchton had “never in fact been able to 
introduce those measures of financial orderliness and budgetary control which we had 
hoped would follow from his appointment and the failure of the Ruler to control the 
activities of the more powerful members of his family made Colonel Crichton’s 
position increasingly difficult”.
111
 Thus, he too soon resigned. 
4.7. CONCEDING DEFEAT AND SHIFTING OBJECTIVES 
In light of the above, it is clear that while the British Government and advisors did 
have important influence on the policies undertaken in internal Kuwaiti development 
affairs. As shown in the next chapter, this influence included their key role in 
formulating the development schemes Kuwait adopted and articulating the ideas 
                                                 
107
 FO1016/514: ‘Shaikh Fahad’s Increasing Stranglehold’ by Reilly, 26 April 1956, p. 2. 
108
 FO371/126869: Kuwait Annual Report for 1956, 20 February 1957, p. 4. 
109
 FO1016/514: ‘Shaikh Fahad’s Increasing Stranglehold’ by Reilly, 26 April 1956. 
110
 Ibid., p. 1. 
111
 FO371/126869: Kuwait Annual Report for 1956, 20 February 1957, p. 8. 
 89 
behind them.  However, as seen, their influence was in no way commanding, and as 
Hay wrote, the British experts engaged remained “in strict subordination to the 
Kuwait heads of departments” (Hay, 1955: 366).  
British frustration to achieve increased control was apparent very early on in the 
development process. Describing the situation in 1953, a Brief to Churchill noted that 
the British had hoped that their representatives and the British advisers “would be able 
to establish an influence with the Ruler and Kuwaiti officials which would be 
sufficiently strong to enable them to exercise control over administration in the 
interests of Kuwait and the United Kingdom”.
112
 After the Ruler rejected appointing a 
Senior British Adviser, noted the Brief, they had to rely on the two British advisers. 
However, their influence was “limited by the emergence of ‘nationalist’ elements in 
Kuwait”, led by Fahad, half-brother of the Ruler, “who, working upon the native pride 
and independence, are determined to keep executive control in Kuwaiti hands, resist 
any invasion by the British advisers into executive matter”.
113
  
Towards the mid-1950s, the British decided to change the objectives embodied in 
what was called the ‘new conception’ of their role in Kuwait as mentioned above. In 
his Memorandum on Kuwait, Fry of the Foreign Office noted that the British 
government was “fully aware of Kuwait’s importance”, and that “their efforts to exert 
influence in the place have in fact been unremitting”.
114
 However, the British had “no 
mandate to interfere directly in internal affairs, and the Ruler and his family resent 
interference”.
115
 “There is nothing we can do”, he concluded, “that we are not already 
doing to get the administration improved, short of insisting on having our way to an 
extent which might involve the use of force…”.
116
 
Likewise, the Political Agent noted in 1954,  
[while] it has been our declared policy over the past two years to 
increase our influence in the internal affairs of Kuwait, in order to 
achieve a closer hold over our moral and material interests, it has been 
equally the firm determination of the Ruler and his family to resist us 
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in doing so; and the Ruler has in great part succeeded…I do not 
believe that we can afford to go any further than we have already gone 
without a revolutionary change of policy and without being prepared to 
take over, by force if necessary, a large measure of internal control.
117
  
To use force or to exert even more pressure on the Ruler to increase British influence, 
however, was seen to be counterproductive to British interests, as “[i]ncreased 
pressure ... would lead either to his abdication, with all the potentially dangerous 
uncertainties which would inevitably follow, or to his altering for the worse his 
present attitude to us, unsatisfactory as in many ways it is”.
118
 It may “result in so 
sharp a reaction on the Ruler’s part as would inevitably lead to a widening rather than 
a binding of the personal relationship between him and the Political Agent which…is 
one of the essentials to the stability of our position in Kuwait”.
119
  
Moreover, these risks were seen as unnecessary to take, because the major British 
interests in Kuwait were under no threat, and neither was the Kuwaiti connection to 
Britain. “It has been a considerable achievement to keep our traditional position 
intact”, noted Fry, and “the Ruler shows no sign of wishing to forgo the British 
conexion”; moreover, “the Oil Company, which provides our main interest in Kuwait, 
is able to operate under stable conditions”.
120
  
With this realization came a shift in objectives. As the 1954 Kuwait Administration 
Report stated,  
The administration objectives with which we began the year in Kuwait, 
namely the establishment of a system of administration meeting 
something more like our own standards of efficiency, had to be 
modified as they were found to be unattainable, but it also became 
apparent that Kuwaiti methods were not necessarily so dangerous in 
themselves and did not necessarily involve any loosening of the basic 
ties between ourselves and Kuwait, nor any serious damage to the 




To the same effect, the Political Agent noted, 
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I do not think that we can hope for anything striking in the way of an 
improvement in our position. It is in the present nature of things more 
defensive than offensive and for that reason if we are to maintain our 
major interests we may even have to surrender some that are of lesser 
importance…So long as our fundamental interests in oil and sterling 
are unaffected, we may have to be less worried about some of our 
moral responsibilities and accept the fact with Burke that ‘it is no 




The resultant position of the British in Kuwait by the mid-1950s was described as 
follows:  
Kuwait’s characteristic as an independent Arab city State has become 
even more marked and our ability to influence its development has 
become less, at any rate for the time being. Our trade has suffered 
some decrease which may be lasting. Our position has become more 




Thus, conceding defeat, the Annual Report of 1956 noted: “[t]he days when we could 





It is clear from examining the documents that the Kuwaitis were successful in 
resisting British attempts to gain control over the internal affairs of the state. 
However, the dynamics resulting from the ensuing struggle produced some of the 
most important institutions during the period. As seen, the Development Board, which 
was the very institution responsible for supervising and coordinating development 
throughout the 1950s, was itself created in the context of the British advisors’ 
attempts to counter entrenched powers in the Kuwaiti government and gain more 
influence for themselves. Despite such attempts, however, control over development 
and ultimate decisions remained firmly in Kuwaiti hands. It is important to know this 
in order to appreciate how Kuwaitis were able to undertake certain economic policies 
despite numerous British objections as discussed in the next chapter. Indeed, it will be 
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apparent that the British had played a primary role in the creation of the Kuwaiti 
economic system as most of the adopted schemes, whether relating to internal 
development or external investments, were centered on British ideas and had taken 
into consideration British interests. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this chapter, 
their influence was not commanding, and Kuwaitis were not forced to undertake 
policies they did not see fit. The next chapter turns the focus to the examination of the 




THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RENTIER ECONOMY 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The arrival of enormous oil revenues instigated a rapid and fundamental 
transformation of Kuwait’s economy. The primitive nature that had characterized 
hundreds of years of the country’s pre-oil economy very soon became 
unrecognizable, and a full-fledged rentier economy emerged within an exceptionally 
short period of time. Indeed, within less than a decade, Kuwait’s face had changed 
forever.   
While the rentier state literature explains post-oil economic policy in terms of 
political utility, it is the aim of this chapter to examine, from primary documentation, 
the underlying ideas and reasoning behind the development schemes adopted by the 
Kuwaiti government with the objective of identifying the particularities of the 
Kuwaiti case. It is also the aim of this chapter to assess the outcomes of these schemes 
and to understand the kinds of problems that were faced in the process of 
implementation, as this will shed further light on the issues a primitive country faces 
in the advent of a sudden surge of revenues. 
5.2. APPROACHING 1950 
Kuwait started to witness a construction boom towards the end of the 1940s. In 1948, 
the situation was described as a “building craze”.1 By the end of that year, work was 
completed on different projects, including “[a] new Security Office, a new Head 
Office for the Education Department, a new reception room for the Sheikh at the 
Customs House Palace to replace the famous old room with its decoration of 
Victorian ladies covering the ceiling, [and] a Customs House…”.2 By the end of 
1949, new schools, a modern hospital, and a wide thoroughfare from the customs pier 
                                                 
1 FO371/74935: Annual Administration Report of the Political Agency, Kuwait for the year 1948, 
February 1949, p. 1. 
2 Ibid. 
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to the main square in the town were built.3 The 1949 Administration Report described 
the activity going on in Kuwait as follows: 
The Kuwait Government continued its activities in an endeavor, in 
some way mis-placed, to create Modern Kuwait. The hospital was 
finished…a new police headquarters and barracks was started between 
the Naif gate and the main square, shining hangar-like erection 
appeared in the Customs are to supply much needed warehouse space, 
pedestals essential for the preservation of the traffic policemen from 
the Kuwaiti drivers were placed in the centre of the main road at every 
cross roads (thereby taking up more than half the available tarmac and 
forcing traffic to go off onto the side) a new street was pushed straight 
through the Suq from the main square down to the jetty. A new 
passport office was opened, and bright green and very badly printed 
Kuwaiti passports were made available to the public…A new 
Electricity A.C. service was put into operation in January, covering 
some three quarters of the town …4  
While such increased activity was being witnessed, it was, however, “haphazard and 
unplanned”.5 As discussed in the next section, it was not until 1950/1951 that 
organized development began to take shape under the new Ruler, Abdulla Al Salim. 
 
5.3. DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES AND THE ROOTS OF THE RENTIER 
STATE 
In 1950, Abdulla Al Salim appointed a British firm, Ewbank & Partners Limited, as 
Consultants for both a water distillation plant and water distribution. Moreover, in 
1951, the private electricity company was nationalized, and a British Chief Electrical 
Engineer was appointed. More significantly, in October, the British firm Messrs 
Minoprio and Spenceley presented a master plan for Kuwait Town.6 This plan was the 
basis on which all future town development was based.  In addition, in February 1952, 
Hasted presented the Ruler with a ‘Preliminary Report on Development of Kuwait 
State’, which he had prepared after studying the problems of Kuwait and having 
“some idea of the conditions existing in the area and the feeling of the people”.7 
                                                 
3 FO371/82003: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1949, January 31, 1950, p. 2. 
4 FO371/82003: Kuwait Annual Report for 1949, pp. 1-2. 
5 Ibid. p.2. 
6 FO371/109860: Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 13. 
7 FO1016/217: Preliminary Report on Development of Kuwait State presented to Ruler of Kuwait, 
February 1952, p 1. 
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According to the report, it was based on the Ruler’s wish to have “the finest city in 
the Middle East and the happiest state”.8 The report’s recommendations are discussed 
here, as it carries many of the core ideas behind the development program that was 
eventually adopted.  
The report emphasized that achieving the Ruler’s wishes “cannot be fulfilled merely 
by the provision of housing, water, electric power, hospitals, schools, etc. alone”.9 
“Happiness and content in a world equipped with modern amenities and an assured 
living”, read the report, “depends on a man’s ability to exercise his creative talent, to 
find interest in his craft, his commerce, his agriculture, and above all, his ability to 
make a contribution towards the welfare of his fellow men”.10 “To provide these 
interests”, the report asserted, “a State must rest on a sound economic and commercial 
basis and give as well as housing and amenities, good and cheap food and interests to 
vitalise its people”.11  
The report recognized and sought to build on the nature of the pre-oil economy and 
the traditional economic leanings and strengths of the Kuwaitis. It contended that 
Kuwaitis were “a vital, shrewd and happy people just because they have had their 
traditional interests in commerce, and trading by sea and in the past had to work hard 
and share and share alike to win their living”.12  However, “[w]ith the coming of 
increased wealth”, it noted,  “additional interests must be provided to absorb their 
creative ability, and opportunities given for the expansion of commercial and 
agricultural enterprise side by side with reasonable prices for staple commodities”.13 
“These opportunities and this stability”, emphasized the report, “can only be given by 
giving to the State the necessities of modern commerce, modern aerodrome, and good 
roads and modern trading facilities such as good warehouses, shops, and the 
encouraging of local industry”.14 Therefore, the issues facing Kuwait were recognized 
to be “much wider than those of re-planning a town”, as “[f]ull consideration must ... 
be given to all the aspects of development and it must be carried out as one whole 









plan, housing, commerce and welfare all together, not piecemeal”.15  
In this context, the stated object of development was two-fold: 
(i) To build the finest town in the Middle East, with the best 
living conditions for all classes of people. 
(ii) To develop pari-passu the commercial interests, economy, 
agriculture and administration of the State so that its future 
prosperity may rest on firm foundations.16 
In terms of the implementation of the plan, the general principle agreed was that as 
much work as possible would be carried out by Kuwaiti contractors, and all stores 
would be obtained through Kuwaiti merchants by competitive tender. Moreover, work 
was to be apportioned in a way in which all contractors big or small would get some 
share according to their capabilities. If work needed to be undertaken by expensive 
machinery to save labor, the state would purchase this machinery, and training teams 
from England would be brought in with it to train Kuwaitis on its use. Contractors 
could thereafter hire these machines and trained operators, and the same would apply 
to work-shops.17 In the placing of contracts, the stated objective was that works would 
be efficiently carried out, and that as many Kuwaitis as possible would share in the 
profits of development contracts. Thus, the requirement of the Kuwaiti government 
was that all foreign contractors were to have a Kuwaiti partner on a sharing basis.18 
“These methods”, contended the report, “will spread the profits over all people in 
Kuwait and keep the money in circulation in the State. The only outside expenditure 
will be for articles not obtainable or for which no factory can be built in Kuwait”.19   
Government intervention in the economy to control prices was seen as necessary, as 
there was a marked rise in prices at the time. Indeed, stabilization of the prices of 
basic commodities was seen as urgent and essential for the success of the plan “in 
obtaining the best value for the money expended and to keep the lower paid workers 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 5 
18 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, p. 2, 
Presented by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol II. 
19 FO1016/217: Preliminary Report on Development of Kuwait State presented to Ruler of Kuwait, 
February 1952, p. 5. 
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happy”.20 Otherwise, “a financial spiral rise in the cost of living will result, with the 
consequent discontent amongst State employees and labour and a lowering of output 
and value for the money expended”.21 
The Ruler endorsed the Report, and in August 1952, a final development plan was 
submitted by Hasted. It was originally a ten-year program with an estimated 
expenditure of £91.5, but was subsequently modified in January 1953, whereby the 
project estimate was broken down in detail over a total period of six years (1952-
1957) rather than ten.22 This plan, although modified, formed the basis of most of 
Kuwait’s development throughout the 1950s.  
The priorities of the Development Program reflect the primitive nature of the pre-oil 
economy, where some of the most basic features of modern states were very much 
lacking. The priorities were for water distillation, pumping, storage, distribution of 










                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Modified estimate and letter by Hasted presented to Development Board dated 
5th January 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol. I. 
23 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, Presented 
by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, p.2, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol. II. 
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Table 5.1.: Kuwait Development Plan, 1952
24
 
Project million £ 
New Palace for Ruler 2 
Ruler's Guest House 1.5 
Hospital 4 
Educational Buildings: Elementary, Secondary, Technical 14 
Hotel 3 
Government Buildings; Naif Avenue 15 
Electric Power Station & Distribution 10 
Gas Supply and Service 2 
Water Distillation Plant 3 
Water Distribution 4 
Sewage 6 
Sanitary Services, Slaughter House, Refuse, etc. 3 
Fire Service: Mains, Hydrants and Stations 1 
Aerodrome 5 
Port & Buildings incl dredging 5 
Reconstruction of Dhow Harbours and Foreshore Road 3.5 
Safat Scheme 0.45 
Research Station 2.5 
Housing Factory, Crushing Plant and Woodworking factory 1 
Contractors' Camps 2.8 
Sand/Lime Brick Factory 0.3 
Margin for possible excesses and deviations etc. 4.7 
Total 93.75 
 
The projects designated by the Program laid the infrastructure to what was hoped to 
be future development of certain industries and trade. Hasted was said to be 
particularly enthusiastic about the water scheme, which aimed at bringing water from 
Shatt al Arab, and port development. He thought they were the two most important 
projects.25 Although the water scheme was eventually not realized, the hope was that 
agriculture would be developed “with water from the Shatt al Arab, and animal 
husbandry, sustained by fodder crops from the irrigated lands and aided by water 
from desert wells, could create considerable employment and reduce the need to 
import fruit, vegetables, dairy produce and meat”.26 With the development of the port, 
Hasted pictured Kuwait “as an important entrepot for trade with surrounding 
countries”, and envisaged “expansion of the ship-building industry”; he also hoped 
                                                 
24 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Modified estimate and letter by Hasted presented to Development Board dated 
5th January 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol. I; FO371/109860: 
Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954. 
25 FO371/104325: Rupert Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 
March 1953, p. 2. 
26 FO371/109860: Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 12; also see The Times 
‘Water Agreement with Kuwait’, January 16, 1956, p. 7. 
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“that merchants will start to run their own steamers...”.27 Moreover, a dry dock was 
part of the port scheme and it was hoped that Kuwait might become a ship-repairing 
centre for vessels up to 1,000 tons.28 
In addition, there was a sense of optimism in the creation of a technical college. “A 
State with no natural resources can, of course, survive on trade and on the skill of its 
workers”, Reilly noted, and “[i]t was with this last idea in view that General Hasted 
emphasized so strongly the need for a technical college”.29 Hasted believed that if 
Kuwaitis “could be trained as skilled technicians”, they could “not only find 
increasing employment with the Oil Company but could build up small industries in 
Kuwait the product of which would satisfy some of their own needs and find a market 
in surrounding areas”.30 
In the meantime, the City scheme designated industrial areas, both inside and outside 
the town. Land plots were given to Kuwaitis who had industrial projects, and 
secondary industries were created, such as Sand Lime Brick Factory, the wood-
working factory, housing factory, etc.. Hasted believed that the creation of these 
second industries “would enable Kuwait to keep going in case oil failed”.31  
As mentioned, a stated objective was that as many Kuwaitis share in the profits from 
development contracts. Apart from this, a principal method by which the people got a 
share in the new found wealth was through the land purchasing program. In this 
regard, the city scheme was “the blueprint in fulfillment of which huge sums of 
money were … spent on buying land and old houses from citizens” (Planning Board, 
1968: 28). In the city, the lands purchased were used to pave roads and to construct 
other public facilities. Some of the land was resold to the private sector. In areas 
surrounding the City, the land was used in small part to construct housing, which was 
then either sold or rented to private persons, mostly government employees. Other 
lands in these areas were also resold to the private sector (IBRD, 1965: 88). In all 
cases, the land acquired from the government were valued at much cheaper prices 
                                                 
27 FO371/104325: Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 March 
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28 FO371/109860: Report by on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 12. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 FO371/104325: Rupert Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 
March 1953, p. 2. 
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than what the government had previously paid for them.  
The land purchasing program took up a major portion of the government’s budget. 
For instance, in the six years leading up to 1965, over fifty per cent more was spent on 
land than on public capital projects (IBRD, 1965: 88). However, while the program 
was recognized to be a means of spreading the wealth, it was also seen as a means to 
keep economic activity going. The private sector, as the International Bank for 
Development and Reconstruction (IBRD) noted, probably relied on land purchases for 
investment capital (IBRD, 1965: 88-90). The Planning Board asserted that these sums 
were used for domestic investment (most of which went to the construction residential 
buildings) and also for consumption. It noted that these domestic expenditures were 
“so large that they provided enough purchasing power to help give momentum to the 
various sectors of the economy” (Planning Board, 1968: 28). Therefore, the IBRD 
thought that “if the amount being spent on land were cut from the budget without 
alternative flow of public investment being provided, the operations of the economy 
at its present level would not be sustained” (IBRD, 1965: 88-90).32 
5.4. LACK OF PRODUCTIVE SCHEMES 
A major concern that was being voiced with regards to the development program 
                                                 
32 The program, however, was criticized for important reasons. As Khoja and Sadler wrote, “the 
government was paying for the purchased land far in excess of what it was worth”, and in the early 
1960s, “land was also acquired at a greater rate than actually required for utilization in the construction 
of such public projects as roads, schools, hospitals and government buildings” (Khoja and Sadler, 
1979: 45). In addition, a “striking fact”, contended the IBRD, “was the relatively small amount that the 
state received from the resale of land or from rentals on government owned property” (IBRD, 1965: 
88). “Despite the fact that the housing program would seem to provide for the turnover of a good deal 
of this land”, noted the IBRD, “only…about 5 per cent of the cost of land acquired by the Government 
has been recovered by sale in the last six years” (IBRD, 1965: 88-90). This had caused a considerable 
drain on state income. 
In addition, an “appreciable part” of funds received from the sale of land were channeled abroad (The 
Planning Board, 1968: 28). While the IBRD recognized the importance of government expenditure, it 
too noted that “to the extent that funds received from the sale of land are remitted for investment 
abroad, they do not affect the prosperity of Kuwait” (IBRD, 1965: 88-90). The land acquisition 
program was also prone to corruption and abuse. For instance, people with connections to decision-
making circles could have foreknowledge of areas that were to be acquired by the state. They would 
therefore buy them from citizens and sell them, when the time came, to the state at inflated rates. In 
sum, the IBRD described the situation and dilemma regarding land acquisition as follows: 
We have the impression that if the amount being spent on land were cut from the 
budget without alternative flow of public investment being provided, the operations 
of the economy at its present level would not be sustained. At the same time, we are 
convinced that the purchase of land at high prices in excess of development needs is 
not a good use of government funds from the standpoint of a desirable distribution of 
the oil revenues within Kuwait, or as a means of promoting orderly development of 
the private sector of the economy… (IBRD, 1965: 88-90). 
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during the period was that there was not enough emphasis on productive schemes 
which would contribute to the state’s revenues. As early as 1953, a Brief for the 
British Prime Minister’s meeting with the Abdulla Al Salem pointed out that a part of 
the difficulties Kuwait was running into without realizing, was “by giving insufficient 
emphasis to productive schemes which would themselves contribute to the State’s 
revenues and make Kuwait less dependent on the oil industry”. 33 The Brief went on 
to suggest the necessity of introducing productive schemes, or in other words, 
“[d]evelopment schemes … which will themselves be productive and furnish a 
contribution to the State’s income”.34  
Other advisors also criticized the situation. In his report on Kuwait, Audsley stated 
“that the present financial ‘gold rush’ may well create serious social problems in due 
course unless the extent and speed of industrial and community developments now 
being undertaken and planned form an integral part of a long-term balanced 
appraisement of the future economic, social and cultural requirements of the people of 
the territory and its administration”.35 
While, as mentioned, industrial projects were in fact created, these projects were 
minor, and some were clearly built up to cash in on the building boom taking place. 
Their prosperity was admittedly dependent on the continuance of the development 
program. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Technical School was far from certain. 
“The success of this long-term project”, admitted Reilly, “depends on how Kuwaiti 
boys take to technical work”.36 In fact, the school was criticized by the Administrative 
Report of 1954 as being unplanned and a result of Hasted’s “steamroller tactics, and 
financial inexperience”, which produced a “£4 million technical school” that up to 
that time, “even with inducements of scholarships”, had not been able “to attract more 
than eight students”.37    
However, it is important to highlight the fact that there was clearly no bias against the 
                                                 
33 FO371/104327: Brief for the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Abdulla Al Salim, May 1953, p. 1. 
34 FO371/104327: Annex A to Brief for the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Abdulla Al Salim, May 
1953, p. 1.  
35 FO371/104450: Notes by Audsley, Development Division, British Middle East Office, Beirut, on a 
visit to Kuwait in April 1953, enclosed in Rapp, British Middle East Office, Beirut to Lord Marquess, 
July 22, 1953. 
36 FO371/109860: Report by on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 12. 
37 FO371/114576: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1954, April 15, 1955, p. 6. 
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creation of industrial projects, as the rentier state literature would suggest. With all its 
problems, the founding of the Technical School had aimed, as discussed, to help in 
the creation of future industries that could generate revenues for Kuwait as an 
alternative to oil. The underlying fact was that the skills that had created Kuwait’s 
vibrant pre-oil economy were rendered obsolete in the post-oil era, and with no 
natural resources other than oil, creating significant industries in the short-term was 
extremely difficult if not almost impossible. Therefore, British officials had 
rationalized the lack of productive schemes in the short term as being ‘reasonable’ in 
the context of the realities of Kuwait, without discounting the development of such 
schemes in future. As Reilly, Economic Counselor on the Political Resident’s staff 
stated:  
 
Though some have doubted its suitability it appears to be as well 
adapted to the needs of Kuwait as could reasonably be expected. It has 
been said that the programme concentrates too much on improving the 
amenities of Kuwait on a lavish scale and ignores the need to 
encourage productive industry in case the income derived from oil 
should be reduced. A short answer is that Kuwait’s present prosperity 
depends entirely on oil and if, for any reason, this source of income 
dried up Kuwait would inevitably sink back to its pre-oil state, since 
there are no other indigenous resources to exploit which would sustain 
industries capable of maintaining Kuwait at its present living 
standards.  A State with no natural resources can, of course, survive on 
trade and on the skill of its workers. It was with this last idea in view 




Likewise, in reply to the charge that was no blueprint for Kuwait’s future, Fry of the 
Foreign Office noted the following: 
 
With no local skill or material resources other than oil, there is little 
hope of building up any industrial potential against the time when the 
oil revenue should cease (a very far distant prospect). Therefore the oil 
revenue must be used largely for developing non-productive social and 
public amenities and for investment. This is in fact what is being done; 
and, although little further in the way of long term planning seems 
feasible, the problem of Kuwait's economic future is frequently 
reviewed.39   
 
                                                 
38 FO371/109860: Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 12. 
39 FO371/114603: Memorandum on Kuwait by Fry, Foreign Office, 4 April 1955, pp. 2-3. 
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These issues were indeed generally recognized.40 Thus, while concerns were raised 
regarding the lack of productive schemes, it was also realized that given Kuwait’s 
realities they were not possible in the short term. In the longer term, however, such 
schemes were hoped for and seen as necessary for the sustainability of the economy. 
Indeed, as discussed, some of the projects planned and created, like the Technical 
School and the water scheme, were thought to be a base upon which future industries 
could be developed. 
5.5. WELFARE vs. SUPER WELFARE 
It is clear from the above that welfare and spreading the wealth among the population 
was a declared and desired objective. This view was shared among the Kuwaitis, 
Hasted and the British Government. While it was believed that wealth distribution 
was economically desirable, the British also viewed this to be essential for social and 
political content. As Reilly pointed out, the program was “a result of intensive thought 
of the British connected with it over the last two years”, and it served two purposes:  
In addition to providing amenities, it also serves to distribute the oil 
wealth widely throughout the population of Kuwait. Not only do the 
merchants make their profit on the imported materials and equipment 
needed for the programme, but shopkeepers and others benefit 
indirectly from the spending of the wages and salaries of those directly 
employed. Consequently, quite apart from the desirability of the 
projects themselves, a steady expenditure on development is essential 
for the general prosperity and contentment of the State.41  
The British, in fact, made sure to emphasize throughout the years the need for 
spreading the oil wealth. In his brief to a Foreign Office representative due to meet 
Shaikh Fahad during the latter’s visit to the United Kingdom, the Political Agent 
pointed out that they should aim to put over to Fahad that “[t]he development 
programme should be thought of not only as providing amenities for Kuwait but also 
as a means of distributing some of the oil wealth to all Kuwaitis from the merchants 
to the coolies”, since “[a] steady flow of this income is most desirable if the 
community is to remain content”. 42 
This was sometimes even seen as more important than the building of a more efficient 
                                                 
40 See for example The Times, “Embarrassments in the Persian Gulf”, May 24 1957, p. 11. 
41 FO371/109860: Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 12. 
42 Political Agent, 1954, in Records of Kuwait, vol. 2, p. 585. 
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administration. As Reilly suggested, it was “unnecessary to force the Kuwaitis to 
accept financial control before they are ready to do so, provided that a sufficient part 
of the State’s revenues reaches all classes of the community and that the level of real 
wages is maintained”.43 
However, while Hasted and the British supported the welfare state and spreading the 
wealth for, among other things, political content, they were very much against what 
Kuwaitis were determined to create: a ‘super-welfare state’, whereby the state 
provides free benefits and subsidized services unsupported by either fees or taxation. 
Describing part of the contemplated super-welfare state, Audlesey noted: “[e]ducation 
is free, including meals (even during holidays), liberal clothing for pupils and costs of 
education abroad. A complete medical service including hospital care, teeth, eye and 
other ailments is free. There are no taxes and customs duties are only four percent of 
the wholesale prices of goods”.44 
This was viewed by the British as extremely dangerous for Kuwait’s future viability. 
The Political Resident argued that  
the attempt to create a super welfare state where everybody will get 
everything for nothing does give cause for alarm, not only because it 
means that none of the existing projects will pay for their maintenance, 
but also because the population will inevitably increase by leaps and 
bounds by the immigration of adventurers and vagrants from all over 
the Middle East.45  
He therefore stressed the need to point out to the Ruler clearly “the dangers that are 
likely to ensue if the State makes a free distribution of all the benefits for which it is 
responsible”.46 
A Foreign Office document on British interests in Kuwait also spoke of this issue 
clearly, tying it to the need for productive schemes. It contended that long-term 
difficulties would arise if Kuwait continued on its current path. “The present 
                                                 
43 FO371/104264: Foreign Office Brief for a meeting of the Kuwait Working Party, November 9, 
1953, p. 2. 
44 FO371/104450: Notes by Audsley, Development Division, British Middle East Office, Beirut, on a 
visit to Kuwait in April 1953, enclosed in Rapp, British Middle East Office, Beirut to Lord Marquess, 
July 22, 1953. 
45 FO371/104325: Rupert Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 
March 1953, p. 6. 
46 Ibid. 
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development plans are laying up heavy maintenance charges for the future”, it 
complained.47 “As things are the intention that many benefits shall be free (water, 
electricity, schooling, school meals etc.) unsupported by local taxation or by local 
hard work may lead not only to the creation of a ‘something for nothing’ mentality 
but to agitation and unrest when it is found that there is nothing useful for the 
Kuwaitis to do”.48 “There is therefore much to be said for encouraging generally 
productive schemes”, that “will yield fairly short term economic returns and at least 
contribute to their own maintenance costs in the future”.49 Likewise, a Brief to 
Churchill prior to his meeting with the Ruler warned that in the long run there a was 
danger of a shortage of money. “The schemes now adopted”, noted the Brief, “will 
lead to heavy maintenance charges to be borne by the state”, and there is “a danger 
that the creation of a ‘something for nothing’ mentality may lead to unrest and 
agitation”.50  
Hasted also held the same view with regards to the super-welfare state. He believed 
that “services such as school, hospitals, etc., should be paid for by the Kuwaitis”.51 In 
describing his position on the matter, the Political Resident reported that Hasted  
deprecated the attempt that is now being made to create a super-
welfare state and recognized the fact that if this process is 
allowed to go too far Kuwait may well run into financial crises. 
For instance, all medical treatment is free and all school children 
are to receive free meals even during holidays and to a certain 
extent free clothing. I do not know whether the supply of water 
and electricity is to be free but it is clear on the principles at 
present being followed that few, if any, of the projects which are 
now in hand will be self-maintaining and that they will involve 
heavy recurring financial commitments.52  
In sum, the British were in favor of and played a crucial role in formulating plans 
through which wealth was spread amongst the population. They emphasized the need 
for such money distribution throughout the years, and viewed it as vital to avoid 
                                                 
47 FO 371/104326: Note on British interests vis a vis Kuwait, unsigned, 30 March 1953, pp. 4-5. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 FO371/104327: Annex B to Brief for the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Abdulla Al Salim, May 
1953, p. 4.  
51 FO371/104340: Political Agent, Kuwait to Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain, 24 February 1953, p. 3. 
52 FO371/104325: Rupert Hay, Political Resident, Bahrain to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 
March 1953, p. 2. 
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social unrest. However, they were at the same time very much against the 
unsustainable policies undertaken by the Kuwaiti government, who despite 
continuous objections by the British, were determined to create the super-welfare 
state. Therefore, the super-welfare state can be concluded to be a Kuwaiti policy 
decision. 
5.6. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
There were many problems facing the implementation of the program. The main 
issues are addressed here by placing them in two general categories: (i) lack of 
efficient administration and ruling family politics; and (ii) haste in carrying out the 
plan. 
(i) Ruling Family Politics and Lack of Efficient Administration 
One of the main impediments to orderly development was the position of the ruling 
family in the affairs of government. As Crichton noted to Fahad, “the Kuwaitis were 
endeavoring to run one of the largest projects in the world with the old patriarchal 
system of administration. It simply could not be done. It was like trying to run the 
‘Queen Mary’ with the crew of a dhow…”.53  
The major problem within this general patriarchal system of rule was the lack of 
central authority, which followed the crushing of the 1938 movement as mentioned 
previously. In the oil age, the lack of central authority became increasingly difficult to 
control. In 1954, the Resident’s Annual Report described the system as ‘oligarchic’, 
where four senior sheikhs occupied the chief offices of Public Security, Public Works, 
Health and Municipality, Police, Justice and Education. “The extent of their powers 
and responsibilities”, it noted, was “indefinite”.54 The Shaikhs with these portfolios, 
especially the more prominent of them, acted very much independently. They were 
described as “behaving as independently of the central authority to the Ruler as did 
the barons of pre-Tudor times”. 55  The acquisition of great wealth, noted the 
Resident’s 1953 Report, “imposed for a time an intolerable strain on the extremely 
                                                 
53 FO371/104330: Account by Crichton of conversation between him and Fahad on September 21, 
1953, enclosed in Pelly, Political Agent to Burrows, Foreign Office, September 30, 1953, p. 3; also see 
Liebesny, 1956: 39.  
54 FO371/114576: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1954, April 15, 1955, p. 3. 
55 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, p. 3. 
 107 
rudimentary administration of the state and at the same time inflated the self-
importance of members of the Shaikh’s family to such an extent that they were very 
impatient of even such slender controls as existed over their personal power and 
finances”.56  To picture the ‘state’ as a single entity, therefore, would be very 
misleading. There were different centers of power, often competing and in direct 
rivalry with one another.  
Budgeting and proper planning in this environment were rendered extremely difficult. 
One of the main contributing reasons was the failure of the Ruler to face members of 
his family who were extravagant, corrupt, and formed major impediments towards 
efficient government. The Ruler “shrinks from definitive actions against sectional 
interests”, that were “only out for their own ends”.57 “The chief weakness was the 
Ruler’s unwillingness to control the members of his family … and his failure to 
impose strict budgetary control of their expenditure as was being continuously 
recommended to him by the Finance Department”.58 
The Ruler’s reluctance to face his family members was sometimes understood to be 
due to his weakness, or “a disinclination to disturb the balance of power in Kuwait 
politics”.59 In fact, the Ruler was sometimes open about the issue. For instance, Pelly 
reported that the Ruler “does not see the necessity for an efficient and well regulated 
administration, in the face of the opposition which it would arouse, particularly 
among his family”.60 Moreover, when the Political Resident suggested to the Ruler 
that he should take more direct control of development, the Ruler replied that while he 
understood what was meant, “he had family difficulties” and “could not himself take 
direct control of development”.61 Thus, even though, for example, the Ruler approved 
a scheme by Crichton to “introduce central financial control whereby the Shaikhs 
holding government portfolios would cease to operate separate departmental 
accounts”, when “the time came to put the scheme into force the Ruler recoiled”.62 
                                                 
56 FO371/109805: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1953, March 12 1954, p. 3-4. 
57 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, p.2. 
58 FO371/109805: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1953, March 12 1954, p. 4. 
59 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, p.2. 
60 FO371/104264: Foreign Office Brief for Meeting of Kuwait working party, 9 November 1953, p. 2. 
61 FO371/114588: Confidential Annex to Kuwait Diary No. 7 of 1955 Covering the Period June 29 to 
July 28, by Bell, 29 June. 
62 Residency Summary of Events during September 1952, p. 5, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, 
vol. 9, p. 323.  
 108 
(ii) Haste in Carrying out the Development Plan 
It must be stressed that Kuwait had no control over the level of oil production and 
hence, of its revenues. Therefore, Kuwait was not able to have a production policy to 
match its needs and capabilities, and to pace itself accordingly.63 This fact, although 
of great importance, is ignored in much of the literature on rentier states. The rise of 
revenues was ‘sudden’ and Kuwait was unprepared. Possibly as a consequence, there 
was a sense of urgency, and haste was the result.  
Indeed, it is very clear from all the documents that Kuwaitis were rushing things, 
particularly in the beginning of development, even though their administrative 
capacity was limited. As Hay wrote, Kuwaitis attempted to “convert the desert town 
of Kuwait into a modern city and to create welfare in the space of a few years without 
first establishing a sound administration. Much confusion resulted” (Hay, 1955: 366). 
This was sometimes described by the British as a “faster, faster mentality” and 
characterized as “an expensive commodity” demanded by Kuwaitis (Monroe, 1954: 
276).64 Indeed, while, as mentioned earlier, Hasted played a role in moving too 
quickly in the process of development, the process itself was initiated by a Kuwaiti 
desire for quick results. This was described as “the Kuwaiti determination to convert 
their newfound wealth into all the amenities of a welfare state in the shortest possible 
time”.65 
In fact, consultants and Hasted had requested that the process of development be 
delayed. “General Hasted told the Ruler that he would have preferred to delay the 
start on construction order to make proper preparations, but the Ruler insisted on 
schools being started immediately”.66 Indeed, Hasted’s instructions were to proceed 
as rapidly as possible with the development program. Thus, his Program was said to 
interpret “the wishes of many Kuwaitis to have a modern welfare state as quickly as 
                                                 
63 It is of course unclear what would have happened if Kuwait actually had control over its oil 
production. However, the fact that it did not does give rise to different possibilities in the way things 
would have eventually developed. Kuwaitis might have chosen to balance oil production with their 
national developmental needs, and hence would not have this sudden huge surplus of funds without any 
plans in place as to their utilization. In the 1970s, for instance, this actually happened. The parliament 
stopped government plans to increase production, as this was seen to be beyond Kuwait's national 
needs. 
64 FO371/104327: Annex B to Brief for the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Abdulla Al Salim, May 
1953, p. 4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 FO371/109860: Report by Reilly on Development of Kuwait to July 1954, p. 15. 
 109 
possible”.67 Moreover, a report presented in the Development Board noted that it had 
been 
stressed by the consultants on town planning in their report that 
the organization of the necessary supervision and contracting 
effort might take eighteen months or more before any visible 
results could be seen on the ground. The Kuwaiti people, 
however, were impatient for results, and therefore ways and 
means had to be found to enable as early a start as possible to be 
made.68 
Some of the haste was rationalized: the haste to build schools, for instance, was in 
order for the schooling program to commence by the end of 1953.69 Nevertheless, the 
situation naturally gave rise to many problems of wasteful spending, lack of proper 
budgeting, and chaos. In fact, a main reason behind Hasted’s wrong estimates was 
“the Kuwaiti desire for haste in getting something done in the first place which moved 
General Hasted to embark upon projects before they had been properly estimated by 
quantity surveyors...”.70 Moreover, the adoption of the cost-plus system, which gave 
rise to huge instances of waste and abuse as discussed in the previous chapter, was in 
large part a consequence of such haste (Monroe, 1954: 276). The context in which 
this system was adopted was described in a Memorandum presented in the 
Development Board. It noted that the projects called for urgency, high-class work and 
finishes, and first class technical skill in supervision and contracting. Therefore, 
 
[t]he problem was how (i) to enable the necessary plans and 
drawings to be prepared, and (ii) to attract the necessary high 
class contracting skill to Kuwait in time to satisfy the demands 
of the programme asked for by the end of 1953. To invite hard 
price tenders from reliable foreign firms required (i) complete 
drawings and bills of quantities estimated at roughly nine 
months work before proceeding to tender and at least one year’s 
delay before state, (ii) some knowledge of local prices and 
conditions by the tenderers and an assurance of stability in the 
supply of local materials, the availability of skilled labour, and 
wage structure, (iii) an assurance of continuity of employment 
                                                 
67 FO371/104327: Annex B to Brief for the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Abdulla Al Salim, May 
1953, p. 2.  
68 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, p. 1, 
Presented by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol. II. 
69 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Development Board, 30 June 1952, in 
Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol. I. 
70 FO371/109947: Note on Reilly’s report by Ewart-Biggs, 14 August 1954, p. 1. 
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to make it worth while for their coming in, and (iv) an assurance 
of the application of normal contracting procedure as elsewhere 
in the world. In order to get the project started, there was 
obviously no alternative to (i) the employment of good outside 
architects and consultants, and (ii) a cost plus and later target 
form of contract with suitable guarantees as employed by 
government departments in many parts of the world where 
similar conditions to those of Kuwait pertain. This was 
recommended to the Education Committee and agreed.71  
 
Thus, as Monroe briefly puts it, “in order to attain the speed and quality of work 
desired, the ruler”, accepting advice, “decided to award main jobs on a cost-plus 
basis, to a limited number of first class British contractors...” (Monroe, 1954: 276). 
The general situation was summed up clearly by the Foreign Office. It noted that 
“Kuwait’s sudden access of wealth has raised also internal problems for her”, a major 
one of them being extravagance and waste: 
Kuwait seems determined to convert her new-found wealth into 
all the apparatus of a welfare state immediately; this is perhaps 
natural, but the rapid increase in oil revenues has outpaced the 
capacity of the administrative machinery. Economy has been 
sacrificed to speed, and there is no proper financial control over 
the development programme; new projects (many of doubtful 
value) are added and existing ones enlarged sometimes to suit 
the ideas of those who gain most in the process.72 
It is clear, therefore, that a combination of haste and an administrative setup in which 
power was decentralized among certain ruling family members played a key role in 
causing much of the waste and lack of orderly development. These members’ 
personalities, together with the position that they had acquired, as will be examined in 
more detail later, formed possibly the major impediment to reform. The discussion 
relating to the decentralization of decision-making also suggests that the rentier state 
literature’s general assumption that policy decisions lie solely in the Rulers’ hands 
who in turn uses them in personally useful ways is extremely misleading. While the 
issues discussed so far relate to the internal development of Kuwait, the next section 
looks at Kuwait’s external investment scheme that had formed a major part of the 
country’s adopted economic system. 
                                                 
71 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, p. 2, 
Presented by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol II. 
72 FO 371/104326: Note on British interests vis a vis Kuwait, unsigned, 30 March 1953, p. 4. 
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5.7. EXTERNAL INVESTMENTS 
The Kuwaiti foreign investment scheme was not part of Hasted’s Development 
Program. However, a general government policy was maintained whereby a third of 
annual revenues would be allocated for external investment (Hay, 1955: 366). While 
the rentier state literature narrowly regards such investments as a perpetuation of the 
rentier nature of the state and as an alternative to industrialization in order to avoid 
social conflict, the documents reveal that the adoption of Kuwait’s investment scheme 
had nothing to do with such motivations. It is the aim of this section, therefore, to 
examine the ideas and reasons behind the initiation of Kuwait’s foreign investment 
policy, albeit briefly. 
The investment scheme adopted by Kuwait was born out of British suggestions to the 
Ruler. This idea was in part taken in light of British interests. “Both from the point of 
view of the sterling area and also of Kuwait itself”, noted the Foreign Office in 1952, 
“it is important that these vast revenues should be responsibly administered”.73 “To 
this end”, it continued, “proposals were made to the Ruler by H.M.G. in March for 
procedure involving the allocation of his revenues between development and current 
expenses, and the investment of the balance (the major portion of the whole) under 
control of an Investment Committee in London which would be appointed by and act 
under the instructions of the Ruler”.74 
Although similar concerns were voiced during the early 1940s as mentioned, in the 
early 1950s, the issue was seen as a matter of urgency. As the Political Resident noted 
in 1951,  
The situation is indeed frightening. The Kuwait Government have at 
present eight million pounds laid up in the bank and are in future likely 
to receive an income from royalties of from fifty to sixty million 
pounds a year. It is impossible for them to spend a quarter of the 
amount, if as much. It is fully time that we started to guide the Ruler 
on the right lines regarding the disposal of his surplus revenue as, and I 
hope it will by possible for somebody to come out and examine the 
question at an early future date.75  
Similar concerns were voiced by the Foreign Office. “Even allowing for the most 
                                                 
73 FO371/98352: Report on the administrative situation in Kuwait, 17 October 1952, p. 3. 
74 Ibid. 
75
 FO371/91300:  Political Resident, Bahrain to Furlonge, Foreign Office, 13 November 1951. 
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ambitious schemes for local development”, Logan contended, “the small capital state 
of Kuwait could not spend all its vast revenues at the rate at which they will be 
received … and a substantial surplus … will therefore remain”.76 Thus, “[t]he use 
made of this surplus is a matter of considerable importance, not only for the Ruler but 
also for the sterling area”.77 For Kuwait, the investment scheme was rationalized by 
the British as providing “a satisfactory means of ensuring lasting benefits for Kuwait 
from her oil industry so that her prosperity may be assured even if her revenues from 
the industry fell below their present level as a result of some unforeseen and 
uncontrollable development in the future”.78 
For the British, as suggested above, a major concern stemmed from the fact that 
Kuwait was in the sterling area and its oil revenues were paid in sterling. This sterling 
surplus was seen to represent “a potential demand for goods, the immediate 
satisfaction of which would place a very heavy strain on the resources of the sterling 
area”; therefore, it was in the British interest “that it should be invested, but 
irresponsible handling of its investment could cause disturbances in the London 
market. Moreover, possession of these large sums leaves the Ruler open to approach 
by all manner of persons and organizations, not all of them worthy”.79  
Thus, in early 1952 certain recommendations regarding the administration and 
investment of Kuwait’s sterling revenues were made to the Ruler by the British in a 
short memorandum given to his representative in London, Kemp. In October of that 
year, the Ruler informed the Political Agent “that he proposed to make arrangements 
for the investment of his surplus revenues and would adopt proposals to be submitted 
to him by Kemp after discussion with his (British) Deputy Director of Finance Mr. 
Crichton, and Mr Loombe, of the Bank of England”.80  
Indeed, the Political Agent noted that the Ruler was prepared to accept these 
proposals even though he did not understand them. The Ruler “does not understand 
the proposals which have already been put to him”, remarked the Agent, “and it is 
clear that his decision involves a large measure of confidence in Her Majesty’s 
                                                 
76 FO371/104340: Logan, Foreign Office to Baily, Washington, 10 February 1953, p. 1. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 3. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., p. 1. 
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Government and trust in the persons to whom he has agreed to leave the detailed 
plan”.81 As advised, an Investment Board was formed in London in 1953, and in the 
next years, “a reasonable balance has been maintained between current expenditure, 
development expenditure and invested reserves”.82 
It is therefore clear that Kuwait’s investment scheme was not a substitute to 
industrialization or seen as way of perpetuating the rentier nature of the state. It was 
previously made clear that there was no bias against industrialization and in fact 
British concerns were raised regarding the lack of productive schemes. The proposal 
for a foreign investment scheme was initiated upon the view that Kuwait would not be 
able to spend all its revenues internally no matter how ambitious the programs were. 
The ideas behind the scheme took into account not only Kuwait’s interests, but British 
interests as well, and the potential harm the sterling surpluses may cause if not 
‘properly’ managed. The latter arguably carried more weight for the British in their 
desire to press on with their investment proposals.  
While the previous sections examined the ideas behind the development schemes 
adopted in the 1950s and highlighted the problems relating to the process of their 
implementation, the next section assesses the economic, social and behavioral 
outcomes of the works carried out.  
5.8. ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF DEVELOPMENT 
The achievements in carrying out the development projects were substantial and must 
not be overlooked. Within less than a decade, the face of Kuwait had changed forever. 
The following are some of the major examples to the bright side of the new Kuwaiti 
post-oil economy up to the mid-1960s (Planning Board, 1968: 29-31; IBRD, 1965: 
146; Ismael, 1993: 105): 
(i) The number of schools jumped from 23 in 1950 to 102 in 1960.83 By 1965, 176 
government schools and 32 private schools were constructed. In 1956/57, there were 
119 students per 1,000 of the population. This ratio was the highest among all Arab 
                                                 
81 FO371/98352: Report on Kuwait by Political Agent, Kuwait, 29 October 1952, p. 1. 
82 FO371/114603: Memorandum on Kuwait by Fry, Foreign Office, 4 April 1955, p. 2; Hay, 1955: 
366. 
83 Naqolo Halaby, Chief Engineer in Kuwait Government,  “Al-Kuwait al-mutaghayyir” (Changing 
Kuwait), in Al-raed al-arabi, November 1960, 1st issue.  
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states, and by 1965, the ratio was further increased to 170 per 1,000. Moreover, in 
terms of women emancipation, the proportion of girls to boys in schools drastically 
increased, from basically 0% in 1936 to 40% in 1962/63. This is reflected in the 
following table:  
 
Table 5.2.: The Rise of Education    
Education  Number   Proportion of: 
Academic Year Boys Girls  Total Boys (%) Girls (%) 
1936/37 600 0 600 100 0 
1946/47 3037 935 3962 76.65 23.6 
1956/57 15946 8578 24524 65.02 34.98 
1960/61 27698 17459 45157 61.34 38.66 
1962/63 35674 23877 59551 59.9 40.1 
Source: IBDR, 1965: 146     
 
(ii) The number of hospitals increased from 2 in 1950 to 10 in 1960.84 By the mid-
1960s, including the 8 hospitals built, 2 sanatoria, 37 health centers and dispensaries, 
148 school dispensaries and 9 centers for preventive medicine were constructed. By 
1965, there was one doctor for every 768 inhabitants, up from one doctor for every 
25,000 inhabitants in 1949. These numbers were comparable to the most advanced 
nations at the time as reflected in tables below. Medical services were free to both 
Kuwaitis and visitors. In 1965, the IBRD noted that these “health services are 
comparable in quality to those in developed countries” (IBRD, 1965: 132). 
 
Table 5.3.: Ratio of Physicians and Nurses to Population  
Country Kuwait Canada U.K. Sweden U.S. 
Number of Inhabitants Per Physician* 1069 950 900 1200 790 
Number of Inhabitants per Nurse* 251 191 - 130 340 
*Data for Canada and Sweden in 1957, for U.K. and U.S. in 1958. Kuwait is based on 1961 tentative 
census results; Data for U.S. in 1956, for Canada, U.K., and Sweden in 1957. 
Source: IBRD 1965, 136. 
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Table 5.4.: Ratio of Hospital Beds to Population 
    
Country 
Kuwait  Canada U.K. Sweden  U.S. 
Hospital Beds per 1,000 Population* 8.4** 11.6 10.8 15 9.2 
Data for Canada, U.K., Sweden and U.S. in 1957; The population of Kuwait is estimated at 350,000 
for purposes of the table. 
Source: IBRD 1965, 136     
 
(iii) Extensive road networks were paved: around 8.5 million square meters of roads 
were paved during the period 1957-1965 alone. 
(iv) A number of electric power stations were built and an expansive network for 
distribution and street lighting were laid down. Installed capacity jumped from 930 
kwh in 1950 to 70,000 in 1960.85 By 1965, installed capacity was 270,000 kwh. 
(v) The largest desalination plant of the time in the world was built, in addition to the 
development of underground brackish and sweet water resources which produced 23 
million gallons per day. This overcame Kuwait’s deficiency in the availability of fresh 
water.  
(vi) By the end of 1965 the government had completed the following constructions: a 
number of government buildings for ministries and the Municipality, several 
neighborhood centers, a new abattoir, and several commercial centers. By 1960, 2,693 
houses for lower income groups were built,86 and by the end of 1965 the number 
jumped to 7,000. 
(vii) Port facilities were expanded. This played a role in absorbing the huge increase 
in imports, which rose from KD 29.9 million in 1954 to KD 135 million in 1965. 
(viii) Numerous modern commercial buildings, blocks of flats and private houses 
were built. 
(ix) Various industries were created to supply the building and construction sector. 




These include sand lime bricks, cement products, metal windows, water tanks, 
asbestos pipes, metal cisterns, sheet metal and wrought iron, wooden windows and 
doors, tiles, marble. 
(x) Music, theatre, and sports facilities and activities were supported/financed by the 
state. Thus, arts and sports flourished and Kuwait became largely recognized as a 
pioneer in this field throughout the region. 
5.8.1. Problems Resulting from Development  
While these accomplishments were indeed substantial, they were accompanied by 
structural ills that have been a persistent feature of Kuwait’s economy lasting till this 
day. Some of the most important ones are mentioned in this section. 
Most significantly, Kuwait became dependent on a single source of income. In 1964, 
for instance, the crude oil and natural gas sector grabbed 63.1% of GDP (Central 
Bank of Kuwait, 19670: 9). Likewise, in 1968, the Planning Board estimated that 61% 
of GDP was from the oil and natural gas sector, which also provided 93.5% of 
government revenues (Planning Board, 1968b: 7).  
A second major problem was the huge shift in population demographics due to the 
influx of foreign labor. In 1949, the population was estimated to be around 100,000. 
By 1957, however, the total jumped to 206,473, and reached 467,339 by 1965 
(Ismael, 1993: 117). Very soon, Kuwaitis became a minority in their own country. As 
can be seen from the table below, in 1965, they constituted 47.1% of the total 
population.  
Table 5.5.: Demographic Change    
Year Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti 
  Number Percent Number Percent Total 
1957 113622 55 92851 45 206473 
1961 161909 50.4 159712 49.6 321621 
1965 220059 47.1 247280 52.9 467339 
Source: Ismael (1993;117)    
Moreover, Kuwaitis drifted away from the traditional productive occupations like 
fishing, pearling and boat-building. They were first attracted by jobs in the oil 
industry, and later “into government service, construction and the manifold service 
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occupations of a high-income economy. Naturally, the traditional labour-intensive 
industries could not compete. They receded to a fraction of their former significance 
or disappeared entirely” (IBRD, 1964: 27). 
With the expansion in the employment of both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, the civil 
service became greatly inflated, and disguised unemployment amongst Kuwaiti 
citizens grew. Thus, labor productivity became very low. In 1965, the IBRD 
described the resulting situation as follows: 
Even a cursory passage through the administrative offices reveals great 
segmentation, showing little groups of two to five persons performing 
a few moves in an administrative process. This fragmentation seems 
unnecessary in what is after all a small State and administration…The 
amount of work done by each person or section is often small because 
there sometimes simply is not enough work to fill the day…a civil 
service of about 36,000 members serving a population of about 
350,000 speaks for itself (IBRD, 1965: 45). 
 
However, it must be pointed out here that, as the IBRD asserted, the expansion of 
employment should not be seen solely as a result of distributive policies, since 
unjustified expansion also included non-Kuwaitis. The IBRD noted that “[i]t would 
not be fair to imply that the problem of redundancy in the public service is entirely 
that of keeping as many Kuwaitis as possible on the public payroll. Kuwait seems to 
follow a fairly liberal policy of employment of employing expatriates as well, 
although at present there are strong pressures to reduce their number” (IBRD, 1965: 
41). 
In any case, the inefficiency of the indigenous labor force could also be seen to be a 
result of another problem: the lack of education. In 1963, less than 1% of the Kuwaitis 
in the classified civil service were college graduates, less than 5% had graduated from 
secondary school, and only 13 % from primary school. Around 30% were illiterate 
(IBRD, 1965: 40). This condition drained the treasury. In 1964, Shehab, Financial 
Consultant at the Ministry of Finance during the period, noted that the situation  
led to such overcrowding in the public service that salaries and wages 
now create a very serious drain on the treasury. The city-state at 
present has on its payroll no less than 53,000 men and women, both 
indigenous and aliens, excluding those in the armed services, at an 
annual cost of nearly $168,000,000. This means that every three 
citizens are being served by one public servant at an average cost of 
 118 
about $1,120 per citizen … This … raised public expenditures for 
administration to an incredible level. (Shehab, 1964: 466) 
Another problem, which developed, was the increased dependence of Kuwait on 
imported consumer and capital goods. The problem resulting from this was that it 
naturally exposed the country’s economy to disturbances abroad as result of highly 
fluctuating prices and unguaranteed sources of supply. Moreover, as the Planning 
Board put it,  
The gravity of the foreign trade situation at hand deserves some 
emphasis. Huge financial resources have found their way abroad to pay 
for imports, while domestic exports-other than oil – remain drastically 
low. With this “leakage” of income and resources the Kuwaiti 
economy would become recessionary were it not for the oil revenues. 
(The Planning Board, 1968: 6)  
These problems constituted the major economic structural ills that have proven to be 
chronic. Indeed, excluding the rate of illiteracy amongst the Kuwaiti workforce, the 
present day economy of Kuwait suffers almost identically from the very same 
problems described above. Therefore, it is clear that the roots of Kuwait’s current 
economic problems embodied in the notion of rentier state lie in the policies 
undertaken during the 1950s. While these were the economic problems witnessed, the 
next two sections focus on the social and behavioral implications of these policies. 
5.8.2. Lack of Socioeconomic Planning and Inequality 
One important feature of the early post-oil policies that deserves some closer look was 
the fact that not all citizens benefited equally. While corruption and connections 
played a role in this, it was also largely a result of “an absence of socio-economic 
planning and control during the boom-period” (Planning Board, 1968: 38). Indeed, in 
the absence of proper planning for a fairer distribution of wealth, remnants of the 
socio-economy of the pre-oil era, for largely practical reasons, caused some to benefit 
more than others.  
For example, it was those who had previously owned larger and more estates in 
Kuwait that naturally benefited more from the land-purchasing program. It was also 
the rich who afforded to buy new plots of land in the hope of having them bought by 
the government, and were able, as well, to purchase resold state land. In addition, the 
top positions in government with higher pay naturally went to people with some 
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education. The educated segment of society at the time happened to be the upper 
class. As the IBRD noted, the fact that “many officials in the higher ranks ... are 
related to merchant families ... is but natural and unavoidable in a country where that 
class has been almost the only educated one” (IBRD, 1965: 39). Thus, the lower a 
person was in the pre-oil class system, the lower education he probably had, and 
therefore, the lower position in the post-oil job market he was able to get. 
Further, in the contracting business, the same idea of ‘practicality’ applies. Indeed, in 
a memorandum presented in the Development Board assessing the contracting 
situation in Kuwait, a main concern was that development works were not distributed 
equally between the large and small Kuwaiti merchants. However, the reasons were 
acknowledged to be more of a practical nature than by deliberate design. In this 
regard, during the initial phases of development, the Development Board agreed that 
the number of major contractors working at one time was to be five in order for them 
to carry out the works economically and to meet the requirements set out. “This 
should have enabled all the contractors to be kept busy using their building trades 
steadily in rotation from one job to the other without causing unemployment 
fluctuations in labour, skilled tradesmen and supervision, and therefore should have 
tended to keep the prices stable”.87 These contractors were required to have Kuwaiti 
partners, and the foreign contractors were at liberty to choose and come to agreement 
with their Kuwaiti counterparts. With the desire of Kuwaitis to commence 
development works quickly, “[t]hose Kuwaitis with initiative and enterprise and those 
with previous business connections” were “first in the field”.88 
In supplying the materials for development, the Kuwaitis were concerned with 
ensuring “a reasonable distribution of the orders”.89 However, a similar problem 
existed. As the Development Board memorandum put it, “[a]nother aggravating factor 
                                                 
87 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, Presented 
by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, pp.3-5, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol. II. It was thought many of the smaller Kuwaiti contractors would also have 
been employed on subcontracting and on the construction of smaller works, houses and road. “Thus it 
was reasonable to suppose many would benefit”. However, due to various reasons, this initially did not 
go as expected, at least in the early staged. The reasons are beyond the scope of the chapter; however, 
as an example, there was government's “slowness of survey and parcellation schemes prevented 
housing and road contracts being let at the expected pace to the smaller contractors”, and its “change in 
policy and the necessity for reorganization and accumulation of the staff to implement a hard price 
tender system”, for a while in 1953 no minor contracts were placed out to tender. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
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is that the majority of the well known agencies for machinery, transport, hardware, 
electrical goods, etc. are in the hands of only a few Kuwaitis. These few are just the 
same enterprising few who entered the major contracting field early or had previous 
foreign business connections”.90 
Many suggestions were in fact put forward to try to remedy the situation. For 
instance, Al Zaid suggested to the Development Board that instead of having 
individual partnerships being awarded contracts, a quasi-official company should be 
formed with shares subscribed by the Kuwaiti people. “This Company ... would be the 
link between the people of Kuwait and foreign contractors, thus replacing the system 
of individual partnerships”.91 However, for practical reasons, it was not possible to 
implement this idea. Moreover, Hasted advocated a system whereby contractors and 
suppliers would be graded into classes and categories so as to distribute contracts 
amongst all according to their capabilities. In fact, this was a principle reason behind 
his advocating of the creation of a Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce. As he noted,  
 
I agree fully ... that both contractors and suppliers should be graded 
into classes and categories. I have been advocating this ever since the 
Development Board was formed, but saw little chance of being able to 
do it until a Chamber of Commerce was in being and the graded and 
classified list had the full approval of the people of Kuwait. This 
grading and classification of Contractors and Suppliers is the whole 
key to a satisfactory future in sharing the profits of Development, and, 
again, I feel, is dependent on a Chamber of Commerce being formed, 
which is fully representative of all Kuwaiti interests.92 
While a Chamber of Commerce was not created until the late 1950s, a grading system 
was indeed adopted. However, apart from corruption, benefiting the people of 
Kuwait in a more equal manner remained a challenge that was, in the absence of 
proper socioeconomic planning, largely a result of the remnants of Kuwait’s prior 
socioeconomic history. 
5.8.3. Behavioral Developments 
Accompanying the economic changes were many behavioral developments that were 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the Development Board, December 15 1952, in 
Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol I. 
92 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Minutes of 100th Meeting of the Development Board, January 4 1954, in 
Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol. III. 
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being recognized as potential threats for future progress. “From the institution of 
Welfare State in Kuwait, society has developed a variety of unfortunate symptoms 
that must be diagnosed and cured before they develop into future obstacles”, admitted 
the Planning Board in its first Five Year Plan (Planning Board, 1968: 136). These 
problems can be placed in two categories. The first is related to work ethics. The 
second is general social behavior. 
(i) Work ethics   
Regarding work ethics, some of the policies undertaken undermined the drive of 
Kuwaitis to take their public jobs seriously. For example, because business was 
booming, its attraction was too powerful to be resisted, especially to the qualified few. 
These qualified few would not have entered the civil service if it had meant that they 
would need to give up their lucrative trades. “It is an open question”, noted the IBRD, 
“whether, not withstanding the liberal salary scales, sufficient Kuwaitis of standing 
and ability could have been attracted to the service of the state if that would have 
mean divesting themselves of all interest in private business” (IBRD, 1965: 39). 
Therefore, a sort of a compromise was devised to eliminate this competition. This 
compromise included permitting civil servants to run their own businesses alongside 
their public offices. This concession, however, had caused great harm. As the 
government economic consultant noted, “[i]t over taxed the limited time and energy 
of those in key positions, strained their allegiance to the state, exposed them to grave 
temptation and meant that the public service ceased to be considered a career” 
(Shehab, 1964: 466).  
It must be noted, however, that the concept of civil service was itself very much alien 
and foreign to the way of thinking and mode of life that had existed just a few years 
previously. As the IBDR noted,  
[t]he work to be done for the community was as much a family affair 
as that performed in commerce, shipping, fishing and the artisan 
trades; who had participated in it and on what conditions was decided 
as much on a basis of personal relationships in the one case as in the 
other...It is therefore easy to understand that the introduction of a 
modern framework for the public service has met...enormous 
difficulties (IBRD, 1965: 37-38).  
Thus, the fact that there was no clear-cut separation between public duty and private 
 122 
interest of the civil servant, which undermined efficiency, may also be seen as largely 
a legacy of the past. In fact, as the IBRD pointed out, the dual activity was further 
“openly recognized and ... considered not at all incompatible with the position of a 
civil servant” (IBRD, 1965: 39).    
In addition to the problems resulting from the mixing of private and public pursuits, 
there were great consequences to the policy of securing employment for Kuwaitis and 
giving them priority over expatriates. Among other things, it dampened the incentives 
to gain higher education and skills. Moreover, by eliminating competitive selection 
for the public service jobs, it encouraged complacency among young Kuwaitis and a 
tendency to judge performance solely by local standards (Shehab, 1964: 466). 
Furthermore, the population’s new dependence on government for income and 
support weakened the traditional Kuwaiti entrepreneurial ability, enterprise, and risk-
taking. “Hardly any worthwhile financial or industrial venture which deviates from 
the established pattern is ever attempted by Kuwaiti entrepreneurs”, contended 
Shehab, “unless it is assured of state financing, protection or guarantee” (Shehab, 
1964: 466).  
Indeed, as the IBRD noted,  
Private investors and industrialists have sought government 
participation, both because of the financial resources which the 
Government could make available and for the preferred position which 
they assumed that such joint enterprises would have in selling their 
products to the Government, by far the largest consumer in the State. 
Contrary to experience elsewhere, private entrepreneurs in Kuwait 
have not hesitated to accord Government a controlling interest in 
enterprises in which they were involved. (IBRD, 1965: 57) 
(ii) General social behavior  
In terms of social patterns, one of the major problems was that the arrival of wealth 
was so sudden and entailed no effort or sacrifice on the part of the Kuwaitis. Public 
services were provided as a right, and in return, laid no responsibility on citizens in 
terms of their duties towards the state. This was seen as a critical issue. Therefore, the 
Planning Board stressed, 
If society ensures the provision of free public services to all citizens, 
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this should not be taken as an absolute right to which every citizen is 
entitled. It should be regarded as a sign of social security based on the 
exchange of mutual interests among the members of society. (Planning 
Board, 1968: 139) 
This situation was not only seen as a problem from a behavioral perspective, but also 
for the sustainability of the state. Thus, the Planning Board’s stated aim was to “make 
well-off groups of society bear some of the costs of welfare services both from a 
sense of responsibility and as an assurance that such services will continue for future 
generations” (Planning Board, 1968: 140). 
The results of all these policies on society were very visible. Shehab, the 
government’s economic consultant at the time, summed up his impression of Kuwaiti 
society, after less than two decades of oil production, as follows: 
Young people have lost their perspective, their urge to acquire 
knowledge, their acceptance of discipline. As a result, the drive, 
diligence and risk-taking that characterized the old Kuwaiti are no 
more. At both ends of the social scale the new citizen is content to 
enjoy a life of leisure and inertia, and is unwilling that this happy state 
of affairs should be disturbed. Protected, pampered, lavishly provided 
for and accountable to no one, he lives in a world of make-believe… 
Ostentatious consumption, prodigal expenditure, idleness and pleasure-
seeking are common; frugality, moderation and enterprise have 
become the antiquated virtues of a bygone age. (Shehab, 1964: 466) 
Thus, the “something from nothing mentality” warned by the British and the shift in 
the attitudes of Kuwaitis was already being observed very early into the boom period. 
In fact, as early as 1954, the Kuwait Administrative Report complained that 
“[a]mongst all classes of Kuwaitis the idea is growing that while paying no taxes they 
are entitled to free or State-subsidised education, health, water, electricity, telephones 
and other services”.93  
5.9. CONCLUSION  
While Kuwait saw considerable achievements during the 1950s, the roots of many of 
the problems it has been suffering from until today clearly go back to policies 
undertaken during that period. The situation was recognized and acknowledged by the 
Kuwaiti government at the time, and was summed up by the Planning Board as 
                                                 
93 FO371/114576: Political Resident’s Annual Report for 1954, April 15, 1955, p. 8. 
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follows: 
It must be admitted here that many of the past achievements were 
accompanied by undesirable or unexpected developments, since the 
country was taken unprepared by the speed of events. Faced with such 
an onslaught it had been impossible to guard adequately against them. 
For example, educational and medical services were expanded without 
thinking about a new policy that would govern their quality and scope. 
Similarly, the civil service became unavoidably inflated during the 
boom period. The country’s economic spirit was clearly one of 
‘laissez-faire’ which did not consider the unbalancing effect of such 
free development on the structure of the economy. It was felt that there 
had been no search for optimum state of equilibrium and 
diversification in economic activity. Moreover, the rapid rate of 
development in the country created a soaring demand for various skills 
of foreign labour. As a result the population exploded. Under such 
circumstances it was impossible to call a halt and formulate a 
population policy to suit the country’s political and economic interests. 
(Planning Board, 1968: 35) 
Therefore, concluded the Board, “there is sufficient reason to consider the Kuwaiti 
economy, in spite of its high per capita income, as one existing in a state of relative 
underdevelopment” (Planning Board, 1968: 4). 
Thus, many of the features of the rentier state with all its associate structural and 
social ills were clearly witnessed very soon into the development process. However, 
as discussed, many of these problems were not a byproduct of the certain narrow 
notions put forward by the rentier state literature. For instance, the lack of productive 
schemes, which some of the literature on rentier states considers in the context of 
avoiding social conflicts, was simply viewed as a result of the fact that the pre-oil 
skills of the people had no place in the modern economy, and with no resources other 
than oil, establishing industries in the short term was not a possible option. Moreover, 
schemes such as external investments were not initiated with the purpose of 
perpetuating the rentier system as is often suggested. Further, the documents revealed 
that possibly the biggest impediment to proper planning and implementation was 
haste, sparked by the sudden onslaught of revenues, combined with ruling family 
members whose personalities undermined much needed administrative reforms. 
Nevertheless, progress even in this regard cannot be discounted, and indeed was not at 
the time. As the Political Agent noted in 1958,   
Although it is impossible for the Finance Department to control the 
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extravagance of the more lavish departments, Kuwait can afford this 
extravagance. What...we must acknowledge is the immense strides 
Kuwait has made in learning to administer its new found wealth. When 
we remember how rapid has been its rise from a desert Shaikhdom 
with an economy which had hardly changed for two hundred years to a 
modern State beset with all the problems which spending probably the 
highest per capita income in the world involves, it is quite surprising 
how the Kuwaitis have adapted themselves to administration...94 
Finally, welfare and other policies relating to wealth distribution were clearly an 
essential part of the official development program. While they were seen as crucial 
for the health and vitality of the economy, they were also thought to be important for 
social and political content. However, despite their continued stress on the need to 
distribute income for such content, the British were very much against the super-
welfare policies Kuwaitis were undertaking. Thus, contrary to the general 
assumptions in the literature, the super-welfare policies were at the time viewed as 
dangerous not only for the sustainability of the economy, but also in that they would 
create social agitation and unrest. In light of this, the goal of the next chapter is to 
examine the mindset behind the Kuwaiti determination to undertake these policies 
despite it being clear that they were potentially dangerous as the British had continued 
to warn and point out.  
 
                                                 
94 FO371/132757: Halford, Political Agent, Kuwait to Burrows, Political Resident, Bahrain, 11 August 
1958, p. 2. 
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CHAPTER 6  
SITUATING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL CULTURE OF 
KUWAIT 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed earlier, during the foundation period of Kuwait, the British had 
supported and emphasized the need for spreading the wealth in order to achieve 
political content. To them this was a primary objective. However, they were at the 
same time very much against the ‘super-welfare’ state Kuwaitis were determined to 
create. They viewed these Kuwaiti policies as dangerous not only economically, but 
also socially as they feared this may lead to future ‘agitation’ and ‘unrest’.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the British did not think the ‘super-welfare’ policies 
were necessary for social and political content; on the contrary, they thought they 
were actually harmful. It can also be inferred from this that there were other factors at 
play behind the Kuwaiti policy decision to create the ‘objectionable’ super-welfare 
state beyond political interests. The question that must therefore be examined is why 
the Kuwaitis consciously decided to undertake such policies despite repeated 
warnings of potentially dangerous future outcomes? 
In addressing this question, the discussion is placed within the framework of 
examining the economic principles adopted by the 1962 Constitution. The reason is 
that the Constitution embodied and formalized many of the ideas and ideals that 
resonated throughout the 1950s. These come out very clearly in the minutes of the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) that framed the Constitution. In this regard, there were 
two arenas of discussion within the CA. First was the general CA sessions, and 
second was the meetings of Constitution Committee (CC) which was elected from 
amongst the members to draft the articles and present them to the CA for discussion 
and acceptance. Furthermore, these discussions are utilized in this chapter as a 
springboard to delve back into understanding the mindset of policy-makers and the 
decisions they had made during the post-oil era of the 1950s.  
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6.2. BEYOND POLITICAL UTILITY 
The discussions in the CA on the economic system Kuwait should adopt went 
extremely smoothly. Except for a few technical issues, the ideas and ideals were 
clearly shared amongst its members. The discussions were conducted at two levels. 
The first was more abstract, dealing with  ‘choosing’ the type of economic system that 
is to be adopted by the constitution and determining the size of the public sector vis-a-
vis the private sector in the economy. The second level dealt with the general 
socioeconomic policies the state is obliged to undertake, which is the primary concern 
of this chapter. 
At the first level, the main issue was finding the right place for Kuwait amidst the 
battling economic systems of the post-war era. In explaining the position of the CC, 
Othman, the Constitutional Adviser, advised the CA that they had wanted to avoid 
any extreme economic system whether affiliated with the East or West; socialist or 
capitalist.
1
 To do so, private property was acknowledged and rendered inviolable. 
Importantly, however, this was not to be at the expense of the public good. Hence, the 
state may place certain limitations on private property for the greater good. As 
Othman stressed, the economy is to be built on respect for individual property, yet this 
right must be consistent with the requirements of social life.
2
  
When asked whether the system was ‘free’ or ‘directed’ (muwajjah), Othman pointed 
out that freedom of the economy is not absolute and government may intervene and 
direct it, just like all freedoms that are regulated so as not to negatively affect the 
public good. Thus, the individual is free in acquiring property and private property is 
inviolable/protected, but both are subject to government direction.
3
  
The idea, therefore, was clear: to protect property rights and at the same time 
emphasize social rights. Hence, the first article in the constitution dealing with the 
economic system reads as follows: 
Article 16 
Property, capital and work are fundamental constituents of the social 
structure of the State and of the national wealth. They are all individual 
                                                 
1
 Minutes of the 19
th




 Ibid.; Minutes of the 26
th
 Meeting of the Constituent Assembly, 3 November 1962, p.2-3. 
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rights with a social function as regulated by law. 
 
As the ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ annexed to the Constitution (EMC) states, the 
article assigned three constituents of society, namely, property, capital, and work to 
determine the place of Kuwaiti society amidst the battling economic and social 
currents in the world. While the first two ensure that Kuwait society would not drift to 
extreme socialism, the third – the right to work – limits the domination and power of 
capital. The article also states that these rights have a ‘social function’, pointed out the 




Two articles go on to stress the right to private property, while at the same time taking 
into consideration the social good: 
Article 18 
Private property is inviolable. No one shall be prevented from 
disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No property 
shall be expropriated except for the public benefit in the circumstances 
and manner specified by law, and on condition that just compensation 
is paid. 
Article 19 
General confiscation of the property of any person shall be prohibited. 
Confiscation of particular property as a penalty may not be inflicted 
except by a court judgment in the circumstances specified by law. 
 
In addition, while the merchants naturally desired a bigger role for private business 
and the reduction government domination in certain areas of business activity, the fact 
that activity was to be mixed between the public sector and private sector was a 
matter taken for granted.
5
 The extent of and areas in which government would 
participate were the real questions.  
For instance, Al Sagar, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a 
government minister at the time, stated in the CA that there is no question that the 
                                                 
4
 Explanatory Memorandum to the Constitution of Kuwait. 
5
 Minutes of the 19
th
 Meeting of the Constituent Assembly, 11 September 1962, p. 11. 
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state has a right to intervene for the public good.
6
 He complained, however, that the 
government was dominant in sectors in which it did not need to be. His primary 
concern was the area of commerce, since Kuwait was first and foremost a commercial 
country. Nevertheless, Al Sagar pointed out, government interferes in commercial 
activities and becomes the dominant and directing force. The state is rich, Al Sagar 
asserted, and does not need this intervention, particularly since the areas available for 
private investment are very limited under the circumstances of the Kuwaiti economy.
7
 
Therefore, while the article concerned with the matter (Article 20) originally stressed 
the need for “cooperation” between the two sectors, the aim of which was “economic 
development, increase of productivity, improvement of the standard of living and 
achievement of prosperity for citizens”, after these concerns were raised, “fair” was 
added to “cooperation”.
8
 As Othman explained to the members, “fairness in 
cooperation” means that the public sector does not dominate individual or private 
activity nor does individual or private activity dominate over the public good. The 
exact extent of the role of each sector was rendered flexible and, according to the 
‘Explanatory Memorandum’, the determination of this was left to the legislator to 
decide based on the public good.
9
 The legislator may decide to expand the role of the 
public sector in areas relating to national security for instance, while the role of the 
private sector may be expanded in areas like commerce. 
The resultant Article 20 reads as follows: 
The national economy shall be based on social justice. It is 
founded on fair co-operation between public and private 
activities. Its aim shall be economic development, increase of 
productivity, improvement of the standard of living and 
achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within the limits of 
law. 
The Kuwait Planning Board summarized the economic principles enshrined in the 
constitution as stated above very carefully in its First Five Year Plan of 1968. It is 
therefore worth quoting at length. The constitution, noted the Board: 
includes provisions concerning the respect and safeguarding of private 




 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
8
 Minutes of the 24
th




property, the prohibition of their general confiscation and the 
regulation of the relationship between employers and employees in line 
with economic principles yet respecting the principles of social justice. 
All these provisions in the Constitution determine, in general, the 
dimensions of the planning process in the State of Kuwait and outline 
its path… Property, capital and labour are no longer uncontested 
absolute rights, but a mixture of rights and obligations. Property is a 
right so long as the holder meets his obligations towards community. 
Capital is a personal right involving social obligations. The most 
important of these obligations is the participation in developing the 
productivity potential of society in accordance with the principles of 
social justice. The same is true of labour as personal right with 
obligations towards society. The activities of both the public and 
private sector are closely associated with the achievement of economic 
development through increasing production, raising the standard of 
living and spreading prosperity and welfare facilities amongst 
everybody. The achievement of this objective will not be possible 
without full cooperation between the public sector and the private 
sector. Such cooperation is vital for the achievement of the common 
good of society as a whole. (Planning Board, 1968: 12-13)   
In this way, the Board asserted, 
The legislators of the constitution did not go to extremes in economic 
and social terms but intended moderation and flexibility. The 
constitution provides for the restriction of the excesses of capitalism, in 
its traditional meaning, by allowing the State to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, to safeguard the interest of the people at all levels. It also 
provides that the intervention of the State should stop at certain limits 
in order to allow private effort and economic freedom enough room to 
function. In other words, the Constitution and the laws resulting from it 
aim at defining the general framework for the performance of the 
economy and society within set boundaries. It also gives individuals 
and private establishments freedom to practice economic activity 
within these boundaries and imposes restraints when attempts are made 
to exceed them. (Planning Board, 1968: 14) 
 
These are the constitutional principals that set the general guidelines for economic 
policy in Kuwait. In sum, the constitution preserved and gave way for private 
enterprise, yet it also stressed the state’s obligation to safeguard the welfare of 
society. While, the discussion has so far looked at the more abstract level in the 
discussions of the CA regarding the economy, the next section examines the more 
practical issues that are the focus of this chapter, namely those relating to the 
socioeconomic policies undertaken by the government.  
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6.3. ALTERNATIVE DIMENSIONS TO SOCIOECONOMIC POLICY 
The economic system adopted by the Kuwaiti constitution carried within it the idea 
that the state has an obligation to support society members, to provide them with 
essential services and to secure a minimum standard of living. This, in fact, could be 
seen as a core feature of the adopted economic system. While much of the 
contemporary literature concerning rentier states views this as a form of buying 
loyalty, the rationalization for socioeconomic policies expressed by Kuwaiti policy-
makers both inside and outside the CA indicate something very different. In this 
regard, there were four main themes that resonated throughout the period: 
(i) Perceptions of tradition and culture; 
(ii) Protectiveness and control; 
(iii) Regional and international currents;  
(iv) Social justice and Kuwaiti rights; 
These themes are discussed in the following sections. 
6.3.1. Perceptions of Tradition and Culture 
One of the most dominant themes cutting across the discourse during the reviewed 
period was the view that the benefits provided by the state were a natural continuation 
of Kuwaiti heritage. As demonstrated below, this view was shared amongst different 
sectors of society, whether they were merchants, intellectuals, government officials, 
etc. It was also the view expressed by the Ruler himself. Indeed, there seemed to be a 
consensus on this idea, and the terms used for its expression were strikingly similar 
amongst all. In this regard, the sense of Kuwaiti society’s core ideals and traditions, 
with takaful,
10
 cooperation, and the sharing of wealth being their main feature, was 
the base upon which much of the rationalization of welfare policies were rooted, and 
                                                 
10
 The word takaful stems from kafala, which means guarantee. Takaful literally means “guaranteeing 
each other” or “joint guarantee”. In its social context, it basically refers to mutual help amongst society 
members whereby each member has an obligation towards society and society as whole has obligations 
to help its members.    
 
 132 
much of the spending patterns were justified. This section provides a sample of the 
discourse with an emphasis on the diversity of the people and bodies expressing the 
indicated views.  
Possibly the most direct and practical example in this regard is found in the reports of 
the Department of Social Affairs, which was established in 1954 precisely for the 
purpose of expanding public services and social welfare.
11
 In its first Annual Report, 
the Department noted that its purpose was to ensure that the new-found wealth would 
reach the normal citizen and to guarantee his rewarding share in it (Department of 
Social Affairs, 1955: 1-2). In general terms, its goal was to achieve social justice, the 
Department contended, and the means to do so was to direct economic development 
towards raising the living standards of citizens and creating stable and rewarding 
employment opportunities (Department of Social Affairs, 1956: 2). The Report went 
on to stress that economic development must be directed towards caring for Kuwait’s 
citizens and guaranteeing the factors of reassurance for them in the future 
(Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 6).  
Importantly, the Department perceived its task as a continuation of core Kuwaiti 
ideals, which it thought were founded on Kuwaiti society’s great traditions of social 
takaful and mutual care amongst neighbors, friends, and citizens rooting back to the 
diving and seafaring era. The Department contended, for example, that ‘begging’ was 
never a salient phenomenon in Kuwaiti society, as manifestations of social takaful, 
particularly amongst seafarers and divers, were strong enough to prevent a person or 
group of citizens from reaching a level of destitution (Department of Social Affairs, 
1956: 45). Thus, the Department asserted that takaful was a distinguishing factor of 
Kuwaiti society, and viewed its very establishment a continuation of such a tradition 
(Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 45).  
The Department, however, sensed that this tradition was slowly fading in an economy 
undergoing rapid economic change. It therefore saw its public assistance projects as 
merely filling a vacuum that it thought was being created (Department of Social 
Affairs, 1957: 22). In fact, some of the Department’s public assistance programs had 
the explicit aim of re-spreading the spirit of takaful and cooperation in society. For 
instance, the Department’s stated goal was to encourage ‘the spirit of takaful’ through 
                                                 
11
 Kuwait al-yawm, 1954, Issue 2, p. 2. 
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developing and encouraging voluntary activities amongst individuals and groups, and 
therefore took great interest in supporting cultural and sports clubs and unions, and 
provided them with yearly subsidies together with technical assistance. It also 
supported the creation of such clubs in villages outside the city and thought that they 
would be centers of cultural and social enlightenment, which would encourage 
voluntary activity and spread the ‘spirit of cooperation’ (Department of Social Affairs, 
1955: 6, 48-50; Department of Social Affairs, 1957: 23).  
This support played a role in creating vibrant political platforms and enhancing the 
role of civil society as it meant to do. This is clearly in direct contradiction to the 
notion that the state’s public assistance policies solely aim to weaken social and 
political activity. In fact, the Department recognized and favorably viewed the fact 
that it was these very clubs that were leading the reformist movement in Kuwait, and 
contributing, through opinion and advice, in drawing the economic and social policies 
of the country (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 50).  
In addition to supporting voluntary activities to further the spirit of cooperation and 
takaful, the Department’s stated aim was also to implement the principle of 
‘cooperation’ in the field of production, consumption and services. Hence, the first 
consumer cooperative was established in 1955 within the Department.  This ‘limited’ 
venture was seen as a test trial, in which employees were encouraged to save, and 
social services would be provided from profits (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 
50). Once the trial is successful, the concept was then to be spread throughout the 
country. Indeed, consumer cooperatives were then established in other departments, 




As noted above, the views of the Department and the rationalizations used for 
Kuwait’s welfare policies were not unique, and were consistent with those held by 
contemporary Kuwaitis of different backgrounds. For instance, Hussein, a 
contemporary ‘intellectual’ and Director of Education during the 1950s, spoke in very 
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 While the Department noted that it had established the first consumer cooperative in Kuwait, it must 
be said that cooperatives were seen in Kuwait since the early 1940s, albeit on a limited scale. The first 
cooperative was in fact established in 1941 in the Mubarakiya School. The concept was also adopted in 
other schools in the early 1950s. 
14




 In a series of lectures first published in 1960, he noted that after 
wealth became available to Kuwait, there was a deeply held feeling amongst citizens 
that the income of Government was an absolute right for all Kuwaitis. They were all 
natural partners in the ownership of this wealth, as they had shared alike the troubles 
of life in pre-oil Kuwait; they were the rightful persons, therefore, to enjoy the 
country’s wealth after oil (Hussein, 1994: 98).  
As a result, Hussein continued, attempts were made by the Government to provide a 
comfortable life for citizens (el-ma'eesha el-raghda), and government efforts 
gradually substituted local traditions of cooperation, takaful and the provision of 
assistance, which had previously stemmed automatically from the feelings of 
Kuwaitis. People, went on Hussein, began to feel that their obligations towards 
society, the tasks of which they had felt were their responsibility throughout Kuwait’s 
history, and which they had undertaken without repining since they were a big part of 
Kuwaiti society’s essence (kayan), were now entrusted to an able body that had the 
capabilities to undertake such tasks (Hussein, 1994: 98). Thus, noted Hussein, 
services provided by the Government were numerous, most important of which were 
free education at all levels; free healthcare services of all kinds; material assistance to 
those unable to work or complete their education; low income housing; ensuring a 
minimum income for citizens; and social assistance in emergency conditions 
(Hussein, 1994: 99).   
Another important contemporary personality who addressed this issue was Al Sagar, 
member of the Constituent Assembly, a prominent merchant who was President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, the first Speaker of Parliament, and also member of the 
Development Board during the 1950s. Again, he used very similar terms in describing 
the rationale behind the socioeconomic policies of the Kuwaiti government. Al Sagar 
contended that Kuwaitis had lived before oil as a family with relations based on 
sympathy amongst its members and ‘social takaful’. He stressed that these values 
were based on Arab and Islamic foundations, and they constituted the foundations on 
which Kuwaiti society was raised, and on which their views of the public good and 
social justice had originated.
15
 
Al Sagar gave some examples of certain local traditions to demonstrate this. It must 
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 Al Sagar, Abdulaziz, “Al-kuwait qabl azzait” (Kuwait before oil), Al-Arabi, June 1964, Issue 67. 
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be borne in mind that Kuwait’s pre-oil economy was very primitive, and its 
population very small. Thus, although the examples may seem trivial at first glance, in 
the context of the period they gain much greater significance. Moreover, much of the 
examples given by Al Sagar relate to experiences from the sea, on which the Kuwaiti 
economy was based and had revolved around. These examples, in other words, lay at 
the core of Kuwaiti life. 
In this regard, Al Sagar noted that many Kuwaiti seafarers were ship owners as well, 
and a ship represented the source of livelihood both to them and their families. 
Seafaring, however, was prone to great dangers, and therefore this field was one in 
which feelings of sympathy and takaful amongst Kuwaitis emerged. When a ship sank 
or got wrecked or so on (and it is inevitable that some would every year), friends and 
acquaintances would rush to raise funds on their own behalf even without the 
knowledge of the ship owners themselves. These donations were collected soon 
enough to cover and even exceed the cost of the total loss. In the same spirit, Al Sagar 
went on, Kuwaitis rushed to rescue any Kuwaiti ship that runs aground or faces 
troubles in the Gulf during its journeys without distinction. The rescue operations 
were voluntary, prompt and comprehensive. The number of persons on a single rescue 
mission could reach one hundred. The expenses of these operations were paid by one 




Another tradition reflecting the spirit of cooperation and ‘brotherhood’, Al Sagar 
thought, was in the process of lowering newly-built ships to sea. When a flag was 
lifted on the ship signaling that it is ready to go, representatives of different ship 
owing families would voluntarily head to contribute together in the process. 
Moreover, Kuwaiti families, asserted Al Sagar, felt secure in the absence of their 
provider (breadwinner) during his long voyages at sea. Residents of the area felt 
morally responsible for them and thus made sure to provide them with their needs in 
case what was left by their provider was insufficient due to, for instance, an 
unexpected expansion in the length of the voyage.
17
  
Finally, Al Sagar pointed out what he saw as possibly the biggest example reflecting 






social takaful, social justice, and what he called ‘Islamic socialism’ in Kuwaiti 
society: the system of allotting the proceeds of ships from seafaring. In this regard, the 
proceeds were considered to be shared and distributed amongst all, including the 
owner, on a fair basis (usus ishtarakiyya a'adila), after deducting the crew’s food 
costs and port docking fees.
18
   
In this context, Al Sagar pointed out that Kuwait’s environment was ripe for many of 
the social policies introduced by the state after oil, such as those in the field of health, 
education, etc. Therefore, it was not strange, he stressed, that the constitution, which 
he participated in framing, would give particular attention to the social sphere. This 
position, he stressed repeatedly, was borne out of their religion and tradition; their 
feelings and thoughts. Their hope was for Kuwait to be a model for a comprehensive 
and collaborative national effort for the sake of the common good and welfare for all. 
Society was to be as the Prophet described, “like a body: if any part of it is ill, the 
whole body shares its sleeplessness and fever”.
19
  
Whether the rosy picture of Kuwaiti society prior to oil is accurate or not could surely 
be debated. However, this perception of the society’s history and values was 
expressed even amongst those on the other side of the class system. Al Khateeb, for 
example, who comes from a poor background, pointed out in the CA that he feared 
the placement of the word ‘capital’ in Article 16 of the constitution would be 
misunderstood to mean that Kuwait was a capitalist state with the excesses of 
capitalism. This, he stressed, ran against core Kuwaiti values, as the people of Kuwait 
had always ‘cooperated’ with each other, pre and post oil. Al Khateeb pointed out that 
in the days of poverty (before oil wealth) Kuwaitis had paid out of their limited and 
private resources to ensure free education and healthcare for all citizens. The Kuwaitis 
did this voluntarily, he asserted, and it would be a shame if they were viewed in a 
different manner due to the inclusion of the word ‘capital’ in the constitution, as this 
may be misinterpreted to mean something that contradicts the nature, tradition and 
reality of Kuwait. 20 The CA members, therefore, made sure to include in the EMC the 
                                                 
18  
Ibid. Al Sagar gave the following percentages regarding the distribution of proceeds from shipping:  
1- Cost of food and docking: 10% 
2- Workers at all levels: 45% 




 Meeting of the 19
th
 Meeting of the Constituent Assembly, 11 September 1962, pp. 12-13. 
 137 
fact that the term ‘capital’ in the constitution does not imply the tarnished image of 
extreme or exploitative capital, which is but a divergence from its social function. 
Moreover, while the fairness of the specific shares distributed amongst the various 
parties in the process of seafaring could also be disputed, the important point is the 
concept of ‘sharing’ itself. The pre-oil economic system of pearling and seafaring was 
based on sharing proceeds according to pre-specified shares (Department of Social 
Affairs, 1956: 64). This idea of ‘sharing’ the proceeds extended to the post-oil era, 
and the notion that citizens are to ‘share’ the revenues from oil was the way in which 
benefits were conceptualized. It is from this concept, in fact, that the notion that these 
benefits are part of citizen’s ‘rights’ is largely rooted. Whether or not the idea had 
stemmed directly and exclusively from the pre-oil system, it essential to make a 
conceptual distinction between a top-down distribution of the wealth for political 
purposes, as opposed to ‘sharing’ as part of a social obligation. The concept of 
‘sharing the wealth’ was indeed the prevalent principle. This was the language used 
and was clearly the dominant mode of thinking rather than being a political tool for 
buying legitimacy.  
This notion is clearly suggested in discussions amongst Kuwaiti policy-makers at the 
time. For instance, a stated main aim of the Development Board was that “[a]s many 
Kuwaitis as possible can share in the profits of development contracts”.
21
 Thus, Al 
Zaid suggested to the Board in 1952 that “instead of awarding...partnerships to 
individual companies, a quasi-official company should be formed with for example, a 
million shares subscribed by the people of Kuwait”, and this was viewed by the 
members as a desired and fair form of “a general sharing of profits”.
22
 However, 
possibly the most direct example of an expressed perception that welfare policies stem 
from the principle of ‘sharing the wealth’ among citizens is found in the discussions 
between the Ruler and Churchill on the state of the Kuwaiti economy in 1953. In a 
message to the Ruler, Churchill warned him about the dangers of finance and 
spending arising in part from the Kuwaiti contemplated super-welfare state. To this, 
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 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Memorandum titled ‘Appreciation of Contract Situation in Kuwait’, p. 1, 
Presented by Hasted to Development Board on 9 July 1953, in Minutes of Government of Kuwait 
Development Board, vol II. 
22
 Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Minutes of the 46
th
 Meeting of the Development Board, 15 December 1952, in 
Minutes of Government of Kuwait Development Board, vol. I. This, however, was not achieved due to 
practical reasons (See Churchill/HSTD 1/1: Minutes of the 47
th
 Meeting of the Development Board, 
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the Ruler replied: “he understood what we [the British] meant but he had to take into 
account the Arab traditions with regard to families and sharing of wealth between 
members of society”.
23
 Hence, the view that the newfound wealth was to be shared 
amongst Kuwaitis, and that they had a right to enjoy its benefits in the context of the 
Kuwait’s culture and tradition, provided a dominant rationalization of the distributive 
policies leading to the super-welfare state.  
It is now important to look more closely at what the policymakers mentioned above 
were referring to in Kuwait’s history as part of their rationalization of post-oil welfare 
policies. Free education, in this regard, is worthy of particular attention, as the first 
major projects in the process of providing free public services was in this field. 
Moreover, the first contracts with the Big Five companies were for the building of 
schools. Spending on education became a major expense in the government budget 
throughout the 1950s. Indeed, in 1950, even before the implementation of the 
Development Plan, it was reported that half of all government expenditure was spent 
on education and health.
24
 In 1951, it was reported that out of all departments, “[t]here 
was special enthusiasm in the Education Department and a ... desire to push on”, and 




Because of the prominence of the field of education in post-oil welfare policies, free 
education is often cited in the rentier state literature as a prime example of distributive 
policy in the context of governments’ efforts to buy social content. While this is in 
itself a strange presumption since it is very much known, even by the policymakers of 
the 1950s, that education leads to growth in political conscience (this is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter), the following section briefly examines the state of 
education in pre-oil Kuwait to provide a better understanding of the claims of 
policymakers in their rationalization of post-oil welfare services. 
As mentioned, Al Khateeb noted in the CA that Kuwaitis before oil had paid out of 
their pockets to ensure free education to all. Indeed, organized schooling began in 
Kuwait with the opening of Al Mubarakiya School in 1911. Al Qinai, co-founder of 
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 FO371/104329: Political Agent to Foreign Office, August 16, 1953, p. 1; emphasis is added. 
24
 FO371/91258: Kuwait Administration Report for 1950, February 14, 1951, p.6. 
25
 FO371/98323: Kuwait Administration Report for 1951, pp. 4-5; FO371/114576: Political Resident’s 
Annual Report for 1954, April 15, 1955, p. 4. 
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the school and its first principal, gave a religious underpinning to the initial 
motivation behind its establishment, such as the need to spread education in order for 
people to be able to gain knowledge of the life and deeds of the Prophet for them to 
follow (Al Qinai, 1986: 43-6). The school was built by donations from the merchants. 
In promoting the idea of the project, Al Qinai had emphasized the value of 
cooperation, and had initiated the process of collecting the donations by contributing 
50 Rupees himself. He then started to collect funds from the merchants who, together, 
contributed 77,500 Rupees, with which the school was built.  
Apart from continuing donations by the merchants in the coming years to keep the 
school going, the merchants invested some of the surplus funds to generate returns for 
it to finance its operations. As hinted, the school was non-profit, and only a token 
joining fee of 2 Rupees was required from rich students, 1 Rupee from middle-income 
students, and non from the poor. The Sheikh at the time did not make any noteworthy 
contribution throughout the school’s life (Al Qinai, 1986: 43-6).  
The second organized school in Kuwait is Al Ahmediya School. By the late 1910s, 
some merchants became increasingly unsatisfied with the standard of education in Al 
Mubarakiya and were adamant to modernize education in the country. Thus, another 
round of donations was made with which Al Ahmediya was built and opened its doors 
in 1921. The Sheikh had this time pledged to help finance its operations by an annual 
contribution of 2000 Rupees (see Al-Rushaid, 1978: 278, 366-370).
26
  
However, in the 1930s, education, like other fields, was hard hit by the economic 
depression and unavailability of funds, to the extent that Al Mubarakiya had to shut 
its doors for a while. The merchants, however, would not accept these conditions. Al 
Adsani, leader of the 1930s merchant movement and Secretary of the 1938 
Legislative Council, described the effect of the intellectual and cultural ‘renaissance’ 
going on in the Arab world, such as that of Iraq and Egypt, on Kuwaitis. He noted 
people’s consequent complaints regarding Kuwait’s failure to keep pace with such 
developments (Al Adsani, undated: 15). Al Adsani pointed out that it was their belief 
that the main reason for Kuwait’s ‘backwardness’ was the state of education and the 
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 It must be noted that one of the demands of 1920 merchant movement on Ahmad Al Jabir as a 
condition of their acceptance of him as Ruler was “[t]he consideration of the requirements for the 
advance and improvement of the town and people, such as spreading of education...” (IOR/R/15/5/205: 
Agent to Resident 29 June, 1938).  
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lack of an official and able educational council that would supervise, direct, and 
finance the field. Because the country’s treasury was financially inadequate, and 
because such an institution required an independent fixed budget, the merchants knew 
that they had to devote funds from their own money to cover the expenses in order to 
convince the Ruler to accept its establishment. Thus, Al Adsani pointed out, the 
merchants proposed to the Ruler an imposition of a 0.5% tax on imports, on top of the 
custom’s tax, the proceeds of which would be used specifically for education. The 
Ruler agreed to their request, and an Educational Council was elected in 1936 (Al 
Adsani, undated: 15).  
The Council took Al Mubarakiya and Al Ahmediya under its wings, and soon decided 
to bring in teachers from Palestine to resurrect the field (Al Adsani, undated: 16; 
Hussein, 1994: 126).
27
 This could be regarded as the start of ‘public education’ in 
Kuwait.  
When the Legislative Council was established, it took the responsibility of overseeing 
the area of education and gave the field special attention. Among other things, the 
Council increased the educational budget by dedicating to it half the proceeds of a 
nationalized transport company. To clarify, the transport company had monopolized 
all the porterage and transport work between the docks and the Customs House. The 
Council decided to nationalize it, as the members believed the previous owners had 
acquired it through corrupt means. The proceeds of the newly nationalized company 
was split between the Departments of Education and Health.
28
  
The Council went on to open three new government schools, including one for girls 
(the first in the region), and decided upon completely free education in all schools.
29
  
By 1940, there were four boys schools and three girls schools inside the town wall, 
excluding the six ‘mulla schools’ for boys situated outside the town. In his 1940 
Report on Government Education in Kuwait, Vallance noted that the sources for 
funding education were the 0.5% from customs and the payments from the ‘Hamal 
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 November 1938, p. 1, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 13, p.211). 
29
 Ibid.; R/15/5/205: ‘Improvements introduced by the Kuwait Council’ by de Gaury, Political Agent, 
Kuwait, enclosed in Fowle, to Peel, 17 November 1938.  
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Bachi Company’ (the transport company). Payments were required on a weekly basis. 
However, because expenses were heavier in some months than in others, it was 
necessary for the Education Committee to borrow money to overcome the difficulty. 
Small amounts, the report noted, were borrowed from Al Qinai’s own pocket, while 
large amounts were borrowed from the Town Treasury.
30
 
Therefore, notwithstanding extreme difficulties with regard to the availability of 
funds, there was a great effort and determination by the merchants to spread free 
education before oil production. From one running school in 1936, the number of 
schools reached thirteen by 1944, three of which were girls’ school, with a total 
number of 119 teachers.
31
 Within the schools, the system was described by Vallance’s 
1940 Report as follows: 
The schools of Kuwait are open to rich and poor alike, and one 
of the most pleasing features of those inside the wall is a scheme 
whereby very poor boys are clothed free of charge by the 
schools themselves, the funds for this purpose being provided, 
not out of the Education Grant, but from sums of money raised 
by means of entertainments given from time to time by the boys. 
About 10% of all the pupils at the four town schools receive free 
clothing in this way. 
Books and stationery are issued free to all pupils too poor to 
purchase their own, and in practice this benefit is enjoyed by 
about 50% of the boys at the largest school, the Mubarakiyah, by 
about 80% of the boys at the other town schools and (in theory) 
by all the boys at the six ‘Mulla schools’ outside the town.
32
 
The above gives a general insight into the feelings Kuwaitis had towards the value of 
education and the role of society in providing it for all before the windfall of oil 
revenues. The description of the system by Vallance also reflects certain values held 
by society with regards to the importance of supporting and helping one another as 
discussed in this section. In light of this, the post-oil policy by the Kuwaiti 
government of providing free education is but an ‘inheritance’ of a system initiated 
and established by the people. Once the state had the means, it was only expected by 
Kuwaitis that it would take over such a responsibility. In this way, free education was 
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 IOR/15/5/196: Report on Government Education in Kuwait, by Adrian Vallance, October 1,1940, p. 
3-4.  
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a continuation of a policy that had become ingrained in Kuwaiti culture, and not a 
distributive mechanism by which the regime buys social content.  
In fact, the high value attached to education continued to be the expressed attitude of 
policymakers in the 1950s in their push to provide it free for all. The Development 
Board, for example, decided to give education 
high priority in the Development Programme, and that every 
effort should be made to see that no Kuwaiti parent who wished 
to put his child to school should be refused. The mere fact of 
children being in school, where they were fed, clothed, and 
looked after, was a contribution to the health of Kuwait.
33
  
Thus, the program of Public Assistance by the Department of Social Affairs included 
financially supporting families of poor students to make sure these students would be 
able to continue their education (Department of Social Affairs, 1957: 19). Finally, 
these sentiments were formalized in the constitutional articles which guarantee free 
education for citizens:  
 Article 13 
 Education is a fundamental requisite for the progress of society, assured 
and promoted by the State. 
Article 40 
Education is a right for Kuwaitis, guaranteed for the State in 
accordance with law and within the limits of public policy and morals. 
Education in its preliminary stages shall be compulsory and free in 
accordance with law. 
Law shall lay down the necessary plan to eliminate illiteracy. 
The State shall devote particular care to the physical, moral and mental 
development of youth. 
In addition, other articles of the constitution that also carry the ideals discussed above 
include: 
Article 7   
Justice, Liberty, and Equality are the pillars of society; cooperation 
and mutual help are the firmest bonds between citizens. 
Article 9  
The family is the corner stone of Society. It is founded on religion, 
morality, and patriotism. Law shall preserve the integrity of the family, 
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The State cares for the young and protects them from exploitation and 
from moral, physical and spiritual neglect. 
Article 11 
The State ensures aid for citizens in old age, sickness or inability to 
work. It also provides them with services of social security, social aid 
and medical care. 
Article 14 
The state shall promote science, letters and the arts and encourage 
scientific research therein. 
Article 15 
The State cares for public health and for means of prevention and 
treatment of diseases and epidemics. 
Article 23 
The state shall encourage both co-operative activities and savings, and 
supervise the system of credit. 
Article 25 
The state shall ensure the solidarity of society in shouldering burdens 
resulting from public disasters and calamities and provide 
compensation for war damages or injuries received by any person as a 
result of the discharge of his military duties. 
Article 48 
Payment of taxes and public imposts is a duty in accordance with law 
which shall regulate exemption of small incomes from taxes in such a 
way as to maintain the minimum standard of living. 
These articles embody the very values that were expressed to be an intrinsic part of 
Kuwait’s culture and heritage, which stress the importance of cooperation, takaful, 
and certain obligations towards society. In fact, the notion that the constitution 
adopted a socioeconomic system consistent with core ideals held by Kuwaiti society 
was not solely accepted by CA members, but was widely believed to be the case. For 
instance, the Planning Board stressed the fact that the constitution of Kuwait “is 
characterized by the adoption of a position consistent with the attitude of Kuwaiti 
society and its future aspirations and ambitions. It is also consistent with the bonds of 
harmony, co-operation and security prevailing among its members” (Planning Board, 
1968: 14). Thus, it is clear that these were the dominant kinds of rationalizations for 
much of the post-oil welfare policies undertaken by the government. As seen, they 
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were articulated in very similar terms by different policymakers of diverse social 
backgrounds, including the Ruler himself, which gives added weight as to their 
genuineness.  
6.3.2. Protectiveness and Control 
The rentier state literature contextualizes the priority and preference given to citizens 
as part of governments’ efforts to buy quiescence of society. However, there were 
more important factors contributing to the push in this direction in Kuwait’s case. As 
mentioned earlier, the surge in oil revenues led to a huge and rapid influx of 
foreigners, flooding Kuwait, and ultimately making citizens a minority in their 
country (see El Mallakh, 1966: 426). As the Political Agent noted, foreigners were 
“rapidly” “pouring” into what was seen as a “gold-rush State”.
34
 Kuwait, suggested a 
Foreign Office document, seemed like “fair game”.
35
  
Kuwaitis, experiencing this and witnessing widespread exploitation and corruption by 
foreign companies and certain foreign employees as indicated earlier, were naturally 
alarmed. Being small and rich, this feeling was compounded. As would be expected, a 
protective attitude amongst them developed during the 1950s. Kuwaiti citizens, it was 
felt, must have priority not only in enjoying the newfound wealth, but also in 
controlling it. This was seen as a natural right. 
In fact, even without such a sudden influx of foreigners and perceived exploitation, it 
is quite surprising that the literature does not find preference and priority given to 
citizens in their own country as normal in the first place, just like in all countries, and 
sees this as part of a government strategy to buy loyalty. Indeed, many of the 
‘privileges’ attached to the Kuwaiti citizenship, such as the requirement that foreign 
companies must have Kuwaiti partners or that items for development must be 
purchased from the local market, must be seen in large part in the context of 
Kuwaitis’ natural belief that, simply, the wealth of Kuwait belonged first and 
foremost to Kuwaitis. The protective attitude only increased and stressed this 
direction in Kuwaitis’ thinking. A letter by Ahmed Al-Amer presented and discussed 
in the Development Board reflects the sentiments of many Kuwaitis at the time in this 
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regard. Al-Amer suggested to the Board to even restrict certain partnerships with 
foreigners if they were not ‘technically’ required. He noted the following: 
I wish there was no partnership at all between Kuwaitis and foreigners 
so as to protect our financial position and national wealth from foreign 
exploitation. But circumstances which cannot be helped force us to 
accept partnership. The only reason for partnership is our 
backwardness in the technical side, and nothing else. It is therefore 
permissible for a Kuwaiti to form a partnership only with a foreign 
technical expert. But a Kuwaiti should not otherwise form a 
partnership with a foreigner or a naturalized Kuwaiti, whether that 
partnership includes a third technical party or not. Such partnerships 
are adverse to the interests of Kuwaitis, to protect which it is the duty 
of the Development Board. Existing companies of this nature give us a 
vivid example of what foreigners enjoy of our rights and interests 
while...Kuwaiti qualified contractors, compete for trifles and minor 
works. The reason for all that is that we improvise everything and lack 
an organized, fixed system which protects our rights and national 
wealth. We are often faced with projects which have to be executed 
quickly and so they are awarded to firms foreign inside out, and even 
without Kuwaiti partners...This is a grave danger to our interests so the 
Development Board is requested to draw a policy which will protect 
the rights of Kuwaitis; this policy should have a retrospective effect 
which will set things right and uproot evil.
36
 
That being said, Kuwait’s case was still somewhat unique, in that the most efficient 
segment of the population was the expatriate community on whose work, skills, and 
effort the economy relied. Indeed, by the early to mid-1960s, Kuwaitis constituted a 
mere one-third of the labor force, and this was seen to be a feature that would 
continue to characterize the Kuwaiti state. As the IBRD noted in 1965, in order to 
provide a labor force of the then present size, the Kuwaiti population would have had 
to treble. It was estimated that this would have taken at least 40 years. Given the 
expected growth of the economy and with it the increase in the number of jobs to be 
filled, non-Kuwaitis were therefore expected to “remain an important feature of the 
labour force” (IBDR, 1965: 26). Thus, preserving basic privileges for citizens and 
giving them things like increased job security over foreigners was attacked by some 
as having negative effects on the economy itself.  As the IBRD explained, “most non-
Kuwaitis consider their stay in Kuwait a temporary one, and indeed, their assured 
terms of employment are usually short and unemployment may quickly be followed 
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by deportation…” (IBRD, 1965: 26). “The labor force would be more efficient”, 
stressed the IBRD, “if it were more stable” (IBRD, 1965: 26).   
Ironically, however, the very size of the foreign workers, which made them 
indispensable and essential for the sustainability of the economy, had itself created the 
sense of protectiveness amongst Kuwaiti citizens. As Shehab, the government’s 
economic consultant in the late 1950s noted, “[t]he discovery that it [Kuwait] was 
being swamped by aliens alarmed Kuwait and prompted defensive measures” 
(Shehab, 1964: 468). These were “intended to preserve the identity of the old 
community, reserve the bulk of the new wealth for its citizens and protect them 
against intruding aliens…” (Shehab, 1964: 471). 
While these measures were in part born out of a feeling that it was Kuwaitis who must 
have a priority in benefiting from Kuwait’s wealth as discussed, an important reason 
behind certain privileges and preferential treatment had more to do with the desire to 
retain control over the wealth rather than to simply gain from it. As Shehab put it, in 
order for the government “to ensure control of its own affairs”, it “gave preference to 
its own citizens” (Shehab, 1964: 465). In fact, the feeling that Kuwaitis had the right 
to control the wealth of the country surfaced dominantly during the discussions of the 
CA, and this was predominantly driven by the developing defensive attitude triggered 
by the sudden demographic change. For this very reason, some of the privileges 
demanded by some CA members went beyond those related to Kuwaiti vs. foreigner, 
and included ‘original’ Kuwaiti vs. naturalized.
37
 
In fact, traces of feelings of the latter kind could be traced back to the early 1950s. In 
Al-Amer’s letter, for example, this comes out very clearly:  
There are certain naturalized Kuwaitis who have acquired the Kuwaiti 
nationality only lately for certain aims. Of these some have been 
registered as contractors by the Development Board. I request the 
Board to consider their cases as it is a dangerous precedent. The fact 
that a certain foreigner managed to acquire a Kuwaiti passport by 
some means or another does not exempt the Board from responsibility 
allowing him to compete with the true Kuwaiti. Many colonial 
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subjects, for instance, hold the British passport but they do not enjoy 
the same political and civil privileged as the English. However, the 
original Kuwaiti who has made many sacrifices and shed his blood in 
the defence of this land has more right to his country in spite of what 
the foreigner is given by law.
38
 
However, with time, as mentioned, the idea of control vs. monetary gain in the 
assignment of certain privileges was more dominant in this regard. Such a sentiment 
manifested itself, for instance, in the CA discussions on the electoral law. The 
legislation passed did not give naturalized persons the right to run for parliament. Al 
Zaid stressed in the CA the fact that they had given naturalized citizens all rights, 
including economic and social benefits. The naturalized could be in commerce, learn 
on the public expense and enjoy all other benefits available to ‘original’ Kuwaitis.
39
 
However, Al Zaid emphasized, they cannot hand over their ‘necks’ to the naturalized 
by allowing the latter rule over them. Kuwaitis were not in a normal situation, he 
stressed, and there was no country in the world in which foreigners outnumber 
citizens on a multiple scale as in Kuwait.
40
 Al Zaid stated that they did not want ‘to 
sell themselves cheap’, as naturalized persons could in ten years group together and 
gain a majority in parliament, with the consequence being that “our [original 
Kuwaitis’] fates would be in their hands”.
41
 Thus, while the naturalized could enjoy 
the benefits of oil wealth, they should not control it. 
Moreover, there was an insistence for a constitutional criterion stipulating that those 
who hold the post of minister, undersecretary, and assistant undersecretary must be 
‘original’ Kuwaitis and not naturalized.
42
 Almazeedi explained that in normal 
situations, constitutions would not have such provisions; however, he asserted, 
Kuwait’s situation was not normal: the ‘founding’ Kuwaitis will become a minority in 
the country, and will not constitute more than a third of its  residents, and with time 
‘original’ Kuwaitis will become a minority. This phenomenon, he stressed, does not 
exist in any other country. To Almazeedi, this constituted a core political problem, 
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and the constitution must therefore not overlook this reality.
43
 Thus, “in this age”, Al 
Dabbous concluded, it is the sons of Kuwait who should be given preference.
44
 
What increased this defensive attitude even further was the perceived corruption and 
exploitation Kuwaitis thought was taking place amongst Arab employees. In the CA, 
Al Khateeb explained the members’ demands as being a result of discontent with 
regards to some high-ranking employees of the state who had been newly naturalized 
and were viewed to act in an inappropriate manner.
45
 These people, Al Khateeb 
believed, tainted the reputation of the rest.
46
 In fact, discontent towards Arab 
employees was reported throughout the 1950s. In 1957, the Political Agent noted that 
the reformist papers were “hostile to foreign Arab government employees”.
47
 In 1958, 
the Political Agent wrote that the reformists appeared to be “associated with a 
movement for excluding non-Kuwaitis from public life…”.
48
 
In light of all of the above, it would be easy to comprehend the government policy of 
‘Kuwaitization’ that was implemented towards the end of the 1950s. Policies in this 
direction were sometimes undertaken even though it was clear that at times they did 
not economically make much sense. In 1957, the Persian Gulf Monthly Report noted: 
“It now appears that the Government policy is to replace expatriate Arabs employed 
in government departments by Kuwaitis with the minimum delay”.
49
 In fact, there 
were “definite signs that the policy of Government Departments is to replace 
expatriate Arabs by Kuwaitis as soon as possible”.
50
 This was to be done, it was 




In sum, limiting the factors behind government policy of giving preferential treatment 
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to citizens to buying loyalty is very much narrow and does not capture the diverse 
underlying reasons behind such a policy. As mentioned, it is very much unfair to view 
these policies as being unique to rentier states. Furthermore, in a small and rich 
country like Kuwait, witnessing a sudden and unprecedented influx of foreigners, it is 
clear that feelings of protectiveness pushed such policies with greater force to the 
extent that they even included undertaking measures that would give priority to 
‘original’ over naturalized Kuwaitis.  
6.3.3. Regional Currents and Social Policy 
It should be noted that the views of policy makers must not be seen in a vacuum, 
isolated from social currents dominating the region at the time. In fact, many of the 
welfare ideas were clearly influenced by such developments. They created a particular 
notion of ‘progress’, and what an advanced and decent society looked liked. 
In this regard, the Department of Social Affairs contended in 1955 that “in the present 
day, the standing of a country and government is measured by the amount it 
designates in its budget and allocates from its resources for educational, medical, and 
social services provided to citizens” (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 69). There 
is no disagreement in the minds of Kuwaitis, asserted the Department, that economic 
development is measured by the amount of services and social care it guarantees to 
provide them and their children in future (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 69). 
In fact, it was representatives of the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs who were 
brought in to build and organize the Kuwaiti Department of Social Affairs, as there 
was very limited local experience to undertake such a task. It was Egyptians, 
therefore, who put in place the administrative and technical organizational 
foundations, studied and prepared the different social programs, and trained Kuwaiti 
employees (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 66). When devising policies and 
issuing legislation such as the Labor Law of 1955, sources on which these were based 
included existing legislation in other Arab states, recommendations by the Arab 
League, and World Labor Organization Agreements (Department of Social Affairs, 
1957: 59). 
Indeed, the Department of Social Affairs was involved in many regional conferences 
in Egypt and elsewhere, such as the Conference of Arab Social Experts held by the 
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Arab League, and worked to be consistent with the resultant recommendations. These 
included placing the effort towards raising the social standards of individuals at the 
core of social policy. The goals of the state as recurrently voiced in these meetings 
should be ‘social justice’, achieved through directing economic development towards 
raising living standards and providing stable and rewarding employment opportunities 
for citizens. Accordingly, the state had to care for its citizens and work to create the 
means for a dignified life and to ‘free them’ from anxiety and fear by guaranteeing 
factors of reassurance regarding their future (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 66-
67). 
The situation in the CA was not different. Othman, the constitutional advisor and the 
person who arguably had the greatest influence in drafting the constitution, was a 
representative of the Egyptian government under Nasser. Moreover, the social 
philosophies overtaking the region had clearly influenced the members greatly and 
created a desire for Kuwait to be in line with regional ‘progressive’ currents. For 
instance, Al Zaid pointed out in the CC that the members desired the constitution to 
be compatible with the social trends taking place in the world as a whole. They did 




Importantly, as suggested, this should be viewed as part of the greatly influencing 
impact of Arab nationalism on Kuwait, with all its implications for the views of 
Kuwaitis towards the desired socioeconomic system. Indeed, the significant impact of 
Arab nationalism is reflected in the Preamble to the Constitution, in which the Emir 
states: 
…having faith in the role of this Country in furthering Arab nationalism 
and the promotion of world peace and human civilisation; and, striving 
towards a better future in which the Country enjoys greater prosperity 
and higher international standing, and in which also the citizens are 
provided with more political freedom, equality, and social justice, a 
future which upholds the traditions inherent in the Arab nation by 
enhancing the dignity of the individual, safeguarding public interest, and 
applying consultative rule yet maintaining the unity and stability of the 
Country… (Kuwait Constitutions) 
 Moreover, in its very first article, the Constitution asserts the following: 
                                                 
52
 Minutes of the 9
th
 Meeting of the Constitution Committee, 31 May 1962, p. 12. 
 151 
 Article 1 
Kuwait is an Arab State, independent and fully sovereign. Neither its 
sovereignty nor any part of its territory may be relinquished.  The people of 
Kuwait is a part of the Arab Nation. 
 Other articles to the same effect include: 
 Article 12   
The State safeguards the heritage of Islam and of the Arabs and 
contributes to the furtherance of human civilisation. 
 Article 157   
Peace is the aim of the State, and the safeguard of the integrity of the 
Country, which is part of the integrity of the Greater Arab World, is a 
trust devolving upon every citizen. 
These articles clearly reflect the Arab nationalistic sentiments of Kuwaitis and by 
intimation the social trends overtaking Arab thought. Thus, the economic policies 
undertaken by the government, and the economic principles assigned by the 
constitution should not be seen as separate from wider regional and international 
developments, with all their effect on the perceived meaning of a just economic 
system. In fact, this was very much understood at the time, as the Planning Board 
noted in its analysis of the constitution: 
Perhaps the most important fact to observe in these [economic] 
provisions is the emphasis placed upon the principles of social justice, 
social functions and economic activity. This emphasis is consistent with 
recent developments in the attitude towards property rights, capital, 
labour, the responsibility of public and private activity in the 
development of the national economy, and the spread of prosperity 
among all citizens. (Planning Board, 1968: 12-13) 
 
6.3.4. Social Justice in the Kuwaiti Context 
The sections above brought out the idea of social justice as a stated aim of Kuwaiti 
economic policy. The concept was voiced in different contexts, all sharing, however, 
the basic underlying notion that the wealth of the nation must be used predominantly 
for the welfare of citizens. In fact, the term ‘social justice’ is recurrent in several 
articles of the constitution. For example:  
 Article 20 
The national economy shall be based on social justice… 
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Article 22 
Relations between employers and employees and between 
landlords and tenants shall be regulated by law on economic 
principles, due regard being given to the rules of social justice. 
Article 24 
Social justice shall be the basis of taxes and public imposts. 
 
While the term may be considered somewhat general with imprecise practical 
ramifications, there was a unique understanding of social justice in the context of the 
Kuwaiti experience that manifested itself very tangibly in the discussions of the CA. 
To give a general background first, the sudden advent of oil wealth and the sudden 
shift in the economic structure had rendered the skills of the majority of the 
population obsolete. These were mainly the seafarers and divers, whose skills and 
labor had constituted the backbone and basis of Kuwait’s pre-oil economy. Suddenly, 
their skills were of no value or use, and being overwhelmingly illiterate without any 
education, this had made them end up occupying very menial jobs with relatively very 
low pay and low corresponding benefits – this, in a country that was transformed to be 
one of the richest in the world.
53
  
Concerns for this segment of society was being voiced very early on in the 
development process. Particularly, in 1954 signs of unemployment amongst them was 
starting to be witnessed, and this was tied in part to the problem of immigration and 
the use of better skilled foreign labor, with whom Kuwaitis were unable to compete. 
Other reasons included the slowing down of development at the end of that year and 
the culturally grounded refusal of Kuwaitis to occupy certain jobs like domestic 
servants. Thus, the problem of unemployment was discussed in the Development 
Board in December 1954 for the first time, and urgent measures were decided upon to 
ensure work for Kuwaiti laborers. These included continuing the use of the Kuwaiti 
laborers that some government departments had decided to dispensed with; replacing 
foreign laborers with Kuwaiti laborers; providing vocational training for Kuwaiti 
laborers in all government workshops and in the Oil Company’s school; and 
regulating the use of labor by stopping the employment of foreigners who were not 
certified by the Department of Social Affairs (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 
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25). 
The Department itself highlighted its concerns regarding Kuwaiti labor in light the 
influx of foreigners and Kuwaitis’ limited skills. In 1955, it pointed to the fact that 
due to the limited skills and experience of Kuwaiti workers in relation to the needs of 
the modern economy, signs of unemployment amongst them were beginning to be 
witnessed despite the expansion of the labor market over the decade. The Department 
noted that both the private and public sector were forced to rely on expatriate labor, 
and the latter ultimately constituted 87% of used labor in Kuwait (Department of 
Social Affairs, 1955: 28; Department of Social Affairs, 1956: 17). The Department 
warned about the ‘dangers of this phenomenon’, and undertook a program to train 
Kuwaiti workers and try to raise their level of productivity, efficiency and skill. 
Further, the stated aim of this program was to provide a Kuwaiti labor force that was 
able to participate effectively in economic production and to gradually replace 
expatriates  (Department of Social Affairs, 1955: 28).  
Nevertheless, despite such efforts, the problems faced by this segment of society 
regarding their employment conditions and status continued in the coming years due 
primarily to their limited skills and illiteracy. However, with time, consciousness 
among the Kuwaiti population about their situation also began to grow, and with it a 
realization that it was simply unfair.
54
 One of the most elaborate manifestations of this 
came to surface during discussions around a complaint submitted by a number of 
Kuwaiti ‘daily’ workers and employees (i.e. they did not have fixed long-term 
contracts) to the CA regarding their employment conditions. In their complaint, they 
had called themselves the ‘sons of the sea’ (i'yal albahar). Al Abdulrazzag, who was 
of a prominent merchant family, appealed to the conscience of the members to help 
these workers and do them justice. He reminded them that it was these very people 
and their fathers before them who had participated with all sincerity and dedication in 
the building of pre-oil Kuwait. They had defended the country in times of defense and 
effectively contributed in building its economy: they had been the backbone 
(uddatuna) of Kuwait in times of need. They had sailed to the ends of India and 
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Africa, Abdulrazzag continued, and during the pearling season they had dived for 
pearls. They had done so in the best possible manner, he contented, and had paid the 
taxes imposed on them (ghwasat al-hukooma) with a piece of mind, seeing this as a 
sacred duty and part of their participation in the defense the country.
55
 Importantly, 
this segment of society, asserted Abdulrazzag, had endured the greatest hardships so 
others could enjoy, and was viewed by many as being ‘owned’ (bahhara mulk). 
Abdulrazzag pointed to the harsh debt structure of the pre-oil era to demonstrate this 
point, whereby the pearl divers and seafarers would remain in debt most of their lives 
to the captains and, in turn, the captains to the merchants. These debts were inherited, 
he went on, by their sons and grandsons, and if they were unpaid and all descendants 
died, the captains would take over their homes for the cheapest of values. After oil, 
these very homes were purchased by the state from their new owners under the land-
purchasing program for extremely high prices, some reaching millions of Rupees.
56
   
These feelings resonated with the members of the CA and it was clear that the 
concern towards this large segment of society was shared amongst the members. Al 
Khateeb, for instance, asserted that helping this segment must not be seen as charity. 
Government had an obligation to help them, as this was their right. The government, 
he stressed, must help these citizens move up in life, as the matter was one of 
livelihood and dignity.
57
 Al Fozan went further, and stressed that the fact that these 
citizens were illiterate was not to be an impediment towards their promotion as they 
constituted the majority of Kuwaitis, and it was they who had historically struggled in 
all fields. Therefore, asserted Al Fozan, the CA members and the government should 
show them appreciation and their high regards and grant them their right – Kuwaitis 
must have the right of preferential treatment in jobs and everything, he concluded.
58
 
Al Hasawi, for his part, assured the CA that they would do them justice and take care 
of all their issues, especially since they constituted the majority of the population: 
70% of Kuwaitis, he believed.
59
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Thus, it is clear that the fact that they get a share in Kuwait’s oil wealth in general was 
seen as a form of justice, fairness, and also a show of gratitude. Moreover, these 
feelings had a direct impact, as seen, on the views towards the employment of 
Kuwaitis and giving them priority and preference. In the context of the CA 
discussions, therefore, it is easy to understand the mindset behind the article 
concerned with guaranteeing employment of Kuwaitis which clearly includes some of 
the themes suggested above: 
Article 41 
Every Kuwaiti has the right to work and to choose the type of his 
work. 
Work is a duty of every citizen necessitated by personal dignity and 
public good. The State shall endeavour to make it available to citizens 
and to make its terms equitable. 
In sum, social justice, as understood in the context of Kuwait’s historical social and 
economic experiences, had a direct impact on views regarding employment and other 
benefits thought to be a right that must be provided by the Kuwaiti state.  
6.4. CONCLUSION  
The focus of this chapter was to examine the perceptions of Kuwaiti policymakers 
and the kinds of rationalizations used by them to justify the ‘generous’ socioeconomic 
policies undertaken by the state upon the advent of the oil boom of the 1950s. The 
importance of looking further into to this question was borne out of the findings of the 
previous chapter, in which it became clear that the main framers of the Development 
Plan – the British – who had emphasized the need to spread the wealth for political 
content, were at the same time very much opposed to the super-welfare policies 
Kuwaitis were undertaking. Contrary to widespread impressions, these policies were 
actually viewed as harmful to social peace in that they would lead to social agitation 
and unrest. By looking more closely at the ideas of contemporary Kuwaitis, it 
becomes clear that the stress of the rentier state literature on the political utility of 
socioeconomic decisions is extremely narrow and does not do justice to major cultural 
and historical underlying factors that shape the attitudes of policymakers. While the 
previous chapters focused on the post-oil economic development of Kuwait, the next 
chapter examines the concurrent and interrelated developments in the political sphere 
that transformed Kuwait into a modern constitutional state.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POST-OIL INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS TO 
REFORM IN KUWAIT 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly assumed in the relevant literature that an oil boom undermines political 
activity and democratization. However, in Kuwait, the onset of the oil boom in the 1950s 
was coupled with both a great rise in political activity and an increase in popular 
participation in the decision-making process at a scale arguably unseen throughout 
Kuwait’s prior history. This had manifested itself in representation in government 
through different bodies, elected or otherwise, and in the development of a serious 
movement demanding reforms. Already in 1951, right after the political quietness that 
marked the 1940s, the Political Agent described his impression of the changes in Kuwait: 
There were … signs of cracks in the structure. As the sheikhs got richer 
through oil royalties their actual dependence on the merchants for money, 
if not their voracious appetites for it, grew less. The merchant community 
with connections all over the world had no longer to fear beating up by 
negro bullies, disgrace, even ruin at the instance of the sheikhs. Amongst 
the poor the workers in the oil company had within them the seeds of 
organized labour. No less that seven Egyptian newspapers cram-full of 
politics were in circulation in the town… In December there were even 
elections, albeit electors chosen by the Ruler, to the various committees 




While the level of political activity and participation in decision-making varied 
throughout the decade, by 1962, these experiences were crowned by the framing of a 
constitution in a clear process of democratization. It is the aim of this chapter, hence, to 
analyze different factors behind such dynamism, with special reference to the role of oil. 
To do so, the internal factors that had given shape to the domestic political scene in 
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Kuwait in the post-oil period are discussed first. Secondly, the international dimension to 
Kuwaiti domestic reform is examined and discussed. Analyzing both, and examining how 
they work together, is essential to understanding why Kuwait developed in the way that it 
did, in opposition to the prevailing views on the nexus between oil and politics.  
7.2. INTERNAL SOURCES OF POLITICAL DYNAMISM: BEYOND 
MATERIALISM 
7.2.1. A Fertile Ground for Activity 
The relationship between oil and politics was subject to much discussion amongst British 
officials very early on during the oil boom. It is interesting to note that education, in these 
arguments, was central. It was acknowledged that the spread of education, bankrolled by 
oil wealth, would give rise to a politically conscious class that may form a basis for 
dissent.  However, this was juxtaposed against other factors related to the effect of oil 
that were believed to have a pacifying influence. In this regard, there were two main 
themes pervading the discussions. Like the rentier state literature, the first viewed the 
issue from a purely material angle. It was believed that the continued oil boom would 
insure the employment of educated Kuwaitis and would therefore lead them away from 
agitation. Moreover, with the huge gains to be made from the oil boom, Kuwaitis would 
not have an incentive for higher education, further decreasing the chances of political 
dissidence. 
In 1952, for instance, the Political Agent wrote that “[a]s long as the boom lasts in 
Kuwait, the dangerous ‘white collar class’ are likely to be absorbed in the expanding 
market for the services of anyone with even a pretension to literacy. In fact, prosperity … 
can probably be relied upon to keep out pernicious politics…”.
2
 The Political Agent 
noticed that “the tendency in Bahrain and here [Kuwait] is for boys to leave school early 
in order to start earning as soon as possible and in Bahrain it has not been possible to fill 
all the places in the secondary school”; therefore, “[t]he picture … of Kuwaitis thirsting 
for higher education and … with it subversive politics is ... unreal”, because “where 
immediate material gain is a motive no Arab is likely to give the slightest consideration 
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 Nevertheless, the Political Agent acknowledged that “were the boom to 
show signs of ending, jobs only available for the well qualified, and the schools full of 
those trying to become so, the picture would obviously emerge again in the form it exists 
in other Middle Eastern countries”.
4
 
The second view stressed the fact that the issue was not solely a matter of material gain. 
As Greenhill of the Foreign Office wrote,  
We feel that it is a mistake to concentrate only on the dangers of 
unemployment … The unemployed effendi would of course constitute a 
potential menace, but in our view … the problem is one which will arise 
from the very emergence of an educated class. The members of this class, 
a new phenomenon in Kuwait, are likely to have a political consciousness 
and political intelligence which their fathers did not posses, and as a result 
they are likely to be impatient with a constitutional system which gives 
them no political outlets. They are likely to demand reforms, not only in 




With time, the second view gained more credence in the discussions. This is clearly 
reflected in a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1957, as the 
British began reassessing their policies in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf as a whole. The 
picture it portrays counters much of what is believed to take hold in countries witnessing 
an oil boom. The Secretary wrote that in the case of the Trucial States and Muscat, the 
pressure for change was largely external. The reason is that “so long as oil is not found, 
society remains primitive and the majority of people illiterate”.
6
 However, the Secretary 
contended,  
In the other States there is much more internal pressure for change 
because prosperity and economic development resulting from 
discovery of oil have brought widespread education, facilitated the 






 FO371/98458: Greenhill, Foreign Office, to Hay, Political Resident, December 22, 1952, p. 2. In fact, it is 
in this context that the idea of establishing a British ‘Institute’ or ‘Council’ was put forward, so that the 
British could “cultivate these people and try to guide both them and the present ruling class so that political 
evolution takes place gradually and without a serious clash”, and extend “British influence in educational 
circles” of Kuwait (FO371/114751: Bell, Political Agent to Fry, Foreign Office, 11 July, 1955). 
6





spread of foreign influence through the media of the press, the radio, 
and through foreigners particularly from Egypt and Palestine and 




This realization, the Secretary wrote, required a change in certain policies.  
Sooner or later the demand for reform will become sufficiently strong and 
insistent to compel some change in the present patriarchal system of 
government. Much will depend on whether the Ruling families have the 
courage and wisdom to come to terms with moderate opinion in their 
States and thus prevent the potential forces of opposition from mobilising 
sufficient strength to be able to overthrow their regimes unless they are 
saved by outside, i.e., British help which it might be difficult for us to 
give. The Political Resident has shown that such a situation might arise in 
Kuwait … it is fairly certain that in the oil-bearing States at least there 
may come a time in the foreseeable future when the Rulers will be forced 
to adjust their relations with this country in order to survive. We should be 
prepared to accept such an adjustment if to do so seems the best way to 




Indeed, in Kuwait, while in the past the movement for change was confined to some rich 
merchant families, after oil the movement started to spread across different classes of 
society. A prime example is Ahmad Al Khateeb, who is of a poor family. In the 1950s, he 
became generally recognized as the leader of the local reformist movement, and was, 
according to the British Agent, “perhaps the most serious” critic amongst “the leaders of 
the cultural clubs, some of the merchants, and the newspaper editors” who hold 
“somewhat vague progressive ideas and constitutional demands”.
9
 This, if anything, was 
an indicator of the popularization of political activism, as opposed to the historical elitist 
merchant movement of the 1920s and 1930s.
10
  
A main reason for this change was that young educated men, such as Al Khateeb, started 






 FO371/1145588: Political Agent, Kuwait to Fry, Foreign Office, 15 August 1955, p. 1; Confidential 
Annex to Kuwait Diary No.11 Covering the Period October 28 to November 28, 1956, p. 1, in Political 
Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 20, p. 251. 
10
 For a review of the different political groups that appeared in the 1950s, see Al-Mudairis: 1999. 
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returning to Kuwait after having completed their university studies in the early 1950s. 
They became known as the ‘intellectuals’, and they emerged as the primary agents of the 
reformist currents and the vibrant political activity that started to take shape. Many of 
these ‘intellectuals’ were only able to get educational scholarships with oil money. Thus, 
as discussed  above, oil contributed in creating an educated class which in turn led to 
demands for serious reforms. Importantly, oil also allowed those of poorer backgrounds 
to settle, and look at the meaning of life beyond the need to provide for themselves and 
their families the basic requirements of survival by traveling across the seas for months 
on end. 
These issues were generally understood at the time. The Times Correspondent, for 
instance, described the position of the reformists as having “legitimate grievances when 
they point out that in the second half of the twentieth century they live under simple 
patriarchal rule, with no modern code of law, no system of public accounting ... and no 
proper system of Government administration”.
11
 “They deplore the greed of some 
individual sheikhs”, he went on, “and are incensed by the suppression of their own 
voices”.
12
 Importantly, “[n]either individual wealth nor Kuwait’s welfare state with its 
free education and medical treatment can compensate the educated youth of Kuwait for 
the humiliation of submitting to archaic customs in a rapidly changing world”.
13
 
Indeed, while it is assumed in the rentier state literature that any social activity that may 
potentially develop would be particularistic, undemocratic, and geared towards rent-
seeking and getting as much from the oil wealth as possible, it is clear that the reformist 
movement during the 1950s did not carry such characteristics. In fact, some of their goals 




In August 1958, Al Fajr newspaper issued a manifesto declaring the “the demands of the 
Reformist movement”.
15
 Nowhere in these demands is any hint of rent-seeking. “The 
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 For a copy of the reformist’s declaration in this regard, see Al-Mudairis, 1999: 131. 
15
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people want”, it was declared: 
a) Every citizen to have the full rights of a citizen; 
b) To take part in the running of the country's affairs. 
Therefore, they want an elected Legislative Council with 
absolute powers to represent all citizens; 
c) To organise relations between citizens, limit the powers of 
Government Departments, define rights and duties of all and 
have a general constitution; 
d) K.O.C.’s relationship with Kuwait to be purely commercial. 
Therefore the people refuse any interference by this 
Company in the country’s affairs; 
e) Equality between all citizens. Preference should be based on 
qualifications; 
f) A water pipeline from Shatt-Al-Arab. 
This is all what the people want and there is no need for spies. 
The people of Kuwait believe that they are part of the Arab 
nation and that Kuwait is a piece of the Arab land. Therefore, 





These ideas resonated throughout the period, and democratization was at the core of the 
demands. In 1956, for instance, the reformists announced that “it was the duty of the 
Clubs ... to continue to fight ‘the routed remnants of feudalism’”.
17
 In conversations with 
them during that year, they continued to re-echo “many of the sentiments” that “were 
anti-British, and violently critical of the privileged position of the British in the Persian 
Gulf, the existence of foreign oil companies, and the feudal form of government existing 
in Kuwait, Bahrain and the other Gulf States”.
18
 
                                                                                                                                                 




 Residency Summary of Events during March 1956, p. 5, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 20, 
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While these were the ideals held by the educated ‘intellectuals’, the merchants, for their 
part, held firmly the belief that participating in the decision-making process was their 
historical right, only taken away after Mubarak violently reached power and signed his 
treaty with Britain. This deeply held belief is a powerful a constant in Kuwaiti elite 
culture. The merchants do not view the Sabah family as being of a higher status than their 
own, and this was very well known. In his Valedictory Despatch, for instance, Sir John 
Richmond noted:  
Kuwaiti merchants have always regarded the Ruling Family as in no 
way superior to their own and have always pretended to a choice in 
the selection of Ruler from among the Al-Sabah. Since the 
establishment of British influence they have not always been able to 
make this good, because this factor gave the Sabah a chance to 




The beliefs of the merchants were translated in petitions to the Ruler throughout the 
decade demanding participation. Indeed, these merchants were highly conscious 
politically. “When discussing commercial matters with the merchants”, noted the British 
Commercial Officer in 1958, “it is invariably difficult to divorce them from politics”.
20
   
Moreover, much of their attitudes did not stem purely from materialistic interests or rent-
seeking. Like the intellectuals, their demands at times went against such interests. For 
example, after numerous discussions with Kuwaiti merchants over the year 1958, the 
British Commercial Officer recorded “the general trend of opinion which appears to be 
commonly that of both senior and junior merchants”.
21
 They believed, he noted, that 
British “support for a Ruling Family which failed to move with the times and remained 
inflexible in its form of government, would, in the long run, leave Kuwaitis, despite 
themselves, with no alternative but to go for union with the United Arab Republic, 
although it is admitted that this would be against their own material interests”.
22
 These 
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views, and others, seemed to be “universal in the market”.
23
 
In fact, that year, both the merchants and intellectuals formed what was known as the 
Kuwaiti League. A part of the idea behind its creation was to unify the reformist efforts 
of both parties. This in itself is a significant reflection of the non-particularistic force 
behind the League’s creation, as it included members of different classes of society. 
Further, the League soon submitted a memorandum to the Ruler demanding that Kuwait 
be a third member of the United Arab Republic (see Al-Mudairis, 1999: 39). In fact, 
coordination between the different classes of society was recurrent throughout the 
following years.  In 1967, for instance, there was an unofficial ‘understanding’ between 
candidates running for parliament. These candidates included both the head of the 
Chamber of Commerce and the head of the Labor Union. This clearly reflects goals that 
go beyond materialism and particularistic rent-seeking, but rather indicates action 
towards change by various stakeholders with a shared aim of more general reform. 
In countries like Kuwait at the time, where modern state institutions were very much 
lacking, and where existed a somewhat tribal form of government, the personality and 
character of the Ruler and indeed ruling family members in power carried increased 
significance to the way things develop. It must therefore be stressed that Abdulla Al 
Salim’s tolerance and relative progressiveness, as the ruler of the country, played a major 
role in allowing for an open and politically active environment to take hold. As 
mentioned earlier, Abdulla had supported the merchant movement of the 1930s, had been 
considered their ally, and had been chosen as President of the resultant Legislative 
Council. During the agitation leading up to the establishment of the Council, Abdulla had 
foreseen that it “might run not only against the Shaikh but also against the family as a 
whole, and was shrewd enough to trim his sails to the rising wind”.
24
 His position was a 
result of him “possessing some learning and modern ideas”, the Political Resident 
believed.
25
 When the Council was established, Abdulla continued to support it in some of 
the most difficult periods, sometimes standing alone amongst his family members. In 
December of 1938, for example, when tensions were high just prior to dissolving the first 








Council, the Political Agent noted:  “all Subah except Abdulla Salim for Sheikh”.
26
  
In sum, in addition to his historical links with the reformist movement, the Ruler was 
considered to be “by far the strongest in character and most intelligent member of the 
Subah family”, and was a “well read man” who “can converse on many more subjects 
than the average man of his class”.
27
 With this background, his relative progressive 
policies upon assuming power should not be surprising. Thus, very soon after becoming 
Ruler, Abdulla called for elections for the various departmental councils in 1951. He also 
included the very same merchants whom he had allied with during the 1930s in the 
decision-making process with regards to important areas of the state. These merchants 
became members of the Development Board, for instance, which held the responsibility 
to supervise and coordinate development. They included Abdul Aziz Al Sagar, Abdulatif 
Thunayan, and Humood Al Zaid.
28
    
Moreover, the Ruler liberalized many avenues through which the reformist movement 
was able to flourish. The reformists established cultural clubs, published newspapers, and 
held public meetings. They also wrote political statements and handed petitions to the 
Ruler, the British Agency, and international organizations. These were in fact some of the 
main means by which dissent was expressed and views were spread. While it is true that 
some of the reformist movement’s writings were distributed secretly, tolerance and lack 
of persecution must have contributed to their increased frequency. In this, Kuwait was 
unique in the region. Indeed, as the Political Resident noted, the “Clubs Committee”, 
which pooled the reformist clubs under one roof, represented “perhaps the only tolerated 
opposition to shaikhly government in the Gulf”.
29
 
In sum, the political consciousness amongst intellectuals and merchants and the relative 
openness of the political order as a result of the relative progressiveness of the new Ruler 
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provided fertile grounds for an active and vibrant political environment during the 1950s. 
These underlying variables combined to allow for dissent to be increasingly expressed 
throughout the decade. The next section will examine the factors fueling such dissent in a 
country undergoing a rapid economic transformation in the context of an oil boom. 
7.2.2. Fueling the Dissent  
The previous section presented the internal social variables that provided a fertile ground 
on which vibrant political activity may develop. In extending the discussion by focusing 
on the other side of the coin, namely dissent, this section aims to examine the major 
factors that fueled the increasingly intensified calls for change and reform in a country 
witnessing an unprecedented surge in oil revenues. The documents showed that these 
factors could be placed in three broad categories: 
(i) Form of government  
(ii) Ruling family corruption  
(iii)Arab nationalist sentiments  
7.2.2.1. Form of government  
As seen earlier, coming into the oil age, the ruling family members were the heads of all 
the governmental departments in Kuwait, and had acted very much independently in a 
system that was sometimes described as ‘oligarchic’.
30
 This administrative setup was a 
source of great discontent among the people. “What right has the Ruler”, asked the 
Kuwait Peoples Party in a letter to the British Government, “to appoint heads of his 
Government departments, which are closely and directly connected with the interests of 
the public out of the members of his family who understand nothing at all except to 
oppress the people, spend the money of the country for their dirty purposes…”.
31
 
“[E]very member of the Ruling Family”, the Party contended, “has become a despot in 
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his actions and also in the department over which he presides and plays with the peoples 
rights in the way he desires, while the Ruler is unable to stop him from doing so and thus 
there is disorder in the country…”.
32
 
In their powerful positions in Government posts, the ruling family members were seen, 
even by the British, as impediments towards any serious political reform. For instance, as 
already mentioned, in 1953, the Resident’s Annual Report noted that the “acquisition of 
great wealth inflated the self-importance of members of the Shaikh’s family to such an 
extent that they were very impatient of even such slender controls as existed over their 
personal power and finances”.
34
  
As such, the shaikhs as heads of government departments were seen as the main reason 
behind the failures of the electoral experiments that took place during the 1950s. 
Members of the elected departmental committees repeatedly clashed with the shaikhs, 
particularly Fahad, ultimately resulting in rounds of resignations. For instance, in April 
1952, the Political Agent noted that Fahad’s “arbitrary actions had caused the Health 
Committee to resign and the British doctors employed by the Kuwait Government to 
contemplate throwing in their hands”.
35
 In May of that year, the Agent reported that 
Fahad 
 
has not abated his activities and has scandalized people by giving the 
Kuwaiti Director of Health a cuff on the ear. Pelly reports that general 
uneasiness prevails in the town and that there is open grumbling against 




This naturally gave rise to significant anger. In their memorandum, the Kuwait 
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Democratic Party summed up the situation relating to the repeated failures of political 
reform as follows: 
After the continuous struggle and repeated requests, the ruling clique 
agreed to the idea of having administrative councils, and after that these 
councils were formed by the method of appointment, those responsible in 
the country, have responded to the demand for adopting the system of 
elections. Because of direct interference in the elections, the fact is that 
those councils are not performing their duties freely, because of the 
appointment of a member of the ruling family as a president of each of 
those councils. In this manner the mentality of autocracy over rules, and 





While the ‘oligarchic’ administrative set-up combined with the personalities and actions 
of certain ruling family members that obstructed reforms had in and of themselves caused 
discontent, there were also other spillover effects that the resultant government 
maladministration had caused, particularly in light of the change of the economic 
structure induced by the oil boom. For example, because the merchants’ businesses were 
now tied to the state, government maladministration would have direct consequences on 
them, as it would directly cause their businesses to suffer. Naturally, therefore, discontent 
in such a context would be directed at the state. Indeed, in 1954, Logan reported that a 
group representing the Kuwaiti merchants presented a petition to the Ruler drawing 
attention to the unsatisfactory state of administration. Logan described the situation 
clearly:  
The slowing down of the pace of developments during the last six months 
has left many merchants with large stocks of building materials which 
they cannot quickly clear. It has also reduced their opportunities for 
making money by contracting. They evidently realize that the main cause 
of this is maladministration, particularly in the departments controlled by 
Shaikh Fahad…the merchants’ feelings on this occasion were stronger 
than usual, probably because their degree of prosperity was threatened, 
and were shared by many of the inhabitants of the town who respect the 
Ruler, but few of his family.
38
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In sum, the oligarchic nature of government and actions of ruling family members that 
blocked change and reform, combined with the ramifications of the consequent 
maladministration, played an important role in fueling anger and discontent amongst 
many Kuwaitis.    
7.2.2.2. Ruling family corruption  
In addition to the above, corruption after oil wealth, particularly of the ruling family 
members, assumed a level previously unseen. Oil, in this case, compounded the feeling of 
discontent towards the shaikhs, as the enormous amounts of money coming into the state 
meant that their corruption would manifest itself on a magnified scale and become highly 
visible to the public. A striking example is the Ruling family’s notorious campaign of 
land grabbing. In his Monthly Summaries of 1952, the Resident described the situation as 
follows:  
Areas of desert stretching from Kuwait town to as far as Ahmadi 
and even beyond have been grabbed by Shaikhs and others marking 
them out with oil drums or concrete blocks painted in various 
colours. The idea of course is that when the town planners come to 
acquire these areas they will have to pay compensation at the rates 




This situation had a great impact on the progress of the development program. As the 
Political Agent reported, “land-grabbing and the claiming of fantastic compensation for it 
when it is required for development, is the chief cause of obstruction”.
40
 According to Al-
Najjar, the share of the Al Sabah from the budget of the land-purchasing program 
between 1952-1954 was about 60%, more than 90% of which went to very few 
individuals amongst them (Al-Najjar, 2000: 64).  
This situation became a major source of agitation. “What right”, asserted the Kuwait 
People Party, “has the local government to dispose of the income of the country by 
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buying lands which are government property from members of the family and paying 
them millions of rupees?”.
41
  
Moreover, the ruling family used public funds to bankroll their private luxurious. In 
1954, Wilkes noted that Al Sabah members have “learned to become large spenders. 
Much of their private expenditure is included in the expenditure of the departments they 
control … Moreover it appears the Family are determined to lay their hands on as much 
money as possible”.
42
 To the same effect, Reilly noted in 1956 that “[i]t looks as though a 
new round of competition in ostentatious palaces is about to start … The cost of these 




Understandably, this enraged many. For instance, a Memorandum and Letter 
submitted to the Ruler in 1954 by the Kuwait Democratic Party (also submitted to 
different international organizations) complained that the Department of Public Works 
continued “its work of meeting the wishes of various Shaikhs and the influential 
people in building palaces and huge houses … while applications and complaints of 
owners of destroyed houses of our own poor classes, are still lying in files”.
44
  
The fact that the vast oil revenues compounded the anger felt towards corruption is 
reflected, for instance, in a widely distributed pamphlet by the National Youth Society in 
1956, in which the following criticism was raised: 
The Kuwait budget is vast. It is more than the budgets of Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq and the other Arab Muslim countries. This budget is 
being taken by the Al-Sabah Government and put in their pockets. 
They also take possession of the land which belongs to the people 
and for which we fought. They sell this land for millions and 
smuggle the proceeds to foreign countries where they buy large 
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Therefore, corruption, on the ‘grand scale’ it assumed after the oil boom, created much 
anger amongst many Kuwaitis to whom such corruption had become very much obvious 
and visible. 
7.2.2.3. Arab nationalist sentiments  
The previous sections identified the ways in which the political structure and the increase 
in corruption paved the way for dissent in the country. Another source of dissent was 
fuelled by the emerging Arab nationalism, as in the 1950s, Arab nationalism swept 
Kuwait just like it did in most other Arab countries.  
In fact, historically, the movement for internal reform in Kuwait had been linked with 
Arabism. The 1938 merchant movement is a case in point. The Arab nationalistic 
leanings of these merchants is well known, and in fact run even deeper than what is 
widely believed. Leading merchants of the 1938 movement, including Abdullatif 
Thunayyan who became the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, were members of a 
secret organization later known as ‘The Secret Arab Movement – the Group of the Red 
Book’ (see: Juha, 2004). Moreover, the intellectuals of the 1950s were themselves Arab 
nationalist leaders. Al Khateeb, for example, was cofounder of the Arab Nationalist 
Movement, established in Beirut, along with George Habash, Wadee Haddad, and Hani 
Al Hindi.  
It is, thus, extremely difficult to separate Arab nationalism from calls for internal reforms. 
There are several reasons for this. First, as suggested above, the leading agents of both 
Arab nationalism in Kuwait and the reformist movement were the same individuals. 
Second, the major public gatherings, rallies, and protests that took place in Kuwait were 
for the ‘anti-imperialist’ Arab cause. It was at these events, moreover, where major 
tensions and frictions with government security forces occurred. A prime example was in 
1956, where security forces used force to disperse crowds who had gathered in solidarity 
with Egypt during the Suez Crisis. This, in fact, even led to resignations of police 
officials, most famously of Colonel Jassim Al Qatami, who refused to be part of the 
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Government clampdown and rejected the regime’s attitude towards the protests.
46
 
In addition, because the organizers of these events were also the main drivers of the 
democratic movement, these events were naturally used as platforms to voice demands 
for internal reforms. For example, in 1959, a large celebration was organized to mark the 
first anniversary of the creation of the United Arab Republic. The gathering ended with a 
clash between the crowd and security forces, after Al Qatami, the resigned officer, 
declared in his speech that “while Kuwaitis had accepted to be ruled by a tribal system of 
government since Subah the First, it is now time for popular democratic governance 
where the people have a constitution and ministers”.  
In addition to the above, the two causes of Arab nationalism and internal reform were not 
seen as separate issues at all. For example, the reformists saw the ‘backwardness’ of the 
regimes as an impediment to their dreams of Arab unity. Moreover, the British and 
American oil companies working in Kuwait, together with the backing of their respective 
governments, were perceived to have a great influence in the running of Kuwaiti affairs. 
Thus, naturally, calls for internal reform were intertwined with anti-imperialist 
sentiments, and democratization was seen as a form of claiming sovereignty and 
counteracting foreign interference in the running of the state. This, for instance, is 
reflected in the Memorandum and Letter submitted to the Ruler in 1954 by Kuwait 
Democratic Party. The Party blamed the British for being “the real responsible ones for 
the corruption, disorder, restlessness and high cost of living which are prevailing in the 
county”.
47
 The Party contended that the Kuwait Oil Company had “made itself the real 
ruler of the country”.
48
 There was “no law or constitution”, it complained, “that 
guarantees the rights of the nationals” or that “can stop the greediness of the Oil 
Companies”.
49
 Therefore, they demanded a Constituent Assembly that would be 
responsible for writing a Constitution to “guarantee the rights of the nationals”, and 
“National Representative Rule, so that the nation will itself be able to manage its affairs 
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In sum, the great rise of Arab nationalism in Kuwait’s case was a major factor enhancing 
the strength of the movement towards internal reform. This was due to the fact that the 
two causes were deeply intertwined and connected in the different ways described above. 
7.2.3. Pacifying Factors… 
While the factors spurring political activity and dissent after oil were significant, it is 
important to juxtapose them against the overwhelming ‘pacifying’ or ‘stabilizing’ factors 
that reinforced the status quo. These factors are discussed in this section. 
The first stabilizing factor was the character of the Ruler and the nature of his 
relationships with Kuwaitis. While the Ruler was sometimes seen as weak in confronting 
his family, he was very popular and was almost never perceived as corrupt. His lifestyle 
was simple and close to the lives of ordinary people. For example, the Kuwait 
Administration Report for 1951 described the Ruler’s “expressed attitude to rule and to 
life” as follows: 
his religious spirit, simplicity in living, dislike of display, devotion 
to the old Arab virtues, (particularly to their individualistic brand of 
freedom), and to the old Oriental object in life, - calmness of spirit. 
To such a man the main concomitant of great wealth was added 
responsibility. There is no doubt that he wishes all to be done for 
the welfare of his people...
51
 
Moreover, the Ruler had warm relations with Kuwaitis. Chief among these relations was 
his close links with the merchants as discussed earlier. Moreover, the Ruler’s good 
personal relations extended to other sectors of society, including the intellectual Arab 
nationalists. Al Khateeb, interestingly, was his personal physician.  
Thus, the character of the Ruler and the respect many felt towards him played a 
significant role in outweighing much of the factors causing agitation. For instance, in 
describing the position of the ruling family in 1955, the Political Agent wrote that the Al 
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Sabah, despite the pressures, were extremely powerful:  
The inefficiency in administration and the luxurious habits of a number of 
the senior sheikhs is a matter of common criticism and discontent, but the 
Ruler’s personal popularity and the apparent austerity of his personal life 




A second powerful factor reinforcing the status quo was the position and strength of the 
ruling family as a whole. While the fact that they were heads of all state departments was 
a matter of complaint, this also meant that they controlled the wealth of Kuwait, and with 
it the livelihoods of many, including the merchants who had historically been the only 
source of challenge to Al Sabah authority. It was now the merchants who were dependent 
on the government for income, as the major source of business had become government 
contracts. In addition, the merchants were, along with the ruling family, the primary 
beneficiaries of the oil boom. While they felt that they had a historical right to be part of 
the decision-making process, and had repeatedly demanded participation, they did not 
want to clash with the Al Sabah to an extent that would jeopardize their economic 
interests. This was in fact a trait that stuck with the merchant class, possibly till this day.  
It must be noted, however, that the merchants’ softened stances must also have been 
influenced by the experiences they had been through in 1930s and 1940s as a result of 
their radical and direct confrontation with the Ruler and the imposition of a council that 
stripped the latter from all his powers. As seen in Chapter Three, the result was 
disastrous, ending in bloodshed, imprisonment and persecution, and a further 
consolidation of Al Sabah autocracy supported by Britain. In fact, as discussed in the next 
chapter, Al Khateeb himself believed that the merchants’ moderate positions in the 
Constituent Assembly of 1961 were partly a result of these experiences.
53
  
In any case, the feelings of the merchants were not unique. Even though the wealth 
brought about by the oil age was not shared equally, everyone was in fact benefiting. 
Thus, while discontent was being voiced, there was a limit on how far many people were 
willing to go in terms of action. This was clearly believed by some British officials at the 
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time. For instance, in 1955, the Political Agent noted that “so long as money is to be 
made by all classes on the scale at which it is at present, the inducements to do anything 
more than criticize will remain limited”.
54
 Likewise, in 1956, the Political Resident’s 
Annual Review noted that “there was increasing evidence that the oil revenues were being 
spread among a wide section of the inhabitants thus contributing in large measure to the 
stability of the State and making it more difficult for extremism or agitation to obtain a 
preponderant influence”.
55
 Again, in 1957, after the Suez Crisis episode and the renewed 
calls for internal change and an elected representative body, the Agent’s Annual Report 
concluded that “[t]aken all in all, resolute action of this sort against a background of 
lavish welfare services for the masses produces a situation which few reformers would 
care to try to alter, at least for the present”.
56
  
However, superseding these factors, which reinforced the strength of the Al Sabah, was a 
major cultural and traditional element that granted their authority respect beyond their 
official positions in government. This feeling may certainly have tribal origins. While it 
is clear that the sense of respect towards the Ruler was shared amongst most people, it 
was amongst the poorer and largely uneducated sectors of society that this attitude 
extended to the rest of the family. These people constituted the majority of the 
population. In 1957, for instance, only 1.5% of Kuwaitis had completed primary school, 
and a mere 0.4% had completed a level an education above the primary level, while 63% 
of Kuwaitis remained illiterate (Ismael, 1993: 121). Throughout Kuwait’s past history, 
this segment of society had been on the margin of political activity, busy trying to make a 
living for their families under very harsh conditions. Although wealth from oil had given 
many of them the time to be involved in politics, especially dissident politics, this clearly 
needed time to evolve. Indeed, while oil and with it increased education created an 
intellectual class who, together with the merchants, were very much active during the 
1950s, they remained a minority in the population.  
The psychologically superior position of the ruling family members was very much 
acknowledged and understood, and was in fact seen by the intellectuals as being a 
                                                 
54
 FO371/1145588: Political Agent, Kuwait to Fry, Foreign Office, 15 August 1955, p. 1. 
55
 FO371/126869: Political Resident’s Annual Review for 1956, April 15, 1957, p. 4. 
56
 FO371/132748: Political Agent’s Annual Report for 1957, February 3, 1958, p. 7. 
 175 
problem for democratic development. This issue is reflected in discussions during the CA 
and CC meetings. When negotiating Article 102 of the Constitution, which deals with the 
issue of voting for ‘non-cooperation’ with the Prime Minister, the Interior Minister had 
wanted the voting to be conducted publicly. This was strongly rejected by the members, 
and the reason was clear. Al Humaithi, noted that no one would “dare” to vote for the 
withdrawal of confidence from a minister publicly, since they in Kuwait have “another 
authority” – other than their authority as ministers. They are Emirs, he stressed, and part 
of the ruling family. Therefore, asserted Al Humaithi, not many would dare stand in front 
of them and tell them they have done wrong. Therefore, to have them vote publicly, 
concluded Al Humaithi, would undermine freedom of speech and the freedom of 
parliament members to hold ministers accountable.
57
  
For the same reasons, Al Khateeb noted his objection to having members of the Al Sabah 
as ministers. He noted that, among other things, it was essential for members of 
parliament to feel they have a right to question and hold any minister accountable. 
Members must view ministers as mere individuals entrusted to carry out certain tasks, Al 




In fact, this sense of the ‘superiority’ of the shaikhs was even demonstrated in the very 
first session of CA itself. The first ministry in Kuwait formed in 1961 consisted of eleven 
sheikhs. Al Khateeb recounts the ‘embarrassing’ site of CA members queuing up to ‘kiss 
their noses’ during its first session. This, he thought, was ‘humiliating’ to the people 
whom they represent, and did not honor the stature of the representatives of the people. In 
fact, one of the major strategies undertaken by the opposition in later years was to attempt 
to break this ‘psychological barrier’ by, among other things, the use of harsh critique.
59
 
This was part of an effort to ‘popularize’ dissident and genuine political participation, 
which had historically been confined to the rich merchants, and now the intellectuals as 
well.  
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It can, thus, be said that the cultural element played a huge role in the stabilization of the 
regime. It was not oil, after all, that kept the Al Sabah in power for more than 300 years. 
Thus, even during some of the most revolutionary times prior to oil, Al Sabah rule was 
hardly questioned. For instance, the Political Agent’s description of the ‘revolutionary 
talk’ in 1920 reflects in some way the attitudes of Kuwaitis in this regard:    
I believe much revolutionary talk is going on, all wanting to be rid 
of Salim and the majority favouring Ahmad bin Jabir [Al Sabah] as 
his successor but a minority preferring Hamad [Al Sabah]. Several 
people have independently asked Mylreas [the American Mission 
doctor] private advice as to the possibility of getting Salim deposed, 
last scheme being to offer throne to Ahmad and then for him and 
representative deputations to come to Agency and ask us to depose 
Salim. Mylrea has, of course, put them off.
60
 
Therefore, the ‘revolutionaries’ seemed to have wanted to change the Ruler by replacing 
him with another member of the Al Sabah. There is no doubt, it must be stressed again, 
that British backing of the Al Sabah had also played a major psychological role in this as 
mentioned previously. In fact, the British position in Kuwait had pacified the Kuwaiti 
stances in less direct ways as well. For instance, while Arab nationalism had swept the 
country, the independence of Kuwait in the region depended on British support. This 
must have had an impact on the how far Kuwaitis were willing to push the British. In 
fact, this was considered to be a “card” in the British hands, and was explicitly 
recognized many times by their officials. “The Kuwaitis know that their independence 
depends upon our protection”, noted a Foreign Office Document, “[t]his is our strongest 
card in attempting to achieve our wishes in Kuwait”.
61
 
The cultural element that reinforced the status quo can also be extended to the dynamics 
within the ruling family itself. For example, the Agent noted that some of the “younger 
sheikhs” had felt  
Sympathy ... for the so far somewhat vague progressive ideas and 
constitutional demands of the cultural clubs, some of the merchants, 
and the newspaper editors...but the traditional Arab respect and fear 
of elders is a powerful influence still, and however much some of the 
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younger sheikhs may express their liberal views in private, none is 
prepared to come forward openly.
62
 
While the factors mentioned so far had a direct impact on reinforcing the status quo, there 
were other less direct influences that had pacified the stances of the reformist movement. 
Primary among them was the nature of the relationship between the intellectuals and 
merchants. This relationship was very close for different reasons. Importantly, the 
merchants shared some of the major concerns articulated by the intellectuals, such as 
those related to Arab nationalism and democratization, and were, along with the 
intellectuals, the most politically dynamic class. 
The merchants were also very highly regarded by the intellectuals, as it was the former 
who had historically led the most significant political movements towards curbing the 
powers of the ruling family. Further, intellectuals such as Al Khateeb built very strong 
friendships with the merchants. These friendships date back to school and more 
significantly university days where they studied together in places like Beirut and Cairo. 
In fact, in this way, people like Al Khateeb may be seen as a link between the poorer 
classes, intellectuals and the merchants, embodying the process of the popularization of 
political activity.  
Moreover, the merchants were a link between the intellectuals and the ruling family with 
whom they had historical ties and upon whom they possessed some influence. The 
merchants also supported the intellectuals both morally and even materially by financing 
projects, charities, raising funds for shared causes, etc. The point here is that the 
intellectuals did not want to jeopardize this close and importantly ‘fruitful’ relationship 
with the merchants, while the merchants, for their part, did not want to ‘rock the boat’ too 
hard with the government as previously mentioned. This dynamic caused the intellectuals 
to settle at times for weaker stances towards certain issues. In fact, this has indeed been 
very much a feature of post-oil Kuwaiti politics. 
An example that reflects this idea clearly is seen in the reaction to the government’s 
rigging of the 1967 parliamentary elections. While the intellectuals desired to take a 
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strong public stance against this, by organizing mass protests for instance, the merchants 
wanted to avoid direct and hard-line confrontation and chose instead to boycott the 
government. As the intellectuals did not want to lose their coalition with the merchants, 
they therefore settled for the latter’s ‘softer’ position.
63
  
In this way, the intellectuals believed that they had to work within the system to achieve 
their goals, or in other words, to alter the system from within. They used various avenues 
of influence available to them, such as the merchants and interestingly some of the 
younger shaikhs as well. The use of the latter was made possible because there was, in 
the words of the Political Agent, “a common meeting ground between the more forward-
thinking elements of the regime”, who basically were these younger shaikhs, “and the 
more moderate elements of the reformist movement”.
64
 Thus, in 1955, the Agent believed 
that Al Khateeb had “probably realized that it is only by exploiting the ideas and 
sympathies of the younger shaikhs that he can hope to make any immediate progress 
against the ruling family’s position. In this he is very likely right and constitutional 
change is bound to come...”.
65
  
In fact, it was this very ‘realism’ (i.e. the idea of having to work within the system) that 
led to the decision by the Arab nationalists to join the Constituent Assembly of 1961. 
While they believed that the whole process was part of a British conspiracy, they decided 
to join in the hope of influencing the outcome from within.
66
 Moreover, while they deeply 
objected to many of the proposed articles as discussed in the next chapter, in the end they 
voted for the constitution as a whole, believing that it was the only possible outcome at 
that moment, with the hope of amending it in the future. 
7.2.4. Summing Up 
It was these diverse internal factors that had interacted to produce lively political 
developments in the 1950s. Experimentations with elections and different institutional 
                                                 
63
 Personal interview with Ahmad Al Khateeb, June 2011. In fact, settling for this weaker position led to 
the very first cracks within the reformist movement, as some members had been adamant to confront the 
issue by harsher means. 
64
 FO371/132757: Rothnie, Kuwait to Adams, Foreign Office August 14, 1958, p. 2. 
65
 FO371/114588: Bell, Political Agent, Kuwait to Fry, Foreign Office, August 15, 1955, p. 1. 
66
 Personal interview with Ahmad Al Khateeb, June 2011. 
 179 
setups were initiated, and freedoms of press and expression fluctuated throughout the 
decade between a high degree of openness and extreme censorship. These experiences, 
however, remained limited, and all experimentations of popular participation had all but 
failed. By 1959, in response to the call for the end of tribal rule mentioned earlier, all 
forms of political freedoms were banned, and Kuwait returned to being a full-fledged 
autocracy. In light of this, it is concluded that the internal forces during the 1950s, though 
producing a vibrant political environment, were insufficient to establish long-lasting 
structural reforms and real democratic governance.  
7.3. TIPPING THE BALANCE: BEYOND LOCAL CALCULATIONS 
While the post-oil internal dynamics were insufficient to produce radical reforms as 
concluded above, there was another factor that began to assume increased force towards 
the end of the 1950s and early 1960s – namely, the international dimension. This factor 
caused a sudden and unprecedented surge in substantial reforms, including the passing of 
a modern code of law, the enactment of a budget, and a push towards democratization 
through a call for the elections of a constituent assembly in 1961, with the purpose of 
drafting a modern constitution. Indeed, the period between 1959 and 1962 saw what was 
described as a “comprehensive legislative revolution”.
67
 
In this section, the international dimension is examined as the factor that had arguably 
played the biggest role in determining significant reforms policy-makers felt bound to 
make. The aim is to understand how, after oil, ‘the international’ had caused a 
development in the attitude of policy-makers towards the importance of undertaking 
certain domestic policies. The objective is, therefore, to show that domestic policies are 
not solely the result of internal calculations during oil booms, but rather a more complex 
interplay between national and international developments. In Kuwait, a small and newly 
rich country in the midst of a tumultuous decade, the international dimension could be 
said to have tipped the balance in favor of the reforms that ultimately transformed the 
country from a tribal autocracy to a modern constitutional state.  
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7.3.1. Background to the Regional Pressures after Oil 
As a result of the oil boom, Kuwait dramatically rose in importance to both regional and 
international powers. After “some centuries of quiet existence”, Kuwait “suddenly 
emerged as the fifth oil-producing country of the world”.
68
 As already mentioned, Kuwait 
became crucial to British interests. By the mid 1950s, fifty percent of the United 
Kingdom’s consumption of oil derived from Kuwait alone.
69
 Kuwait’s importance to the 
British dwarfed that of other countries in the region. Annual profits from Kuwait 
amounted to £45 million out of a total of around £100 million for all Middle East oil.
70
 
Thus, a paper prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Britain’s “main 
purpose in the Gulf” was “to ensure fair access to the oil and stable conditions for its 
production,” which “makes Kuwait by far the most important to us [Britain] of the 
territories” of the Gulf.
71
  
The importance of Kuwait to Britain relative to other countries in the region is reflected 
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Table 7.1. British Oil Interests in the Gulf, 1956
72
 
State Population  
AnnualOil 
Production 




Kuwait 250,000 60 50% British 100 
   50% American 
Bahrain 120,000 1 ! 
100% 
American 3 
Qatar 25,000 5 
23.75% 
British 8 
   23.75% American 
23.75% Shell  
   (Anglo-Dutch) 
   23.75% French 
   5% Gulbenkian 
Trucial States 90,000 Nil As Qatar Insignificant 
 
 
The important point here is that the importance of Kuwait to Britain had spill over effects 
across the region, as it required the British to undertake policies, including military 
measures, which extended beyond the borders of Kuwait. Indeed, by the end of the 
1950s, Kuwait became the center of British policy in the whole Persian Gulf. As the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Relations noted in 1960:  
Our interests in the area to-day are no less important than those 
which weighed with Her Majesty’s Government in 1958. They 
relate principally to the preservation of the independence of Kuwait, 
on account both of her oil and of her sterling balances, and for this 
purpose certain political and military requirements in the Persian 
Gulf must be assured: in particular, the confidence of the Rulers in 
our protection must be maintained and we must retain military 
facilities in Masirah (which belongs to the Sultanate), Sharjah on 
the Trucial Coast, and Bahrain.
73
  
Likewise, “[t]he most important military commitment” in the area, noted a study 
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conducted for the British Government, “is the requirement to intervene at very short 
notice to ensure the security of Kuwait, particularly against Iraqi attack”.
74
  
There were other “minor commitments to help other Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and 
to support the local forces in the Somaliland Protectorate”, the report went on, “but these 
are covered by the ability to meet the major tasks”.
75
 The latter required “naval, land and 





In another more specific example of the way in which the protection of Kuwait entailed 
undertaking policies beyond the Kuwaiti borders, a study conducted by the British 
Government stated, “[o]ur economic stake in Kuwait itself, and the central position of 
Kuwait to our oil operations in this whole area, are such that we should take all 
reasonable measures that we can to protect Kuwait”.
77
 While “the only really satisfactory 
military insurance would be the stationing of adequate British forces in Kuwait itself”, 
“this is unacceptable to the Kuwaitis”.
78
 “Such a solution”, stressed the report, “is 
politically unacceptable to the Amir, having regard to Arab opinion”.
79
 Thus, plans were 
prepared by the Chiefs of Staff whereby a British military presence in the area is 
maintained, “sufficient both to deter Iraq by being demonstrably in a position to prevent 
Iraqi forces overrunning Kuwait and, failing deterrence, to intervene in time to hold 
Kuwait itself in the face of Iraqi attacks on the scale and timing that we believe to be 
possible”.
80
 These plans specifically involved, for example, the building of additional 
facilities in Bahrain to station more British forces for this particular purpose. They also 
entailed other military arrangements in the wider region. “Despite the costs” of these 
arrangements, asserted the report, “compared with the size of the economic benefits 
which we derive from the maintenance of the independence of Kuwait under the present 
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regime, the expenditure is well worth while”.
81
  
Finally, the spill-over effect created by Kuwait’s importance to British interests may also 
be seen in the following statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
explaining the shift in British policy with regards to the region: 
For some 150 years it was British policy to avoid intervention on 
land in either the interior of Oman or the Trucial Shaikhdoms. The 
reversal of this policy in the last decade was due to the growth in 
importance of oil and pre-eminence of Kuwait, and secondly to the 
growth of Saudi Arabian imperialism. We now have to reckon also 
with the Iraqi threat to Kuwait. It is difficult to put a precise 
monetary value on the preservation of Kuwait, but it is extremely 
important that Kuwait should not fall under the control of 
unfriendly Government since this would greatly strengthen any of 
the Arab States in putting pressure on the oil companies or Her 





The crucial point to be made in light of the above is that this rise of the importance of 
Kuwait to Britain, due to its increased oil wealth, coincided with the rise of Arab 
nationalism throughout the region. As Britain was the main target of Arab resentment, the 
special British connection with Kuwait naturally became a focus of attention. As Childers 
reported, “Kuwait has been the focal point of Arab nationalist resentment about Britain’s 
whole archaic treaty position in the Persian Gulf”.
83
 With its enormous wealth, Kuwait’s 
financial arrangements and the utilization of its revenues also became increasingly 
scrutinized. This was in fact predicted even before the oil boom of the 1950s. In 1949, for 
example, Burrows of the Foreign Office told the Ruler that “the presence of large sums of 
money in a small State like Kuwait in the midst of a world racked by poverty and 
insecurity would give rise to an increasing volume of criticism and jealousy from His 
Highness’ neighbors and others”.
84
 Moreover, during the concerned period, most of 
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Kuwait’s investments were in Britain rather than in Arab countries. This situation had 
caused great discontent. For instance, a report prepared by the British Government in 
1961 noted that,  
[h]itherto, the bulk of Kuwait Government money has been invested on 
the London market with relatively small amounts in America and Western 
Europe; only an insignificant beginning has been made with investment in 
other Arab countries. This has long been a matter of reproach in the Arab 
world and it is clear that the Kuwaiti authorities already have in mind the 




Likewise, Childers wrote that Arabs in Kuwait and throughout the Middle East “have 
resented the fact that Kuwait’s income surpluses have been invested clear outside the 
Arab world, in London”.
86
 “They have”, stressed Childers, “identified both this process 




In this environment, Kuwaiti policymakers felt that their actions were under constant 
scrutiny by the outside world, particularly the Arabs and British, as much of what Kuwait 
did tended to get an exaggerated reaction. “Because of its symbolic and its real 
importance as a source of oil and sterling income”, wrote The Times Middle East 
Correspondent, “any news about Kuwait tends to acquire exaggerated significance”.
88
 
Likewise, after a meeting with the Ruler, the Political Resident noted in 1958 that “[a]s 
seen from here, and even more so as seen by the Ruler, the attitude in London, both in 
official circles and in the Press, about matter affecting Kuwait is apt to seem quite 
unnecessarily jittery...”
89
   
While these issues set the background to the environment in which Kuwaiti policymakers 
functioned, the next section examines the practical ways in which international factors, in 
the context of Kuwait’s newly acquired importance, played a role in pushing 
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policymakers to adopt substantial reformist policies. 
7.3.2. Casting Positive Light on Kuwait: Alternatives to British Military Protection  
One of the main ways in which the international dimension played a role in pushing 
Kuwait towards adopting certain reforms was by creating an environment in which 
policymakers felt the need to cast Kuwait in positive light in the region. To explain the 
context of this, in 1958, the Ruler came under enormous pressure by the Iraqis to join the 
Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan. A look at the details of the Ruler’s visit to Baghdad to 
negotiate pending problems between the two states reveals the extent of the pressure the 
Ruler had to resist. The Political Agent noted that the Iraqis “made threats … about what 
they would do if Kuwait refused” to join the Union; they had seemed “disposed to stand 
on immediate accession ... failing which they threatened to use more Draconian methods 
to obtain what they want”.
90
 The Union, in the Ruler’s opinion (and that of many others), 
was mostly after Kuwait’s economic resources. 
To add to the pressure, British officials were also in favor of Kuwait’s joining the Union, 
to counter the influence of the rival United Arab Republic. Therefore, the Ruler felt 
“deserted” by the British and believed that they were attempting to “force” him into the 
Union.
91
 Luckily, however, in July 1958, almost immediately after these threats were 
made, Qassim led a revolution which saw the overthrow the Iraqi monarchy.  
In response, the Kuwait army and public security were brought to “state of readiness” in 
case of any disturbance.
92
 The Kuwaiti government, however, was confident with regards 
to internal peace, yet the British were more skeptical. “The gnawing doubt”, wrote 
Riches of the Foreign Office, “is of course whether the Kuwaiti Ruling family themselves 
are not living in a fool’s paradise and whether Abdullah Mubarak’s confidence in the 
loyalty of his forces is not misplaced as was that of the Iraqi Ruling family and 
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Therefore, the British and Americans became alarmed on account of the threat to their oil 
interests. They consequently devised military measures and plans to land their armies in 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with or without the Rulers’ consent. As Riches noted, with 
regards to Kuwait, “the military proposals involve the seizure and holding of the oilfields 
round Ahmedi, and the refinery and port installations at Minat al Ahmedi together with 
the water supply at Abdulliyah and the Political Agency in Kuwait town”.
94
 These plans 
included scenarios involving clashes with the Kuwait Armed Forces in case of resistance. 
Indeed, internal disturbance and a possible coup were seen by the British as more of a 
threat than an Iraqi attack.
95
 
While the Political Agent reassured the Ruler of British support and fulfillment of their 
obligations to him at a “critical moment in the Middle East when danger presses on the 
stability of all small countries throughout the region and particularly on hereditary 
rulers”, he also informed him of the “unobtrusive military measures to be ready to meet 




This placed the Ruler under massive pressure as he was very much against such military 
measures. In fact, the British had “pressed” the Ruler to accept British forces in Kuwait, 
only to be met by his “firm refusal”.
97
 The Ruler “made it clear that he could not accept 
an advance party of troops to make unobtrusive preparations for the arrival of 
reinforcements should it prove necessary to bring military aid to Kuwait, as he was sure 
that such a step would only precipitate trouble”.
98
 
The ensuing discussions between the Ruler and the British reflected a growing realization 
by the former as to the inadequacy of relying on British support for Kuwait’s security. 
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The importance of building good ties with the Arabs began to be seen as a primary 
objective for Kuwait’s long-term integrity. Indeed, the attitude of the British during the 
Iraq negotiations seemed to have had a lasting imprint on the way the Ruler began to see 
things. After the revolution, the Ruler was reported to be: 
much pre-occupied by Kuwait’s relations with Iraq. In particular he 
was concerned with the attitude of the new regime and was anxious 
not to suffer a repetition of the events of last May when he felt that 




The Political Resident described the Ruler as having “almost obsessive feelings about the 
Iraq negotiations”.
100
 One of the most immediate ways the Ruler reacted after these 
negotiations was to ask the British that they would agree to Kuwait joining the Arab 
League as a full member, a proposal that he said had ‘crystallized’ as a result of the 
events experienced.
101
 The Ruler pointed out to the Political Agent, with whom he 
discussed the issue for the first time, that he believed membership would benefit Kuwait 
in that “it would help keep her more closely in touch with the Arab World”.
102
 He said 
membership would “give him security in the Arab World. He would know more about 
what was going on and he would be able to solve his problems with individual Arab 
States in the presence of other Arab rulers”.
103
 The Ruler pointed out that “he had felt the 
need for this kind of general support when he was having talks with Nuri and Iraqi 
Ministers in May” and it was then that the idea of joining the League had first occurred to 
him. “It was no longer practical”, felt the Ruler, “to expect Her Majesty’s Government to 
try to intervene in his problems with the Arab States”.
104
  
The Ruler’s rationale, as he pointed out to the Political Agent, was as follows:  
He was pretty sure that Iraq would soon join the Arab Republic. He did 
not trust the new revolutionary leaders, who were all extremists. Nor did 
he trust the Syrian Ba’athists. If they were all to gang up on him and 
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demand that Kuwait should do this and that, where would he be? He 
believed that the only security was in membership of the Arab League. 
The real problems in the Arab World were between the Arabs themselves 
and only the Arabs could solve them.
105
  
The Political Agent acknowledged “his desire to demonstrate Kuwait’s solidarity with the 
Arab World”, and “assumed that joining the Arab League was intended to please public 
opinion, both at home and abroad”.
106
 In describing the Ruler’s position, a Foreign Office 
Document noted the following: 
The Ruler felt alone in the world when he faced Nuri and the Iraqis in 
Baghdad in May and then H.M.G. were close to the Iraqis. I should 
imagine that he now feels that we are no longer on good terms with the 
Iraqis (he made the proposal before were recognized the new Iraqi Govt.) 
and that he sees no one to defend him against Iraq save Nasser. H.M.G. 
can only offer force which will bring worse disaster in its train. It is “no 
longer practicable to expect H.M.G. to try to intervene in his problems 
with the Arab states...” 
Briefly therefore the Ruler’s attitude springs from his belief in the need 
to:- 
(iv) Defend himself against aggression, particularly Iraqi whether overt 
or cover by means other than bringing British troops into Kuwait. 
(v) Make some gesture to show his people that he is a good Arab. 
H.M.G’s interests may be reduced to the simple proposition of the 
need to maintain the separate identity of Kuwait.
107
  
After meeting with the Ruler, the Resident concluded: 
We should be in no doubt that the Ruler intends to do a good deal towards 
looking after his interests with the other Arab states in his own way. He 
emphasized that he intended to save us the trouble of doing this so far as 
possible. What I think he has in mind, in addition to this charitable 
gesture, is that he and his family can do a good deal to keep the Egyptians 
and others sweet by going there and making or allowing themselves to be 
quoted as making woolly statements of friendship and devotion to 
Arabism, etc., in a way that we should never dream of doing, nor be able 
to do even if we tried … This, I think, is a gesture which many people in 
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Kuwait, including to some extent our Agency, consider that he ought to 
make in the interests of tranquility within the country. I think it may well 
be enough for the purpose.
108
 
Thus, to cast Kuwait in a positive light in the region, which came hand in hand with 
building closer ties with Arab countries, became at the forefront of Kuwaiti policy 
thinking. These new circumstances were generally understood at the time. The Times, for 
instance, reported that  
[f]or the best part of a hundred years this small territory has survived 
thanks to one thing only – British protection. To-day’s pattern of power, 
and Kuwait’s vast oil riches, have not made that protection obsolete, but 
have suggested supplementary tactics. The Ruler’s talks with President 
Nasser in Baghdad are probably part of the diplomatic effort which has 
taken him all over the world – most recently to Baghdad – with the object 
of preserving his independence. The situation is, of course, not without its 
dangers. Pressures are stronger than ever. Kuwait has always seemed a 
temping booty, and there is now the additional danger from strong 
Nasserite groups within the country...
109
 
In any case, while the Ruler was dissuaded by the British from joining the Arab League, 
and accepted in exchange a new Letter of Assurance from Britain (see Appendix 7.1 for 
full text of Letter), this marked the beginnings of a ‘formal’ change in Kuwaiti policy.
110
 
By default, it was also the beginnings of a formal change in the British-Kuwaiti 
relationship. Kuwait now asked for an “evolution of the relations with Britain”, which 
should be “based on a certain amount of flexibility and the capability to readjust to 
changing circumstances”.
111
 Thus, in a Memorandum by the Kuwait Government to the 
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British, Kuwait requested “that neither party should adhere to formalities and the letter of 
the written word when flexibility in applying or interpreting the existing relations can 
help to keep the independence of Kuwait and to maintain her good relations with her 
Arab neighbours”.
112
 Kuwait wanted to deal with the Arabs in a direct manner, which had 
been, as per the 1899 Treaty, conducted through the British Government. This 
“assumption of some of the responsibilities towards the Arab world”, noted the 
Memorandum, “will certainly be welcome in both Kuwait and the Arab states inasmuch 
as it is an indication to the Arabs that Kuwait is prepared to take up her responsibilities in 
Arab affairs”.
113
 Moreover, “[t]he benefit that Kuwait will derive from such a step is that 
her Arab neighbours will not look upon Kuwait as a segregate unit in the Arab world, and 
the Arabs will realise that Kuwait is a friendly Arab country, and no one would 
accordingly create difficulties for her”.
114
  
7.4. DEMONSTRATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND DOMESTIC REFORM 
From the above stems the idea of the need to create a friendly atmosphere for Kuwait in a 
country and region overtaken by Arab nationalist sentiments. This naturally meant 
demonstrating independence from colonial subjugation and influence. In a Memorandum 
by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated November 1958, it was noted that 
Even before the Iraqi revolution of 14th July 1958, the Ruler of 
Kuwait showed signs of restiveness in his position of apparent 






 Ibid. It must be noted that the importance of demonstrating independence and casting positive light on 
Kuwait was realized earlier. It may be said that it began to gain more importance even earlier, particularly 
after the Suez Crisis of 1956.  As the Political Agent noted,  
Even if history did not teach us the impermanence of international relations, the 
Suez episode was bound to have a corrosive effect on Britain’s special position in 
Kuwait, if only in that it accelerated an already existing tendency towards Kuwaiti 
independence in, at least, Arab Affairs. The Kuwaiti authorities are very conscious 
of their status as our clients. I believe that, in their heart, they do not resent this. 
But it is perhaps just because of this essential dependence that they must 
demonstrate to the world that they are as good Arabs as the rest. There has 
therefore been a marked increase in their espousal of general Arab causes...their 
direct contacts with the rest of the Arab world have been intensified and they have 
shown a growing distaste for consulting her Majesty’s Government about any such 
contacts (FO371/132748: Political Agent’s Annual Report for 1957, February 3, 
1958, p. 7). 
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tutelage. Since that date he has warned us with increasing frequency 
and force that if the essentials of his relationship with Her Majesty’s 
Government are to be preserved the British Government must be 
prepared to allow to Kuwait the greatest possible appearance of 
independence. He is under considerable pressure in this respect not 
only from his own family, but also from many of the groups on 
whose support the strength of the regime in Kuwait must largely 
rest. 
The Kuwait government therefore took major steps in this direction. In the process of 
doing so, it was forced to undertake major reforms. The following section analyses the 
three main steps in this regard, and the consequent reforms the government was pushed to 
take.   
7.4.1. Administration of Justice  
One of the principle ways in which Kuwait sought to demonstrate its independence was 
in the administration of justice. Foreign nationals in Kuwait had been under British 
jurisdiction. This was a matter of great concern as Kuwait became increasingly insistent 
to end all forms of perceived subjugation to British power. In 1957, Britain surrendered, 
at the Ruler’s request, jurisdiction over the citizens of Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and “certain protected persons (in addition to nationals of other 




By 1959, the Ruler, however, became adamant that the entire system of dual jurisdiction 
must be terminated. The “resentment of the Kuwaiti authorities at the continuance of our 
jurisdiction”, noted the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has become “stronger and 
more outspoken”.
116
 The British, for their part, understood the importance of this for 
Kuwait’s security as an independent state. As a Memorandum by Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs noted, Kuwait’s “independence in the Arab world would … be 
strengthened if she were recognised as an independent entity by other countries ... it 
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The point here is that in order to take over administration in relation to justice related 
issues over foreign nationals, including British citizens, as part of its “development of an 
international personality”, Kuwait was pushed to undertake major reforms and to 
modernize its judicial system.
118
  
This is clearly reflected in the discussions amongst British officials and in their 
negotiations with the Ruler. The Foreign Secretary for Foreign Affairs concluded that the 
they “should endeavour, by all practicable means of persuasion, to ensure that the 
Kuwaitis introduce suitable civil and criminal codes, penal reform and courts of law”, 
and that British “relinquishment of jurisdiction proceeds only pari passu with such 
reforms”.
119
 Thus, before abandoning their jurisdiction, the British sought “to ensure that 




It should be noted that the British concern, among other things, was to protect their 
subjects, as they viewed the Kuwaiti justice system as follows:  
At present it remains … extremely primitive. There are no proper criminal 
and civil codes … The local judges should generally use the Muslim 
Sharia tempered by local custom but in many cases their decisions are 
entirely arbitrary. They are largely unqualified and follow virtually no 
rules of evidence or procedure. A recent visit to a Kuwaiti prison has 
revealed conditions which would be extremely hard for any European to 
bear for any length of time. Floggings are still ordered by shaikhly judges 
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Importantly, apart from British concern for the ‘welfare’ of the people under their 
jurisdiction, the awareness of the necessity of having a presentable international image 
was very much present. The British explained to the Kuwaitis “the complications which 
may arise for the Kuwaiti authorities if persons now subject to our [British] jurisdiction 
are for instance confined in prisons so unsuitable as to endanger their health or if they are 
condemned by a code or in a manner repugnant to the vast majority of States”.
122
 “The 




In any case, as suggested, this pushed Kuwait to undertake many reforms in this 
direction. Thus, when Britain finally ceded its jurisdictional powers to Kuwait in 1961, it 
was reported in the Press as follows: 
 
Britain has relinquished effective jurisdiction over foreigners in Kuwait, 
exercised through a court of the Political Agency by which she is 
represented here, and intends formally to abolish this court in the coming 
summer...Before assuming jurisdiction over foreigners Kuwait promulgated 
a code of laws and having had judges trained in the past few years she 
established the necessary courts last year…This transfer of responsibility is 
in step with Kuwait’s formal assumption also of control of her foreign 
affairs, though control does not yet mean full management. She has to form 




In sum, in taking over the administration of justice as parts of its general strategy to 
demonstrate independence from British control, Kuwait had to undertake major 
legislative reform. 
7.4.2. Joining International Organizations 
Another important way in which independence was to be demonstrated was by joining 
international organizations in order “to create a friendly atmosphere in the Arab world for 
Kuwait”.
125
 In this way, noted a Memorandum by the Kuwait Government to the British, 
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“[t]he neighbours” would “see that Kuwait is taking an active part expected of her in 
some of the international bodies which had been formed for the purpose of looking after 
the various normal walks of life, such as posts, telephones, telecommunications, 
quarantine, marine, [etc.]”.
126
 Kuwait’s membership and active participation in these 
international bodies would satisfy “certain communities in Kuwait”, the “trends of 
thought among the Kuwaitis”, and “tinges Kuwait with a progressive colour which suits 
the conditions prevalent in the Arab world”.
127
 Thus, such participation, contended the 
Kuwaitis, would not only “be welcome among the Arabs”, but would also  “help to 
stabilise the regime in Kuwait”.
128
  
From July 1959 to July 1961, Kuwait successfully joined the International 
Telecommunications Union, the Universal Postal Union, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization and the international Labour Organization.
129
 Entering these 
organizations naturally entailed huge steps in legislative reform. As the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs explained in a 1959 Memorandum, it has “led to the enactment of 




The importance of the reforms that were enacted as a result of joining international 
organizations is reflected in how they helped the process of allowing the British to give 
up their jurisdiction. The British, in this regard, told the Ruler that, “[a]s an earnest of 
their intentions”, they would be prepared to start by “making persons who are ordinarily 
subject to Her Majesty’s jurisdiction amenable to the administrative tribunals which have 
been established by recently enacted Kuwaiti legislation and which are guided by clear 
and fair rules or laws”.
131
 These laws were to a large degree the result of joining 
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international organizations. Indeed, the Resident was instructed to tell the Ruler that the 
British Government was ready to recognize the competence of the Labour Arbitration 
Tribunal to arbitrate in matters affecting persons subject to British jurisdiction; the 
competence of Boards of Enquiry to rule on alleged contraventions of the Kuwait Port 
Rules by persons subject to their jurisdiction; and the competence of the President of the 
Port to impose penalties on them. “These changes represent an important departure of 
principle”, contended the British, and while “only these two administrative tribunals exist 
at this moment … in principle the decision would apply to similar cases in future”.132  
7.4.3. Abrogation of the 1899 Treaty and Admittance into the Arab League and 
United Nations: Towards a Constitutional State 
The major step towards gaining international legitimacy was by achieving full 
independence through the abrogation of the 1899 Treaty, and becoming a member of the 
United Nations and the Arab League as a fully independent state. By 1961, the Treaty 
clearly did not reflect the actual international status and position Kuwait had begun to 
assume.133 While the British recognized the inevitability of abrogation, they decided not 
to take the initiative in this direction and instead to be ready to reply positively when the 
Ruler requested it himself.
134
 In April 1961, this actually happened, and the Ruler 
requested that “the Exclusive Agreement of 1899, under which the United Kingdom 
Government assumed responsibility for the external affairs of Kuwait, should be replaced 
by an instrument reaffirming our [British] friendship and support”.
135
 There was to be, 
importantly, no change in British military or financial arrangements.  
One main concern during the negotiations was, again, Arab opinion. “Any new 
agreement of this kind”, explained the Lord Privy Seal, “should be made in a form which 




 In fact, the quasi-formal declaration of the invalidity of the treaty could be traced back to March 1960 
when the Council of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization challenged the eligibility 
of Kuwait for membership in the organization. The British, as a consequence, were pushed to declare that 
Kuwait was responsible for the conduct of its international relations. The statement, however, was only 
made orally in the Council's meeting by the UK representative. 
134 CAB/128/35: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 13 April 1961; CAB/128/34: Conclusions of a 
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would not provoke the opposition of other Arab States”.
136
 In discussions amongst the 
British government, it was pointed out that the conclusion of a new “formal treaty” was 
not in the interest of Kuwait or Britain. Such a treaty might “offend” other Arab states, 
and experience elsewhere in the region indicated that its existence “could be a standing 
temptation to its abrogation”.
137
  
Moreover, the British wanted any new agreement to recognize their right and obligation 
to intervene if Kuwait’s independence were threatened.
138
 Therefore, the British 
presented the Ruler with two alternatives: 
(i)  “an exchange of notes which would abrogate the Agreement of 1899 but would be 
accompanied by an oral and unpublished assurance that the British recognised their 
continuing obligation to assist in maintaining the independence of Kuwait”;  
(ii) “an exchange of notes which would state in terms that abrogation of the Agreement of 
1899 did not affect that continuing obligation”.
139
 
In agreement with the leading members of the ruling family, the Ruler preferred the 
second alternative. However, like the British, he was very much concerned with Arab 
opinion. Thus, he proposed a somewhat elastic and general wording to the agreement in 
opposition to the British desire for more specific terms. The Ruler ultimately secured 
British acceptance to his proposal that the agreement should be expressed as follows: 
“nothing shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty’s Government to assist the 




As the Lord Privy Seal noted in the Cabinet, “[t]his formula, which was designed to avert 
criticism from other Arab States, was less specific than was customary in instruments 
constituting a defence commitment, but the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf had 
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been unable to secure the Ruler’s agreement to more precise terms”.
141
  
On June 19 1961, the agreement was signed and the independence of Kuwait was 
announced by the Ruler. While much care was taken not to cause a stir within the Arab 
countries, Kuwaiti independence brought with it unprecedented pressures on the country. 
Only six days after the announcement, the Iraqi leadership, namely, Qassim declared 
Kuwait an ‘integral part of Iraq’. The agreement, he said, was “a blow to the 
independence of Iraq and the aspirations of the Kuwaitis”, as it was signed by a ruling 
clique of “irresponsible persons” who serve the interests of the imperialists.
142
 Iraq, he 




Qassim continued to threaten Kuwait with annexation, calling it a district of Iraq.
144
 
Under these circumstances, Kuwait was forced to call for British troops to protect the 
country. This, however, only precipitated the situation and drew widespread 
condemnation. The UAR proposed a resolution in the Security Council calling for the 
immediate withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait. The USSR representative said that 
the “delegate of Kuwait could scarcely be deemed to be acting as the representative of a 




Significantly, the criticism in Arab and international press extended to the Kuwaiti 
regime itself. The Egyptian Al Akhbar, for instance, attacked the “Kuwaiti Shaykhs”, 
declaring that they had asked for British assistance solely in order to protect their position 
and wealth. The paper differentiated between the Kuwaiti government, which had acted 
out of “ignorance, disorientation and pride”, and the Kuwait people, whom the paper 
claimed had “strong emotional ties” with the UAR and trust for the “Arab national 
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 Indeed, the whole political system in Kuwait began to come into the spotlight. 
As Childers wrote, Qassim “declared for the absorption of Kuwait: and the fact that 




Kuwait was therefore placed under considerable pressure to dispense with British 
military support, and to replace British troops with an Arab force to protect its 
independence. In fact, asking the British troops to withdraw from Kuwait as soon as 
possible (and replacing it with an Arab force) was a condition for Kuwait’s membership 
in the Arab League.
148
 However, while the Arab League accepted Kuwait’s membership 
on July 20, its membership to the United Nations was vetoed by the Russians – twice.  
The Russian representative noted that the “formal withdrawal of British troops from 
Kuwait, under the circumstances of such withdrawal, does not in any way mean that 
Kuwait can be regarded as a genuinely independent states”.
149
 The exchange of notes 
between Britain and Kuwait made the latter “play the role of a pawn, a jumping-off stage 
for possible further aggression”.
150
 He pointed out that oil was involved in the Kuwait 
question.  “The actions of the UK government in regard to Kuwait cannot, under these 
circumstances, be regarded otherwise than as maneuvers designed to cover up the fact 
that Kuwait continues to remain a British colony and to help the UK to retain in Kuwait a 
military base in the Near and ME”.
151
 Further, he argued, in “admitting Kuwait, the 
Council would be prejudging the subject of this controversy between Arab states”.
152
  
In this context, the realization that British protection was no longer adequate for Kuwait’s 
long-term security was magnified. World and Arab opinion now became the priority to 
secure Kuwait’s legitimacy as an independent state. Hence, policies had to be undertaken 
by the government to enhance Kuwait’s image and show the world that it is a ‘proper’ 
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and eligible state, and fast. Two major steps were seen to be of primary importance. The 
first was to push forward internal political reforms to legitimize the regime. Second, 
Kuwait’s investment policy was to be reconsidered. These ideas were clearly reflected in 
a British Government report: 
The only political course open to the Amir to reduce the threats to Kuwait 
is the adoption of policies designed to strengthen his regime internally, 
and make it more acceptable to Arab opinion both in his own population 
and in the surrounding countries. Kuwait is already a welfare State, but it 
is still largely administered on feudal lines. The Amir is, however, 
actively engaged in trying to modernise his administration, with the 
assistance of a recent mission from the International Bank. Attempts at 
democratisation have not in the past led to any real result, but it has now 





Moreover, the report pointed out that “[m]ore important from the point of view of the 
other Arab Governments is the Kuwait Governments investment policy”; therefore, 
“increasing their investment in the Arab countries” and developing “such an investment 
programme on a substantial scale would be the most effective way of improving 
Kuwait’s standing, especially in the U.A.R. and Jordan, which are most in need of 
finance...”.
154
 Indeed, this was clearly understood by the Kuwaitis. As Macmillan stated 
in the House of Commons, “the Ruler of Kuwait had shown himself conscious of his 
responsibilities in the Arab world and that his Government had recently agreed to employ 
part of its revenue for constructive projects”.
155
 
These ideas were widely recognized and acknowledged in the international press too. As 
The Times correspondent put it, 
Kuwait’s best hope of survival is to redraw the popular image of the 
shaikhdom as an astonishing anomaly, rolling in wealth which a 
small ruling oligarchy does not know what to do with. It was never 
a wholly true picture, and a wider distribution of power, even if it 
does not reach out to the many immigrant Arabs who make up more 
than half the population, is a great step in the right direction. So is 
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the gesture of more help for other Arab states. It must be made a 
matter of enlightened self-interest for all to see that Kuwait is not 




The fact that some states had “vast oil revenues controlled by their autocratic rulers”, 
while “others miserably poor”, was “a scandalous anachronism asking for trouble” wrote 
The Observer’s correspondent.
157
 “If Kuwait is really to be accepted as independent in 
the present state of the Middle East”, he stressed, “the Sheikh will have to dispense with 
British military protection and to set up some more representative form of local 
government which ratify Kuwait’s change of national status”.
158
 “It is asking altogether 
too much of human nature”, Stephens went on, “to expect Arab world to put indefinitely 
with a situation in which not only oil profits but also a substantial part of oil royalties are 
exported, while most of the Arab countries themselves are crying for development capital 
to overcome the abysmal poverty of many millions”.
159
 Thus, “a switch of some Kuwaiti 
investment from Britain to other less-well-off Arab countries” should be encouraged.
160
  
Indeed, in December 1961, Kuwait established the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development to “assist Arab and other developing countries in developing their 
economies”, and a call for elections to a constituent assembly to draft a modern 
constitution was announced.
161
 Not surprisingly, these decisions were widely interpreted 
to be an attempt to gain international legitimacy. In the run-up to these final 
announcements, the developments in Kuwait were described in October as follows: 
Where change has been noticeable since June has been in Kuwait 
itself, whose Government, under the shock of Iraq’s take-over bid, 
has faced realistically the problems of independence. Elections for a 
constituent assembly… are to be held at the end of December, and 
out of it a constitution is due to emerge. This follows successful 
introduction of a modern penal code, which many Kuwaitis felt was 
more urgently needed than a constitution. There are signs, too, of a 
                                                 
156
 The Times, ‘After the Withdrawal’, October 16, 1961, p. 13. 








 Law No. 35 of 1961 concerning the establishment of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
published in Kuwait al-yawm, 360
th
 issue, 7 January 1962; The Times, Kuwait Holds its First Election’, 
December 30, 1961, p. 12. 
 201 
new approach to other Arab countries. A mission, on which the 
ruling family and prominent merchants are represented, is now 




Moreover, Adams summed up the situation in the following manner:  
...Kuwait Government is, rather belatedly, doing what it can to put 
its house in order. An economic mission has toured the Arab world 
examining the possibilities for investing Kuwait money in the 
development projects of its less fortunate neighbours. Embassies are 
being established abroad as fast as they can be staffed by 
Kuwaitis…and on Saturday for the first time in their 
lives...[Kuwaitis] are to vote for the members of a Constituent 
Assembly in what is said to be the first stage of the transition from 
patriarchal to constitutional government ... Father down the Gulf the 
problems of the present and of the immediate future do not press so 
urgently as they do upon Kuwait. The other sheikhdoms are not so 
rich as Kuwait nor do they have a neighbour glaring at them across 
a few short miles of sands.
163
 
Finally, The Times correspondent reported the news of the elections as follows: 
The first popular election in Kuwait, the oil territory which Iraq 
claims, takes place tomorrow ... This election is the culminating 
point of the changes this small country felt bound to make since the 
world’s gaze fell upon it six months ago because of Iraq’s claim … 
Realizing that one way of spiking the guns of critics was to introduce 





While the above clearly demonstrates the international influence in pushing an oil-rich 
state towards political reform and a call for elections of a constituent assembly, the 
attitude of Kuwaitis towards the importance of world opinion did stop there, but extended 
to the writing of the constitution itself. The acceptability of the constitution to the world 
was seen as crucial at a critical time when Kuwait was under threat and seeking to join 
the United Nations. In other words, in the minds of Kuwaitis, reforms had to be genuine.  
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Indeed, the importance attached to world opinion and the attitude of policy-makers 
towards portraying Kuwait in a positive light is clearly reflected in the minutes of both 
the CA and CC.  
For example, in their stance against granting appointed ministers the right to vote in 
parliament, one of the important arguments made by both the constitutional advisor, 
Othman, and other members was that the appearance of the constitution would be subject 
to great criticism in the outside world. As Al Humaithi emphasized in addressing this 
issue, the constitution would be subject to criticism by everyone in the outside world if it 
were a mere façade.
165
   
The importance attached to world opinion is also clear, for instance, in the discussions 
around the political rights of naturalized Kuwaitis. Saad Al Sabah, Minister of Interior, 
pointed out that the outside world was asking Kuwait to give naturalized citizens 
complete rights after a certain period. What will be said, he asked the members, about 
Kuwait in Arab newspapers? Al Sabah emphasized that not doing so would be used 




Another example showing the importance attached to world opinion is reflected in the 
debate on the employment criteria for ministerial undersecretaries and assistant 
undersecretaries. As mentioned earlier, there was a call and insistence by some members 
that whoever was assigned must be ‘original’ Kuwaiti. In addressing the issue, however, 
Al Khateeb stressed the importance of Kuwait’s reputation abroad and of ‘silencing’ the 
newspapers in the Arab world that were already describing Kuwait in a way which 
portrays it as “non-Arab”.
167
 Thus, Al Khateeb emphasized, the issue must be solved 
without opening the door to propaganda against the reputation of Kuwait and its 
“Arabism”.
168
 Jabir Al Sabah, the Finance Secretary, also stated during these discussions 
that the government did not want to allow ‘others’ to interpret the law for their own 
interests, and wanted to avoid it being said abroad that “Kuwait has become Kuwaiti and 
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 The government, stressed Al Sabah, tries to avoid all matters of this sort.
170
   
Finally, another clear example of the attitude of policy-makers towards being accepted by 
the world community comes out during the discussions on the use of torture. The relevant 
article in this regard is Article 30, which reads as follows:  
(1) No person shall be arrested, detained, searched, or compelled to 
reside in a specified place, nor shall the residence of any person or 
his liberty to choose his place of residence or his liberty of 
movement be restricted, except in accordance with the provisions of 
the law. 
(2) No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment.  
There was a tense debate around this Article as some members, albeit small in number, 
were actually in favor of harsh treatment and/or torture of suspected criminals. However, 
the constitutional adviser pointed out that the Article was taken from the International 
Covenant for Human Rights, and that torture was a ‘crime’ that was absolutely rejected 
by the world. Other members were struck by the mere discussion over the issue. It is a 




Importantly in this regard, Kuwait’s eligibility for entry into the United Nations was very 
much on the minds of the members. Even those favoring harsh treatment or torture were 
aware of this. For example, Al Jeri noted that there were already United Nations member 
states who employ torture; thus, he thought, the United Nations would not reject 
Kuwait’s bid for entry on the basis that they did not accept the Article.
172
 Likewise, Al 
Hassawi noted that he refused torture (he wanted ‘harsh’ treatment) “especially because 
we want to enter the United Nations”.
173
 The Article was accepted as proposed, however, 
and accepting it was stated to be important for the Kuwait’s acceptance into the UN. 
Kuwait would be in deep trouble, stressed Al Khateeb, if the above opinions were 
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accepted by the CA.
174
  
It is clear, therefore, that the international dimension, in the context of Kuwait’s newly 
acquired importance due primarily to oil, had not only played a significant role in 
pushing Kuwait towards adopting reforms and, importantly, a constitutional form of 
government, but had also influenced the very nature of the constitution itself. While the 
discussion has so far focused on the Kuwaiti mindset in the aftermath of the oil boom, the 
next section reviews the British attitude during these deliberations, albeit briefly, as the 
analysis of the international dimension to domestic Kuwaiti reform could not be fully 
comprehended without a look at the British position.  
 7.5. REFORM: OIL INTERESTS AND BRITISH POLICY 
It is clear from the analysis above that Britain had both encouraged Kuwaitis in the 
direction of political reform, and had readily accepted many of the Ruler’s demands to 
demonstrate Kuwait’s independence from British influence which, in turn, required 
further reform. This section briefly examines the reasons behind British policy in this 
regard. 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the British undertook a major reassessment of their 
strategy in the region as a whole. In 1957, before the Iraqi revolution of 1958, a 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Relations explained the new 
circumstances Britain was facing:  
the situation is continually developing and compared with even ten 
years ago new and important factors in the Middle East situation are 
at work against our position. The Soviet Union has intruded in the 
Arab world, and Egypt and Syria are openly antagonistic to the 
Western position there, pan-Arabism at present led by Egypt has 
spread to many parts of the Gulf and can hardly be prevented from 
eventually spreading to the whole, the Israeli issue has exacerbated 
and will continue to exacerbate Anglo-Arab relations, the Suez crisis 
has further shaken these relations, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have 
gained considerably in strength and confidence and Saudi Arabia 
and Iran in ambition, our position generally may become 
increasingly the target of an Afro-Asian attack pressing us to 
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relinquish authority in the Gulf as we have done elsewhere, the 
United States and not Britain is now the predominant Western 
Power in the Middle East.
175
  
The British were also concerned about the ramifications developments in surrounding 
countries, like a ‘collapse’ in Iraq, would have on the Gulf states. This was thought to 
potentially give rise to constitutional, labour, or social upheavals threatening “the British 
connection” and creating an “extremely dangerous situation”.
176
 Egyptian propaganda 
would in turn be intensified and “achieve an influence” that would “seriously” threaten 
the British position. Thus, the only “shield for the Gulf” states against such influences 
was a “temporising policy” to “moderate” the effect of “hostile propaganda” by counter-
measures of their own.
177
 
Part of the strategy was to ensure that the rulers maintained their confidence in the British 
ability and determination to protect them; to encourage local governments to take over 
any primarily internal functions as they become capable of doing so; and to undertake 
political reforms towards liberalizing their regimes, albeit with great caution.
178
 While 
carefully avoiding any open interference in internal affairs, the Secretary noted, 
 we should encourage the Rulers to base their regimes on as broad a 
consent of their people as is practicable and as is consistent with the 
maintenance of stability. We should wait for opportunities to use our 
influence, provided this can be done unobtrusively, in the direction of 
more efficient government and of wider participation in the business 
of government, e.g., by including nominated or elected members from 
outside the Ruling Families in committees controlling Government 
Departments, as is the case in Bahrain.
179
 
In the same direction, a ‘Future Policy Study 1960-70’ prepared by the British 
Government noted that while Britain cannot abandon its military protection of the region, 
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 The Secretary of State stressed that it is “particularly important that any liberalisation of the regimes 
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powers of the Ruling Families or compel them to bow to nationalist demands at the expense of their own 
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they “should continue to encourage the Persian Gulf rulers to modernise their regimes ... 
to prevent revolutionary pressures from building up”.
180
 
Moreover, while there were at the time differing views with regards to pushing the Gulf 
states to join the Arab Union, after the 1958 revolution this was no longer a possibility. 
With a friendly Iraq gone, Kuwait’s “independence” and “friendship” of Kuwait started 
to become of prime importance in the British view. As the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs noted, “[t]he friendship of Kuwait and her independence in the Arab world are of 
great importance to us to enable us to have access to Kuwaiti-oil on reasonable terms”.
181
  
In fact, Kuwait’s independence and friendship was seen to have much greater 
significance to Britain’s wider interests in the region. For instance, a British Government 
report drew attention to “the vital importance of Kuwait” to Britain’s “Middle East oil 
interests” and emphasized “the advantages to this country [Britain], both in supplies and 
in the balance of payments, which flow from the operations of the British companies in 
an independent, affluent and friendly Kuwait and from Kuwait’s readiness to accept and 
hold sterling”.
182
  The report reaffirmed that the “best chance of protecting these interests 
lies in the preservation of an independent Kuwait ready to co-operate with the United 
Kingdom”.
183
 “Because of its independence, affluence and friendship with us”, 
emphasized the report,  
Kuwait stands in the way of a consolidation of control of Middle 
East oil by one or more of the remaining major Middle East 
producers (Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran) or transit States (the United 
Arab Republic), and thus provides a valuable insurance that oil will 
continue to flow from the Middle East in adequate quantities and on 
reasonable terms (the Middle East supplies three-quarters of the oil 
used outside the Americas).
184
  
The report warned that if “the Kuwaitis lose confidence” in Britain, “they will probably 
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seek to reinsure with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (UAR.)”, the result of 
which “would probably be at least to hasten changes in Kuwaiti policy to our 
disadvantage and at worst expose Kuwait to a subsequent Iraqi takeover”.
185
  
The British were therefore very careful not harm their relationship with the Ruler, and 
consequently readily accepted many of his requests. Throughout their negotiations on 
different issues relating to the Ruler’s wish of gaining more control of Kuwait’s 
international affairs, this attitude was very clear. In discussing membership of Kuwait in 
international organizations, for instance, the Foreign Secretary noted that,  
it would not necessarily be to our disadvantage that he should take a 
more direct and personal interest in its international relations as 
well. If we opposed this tendency we should risk forfeiting his 
goodwill and should appear to be attempting to impose our authority 
on a country which was legally independent, although it enjoyed our 
protection. But if we allowed the Ruler to develop an international 
personality of his own, we could hope to retain his confidence 
without modifying the substance of our relationship with him.
186
  
Moreover, when discussing jurisdictional issues, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs pointed out in a Memorandum to the Cabinet that to resist the Ruler’s demand 
would “sour” the British relationship with the Ruling family “to a point where our, oil 
interest and, possibly, the Ruler’s continued investment in sterling might be affected. It 
would also give cause, locally for popular agitation against us in Kuwait and, in the Arab-




In sum, it is clear that the importance of Kuwait to Britain as a result of Kuwait’s oil 
wealth was central in shaping not only the attitudes of Kuwaitis towards certain policies, 
but also that of the British as well. Combined, they allowed and pushed Kuwait to follow 
the route to independence and, with it, reform, ultimately leading the country to adopt a 
constitutional form of government. 
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7.6. CONCLUSION 
The chapter examined the internal and external influences that shaped the attitudes of 
policymakers during the post-oil boom of the 1950s and early 1960s. It became clear that 
the oil boom was coupled with a great rise in internal political activity and reform, 
contrary to general views of the rentier state literature. While internal developments had 
played a role in fuelling dissent, there were overwhelming pacifying influences that had 
reinforced the status quo. However, Kuwait’s enormous oil wealth gave rise to new 
international variables that had ultimately tipped the balance in favor of major reforms. In 
the post-oil environment, Kuwaitis felt it necessary to adopt certain measures that would 
preserve the country’s sovereignty and integrity. These largely took the form of 
attempting to create a friendlier atmosphere for Kuwait in the region by casting the 
country in a positive light through, in part, certain domestic policies.  
In fact, the effort of Kuwaiti policymakers to present the country as a ‘proper’ state with 
respectable domestic policies is clearly reflected in the Kuwaiti defense during the 
deliberations in the UN over the Iraqi crisis of 1961. Many of the different policies 
discussed above were pointed out as an indication of Kuwait’s eligibility for 
independence and UN membership. Interestingly, even Kuwait’s welfare policies were 
pointed out in this context, reflecting the dominant currents typical of the era, which 
viewed ‘welfare’ as a feature of any ‘proper’ economic system. Therefore, the Kuwaiti 
delegation not only spoke about their political and legislative reforms to defend Kuwait’s 
legitimacy, but also emphasized the welfare nature of its economy. During the Security 
Council debate, Hussein, the Kuwait representative, argued the following:   
If we look at the present we shall see how Kuwait has progressively 
and systematically established all requisite institutions by which a 
modern State is defined. Before the declaration of the independent 
State of Kuwait on 19 June 1961, Kuwait had already established a 
viable system of effectively administered government. It had its 
own currency and its own postage stamps, its own laws and is own 
courts of justice. In fact, aided by its economic resources, the 
Government had become an efficiently organized welfare State - a 
welfare State which is today the pride of the Middle East…
188
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To the same effect, in their Statement to the press, the Kuwait delegation emphasized the 
following:  
The Independence of Kuwait has never been a disputed question. It 
has always had a separate and Sovereign Government – a 
Government which in recent years has made tremendous effort to 
reorganize itself along the modern lines of a model Welfare State, 
and in this we have been successful. Our modern laws and 
regulations ensure the safety and well-being of our People and all 
those who are resident in Kuwait. The fact that Kuwait is a Welfare 
State in the proper sense of the word is the pride of the Middle 
East…We hope we shall be given the chance as a free and 
Independent Member of the United Nation’s Organisation…The 
agreement of 19 June 1961 between the Government of the United 
Kingdom and that of Kuwait did not in fact give birth to the 
independence of Kuwait; it merely recognized the status quo as it 
had become, as the result of the long-range strategy and wise 
diplomacy of His Highness, the Ruler of Kuwait. Previous to the 
formal announcement of her independence, Kuwait had already 
taken long strides in the field of international diplomacy, proving 
she was a sovereign State. Even before the abrogation of the Treaty 
of 1899 with Great Britain, Kuwait has achieved all the traditional 
aspects by which a sovereign State is recognized and 
defined...Beginning with 24 July, Kuwait has successively been 
admitted to the following international organizations: International 
Telecommunications Union, the Universal Postal Union, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health 
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organization.
189
  
In sum, many of these policies, as demonstrated in the chapter, were instigated by the 
problems a small and newly rich Kuwait had to face in a country and region overtaken by 
Arab nationalism. While this chapter discussed the progression of Kuwait into a 
constitutional state, the next chapter examines the adopted constitutional system. The aim 
is to understand the reasoning and ideas behind its peculiar nature, and more importantly, 
to confirm whether the claimed democratic reforms were indeed genuine, or as the rentier 
state literature would suggest, a mere façade.  
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CHAPTER 8  
THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE OF KUWAIT 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the previous chapters was to examine the reasons and attitudes behind 
the post-oil policy decisions that transformed Kuwait into a rentier and constitutional 
state. It was argued that the framework provided by rentier state theory is extremely 
narrow and does not capture the diverse ways in which oil influences such decisions. The 
first part of the research examined the ideas and attitudes behind post-oil economic 
policies, while the second part focused on the different factors that shaped the post-oil 
political dynamics and pushed Kuwait to undertake major political reforms crowned by 
the adoption of a constitutional form of government.  
The second part of the research is the concern of this chapter. This is because, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, rentier state scholars have dismissed political reforms during 
oil booms as being a mere façade, and in fact, as Niblock (1998: 226) points out, have 
“written off the political systems of the area as being congenitally undemocratic”. This 
has undermined a better understanding of the systems in place, particularly those 
possessing some form of formal participation. While it is certainly beyond the scope of 
this research to analyze the constitutional form of government adopted by the Kuwaitis, 
the notion that such reforms were a genuine process in democratization was a base on 
which much of the arguments has rested in this study so far. Thus, it is important to 
examine, albeit briefly, Kuwait’s constitutional system to demonstrate that such a notion 
is indeed valid by reviewing the relevant constitutional articles. 
To provide a better understanding of the peculiar system adopted by the members of the 
CA, it is important first to understand the thought processes that went into drafting the 
constitution in the context of Kuwait’s experiences as described in the previous chapters. 
The first section, therefore, traces how and more importantly why the political system 
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adopted by the constitution was formulated in the way that it did. The second section then 
demonstrates that, despite its limitations, the institution of the new system was indeed a 
real and genuine step in the process of democratization. 
8.2. THE SHAPING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 
It must be remembered that the framing of the constitution took place in the shadow of 
Qassim’s threats to Kuwait. The unintended result of these threats was to unite Kuwaitis 
behind the Ruler and spread a general mood of cooperation. Thus, remnants of past 
problems were all but forgotten, and the merchants together with the Arab Nationalists 
were back on extremely good relations and in solidarity with the Ruler, who had 
previously banned all forms of freedom as a result of the nationalist demonstration of 
1959 as discussed in Chapter Seven. The sense of the need to cooperate and stand 
together during that critical time is reflected, for instance, in the acceptance of Al Qatami 
(the retired colonel and Arab nationalist leader) to become part of the Amiri Diwan, and 
the merchants to become members of the Cabinet. Moreover, as reflected below, the 
factors that shaped the dynamics of the 1950s and early 1960s manifested themselves in 
the discussions of the CA and clearly influenced the peculiar outcome of the adopted 
political system.  
8.2.1 ‘Stability’ as the Guiding Principle of the Adopted Political System 
In light of the above, it would not be surprising that in both the CA and the CC, the theme 
that cut across the discussions was ‘stability’. Indeed, with foreign threats, instability 
throughout the region, and a mood of ‘unity’ among Kuwaitis in reaction, this theme 
gained increased importance. There were means to this end; namely ‘balance’, 
‘cooperation’, and ‘gradualism’. All these appeared dominant in the CA and CC minutes. 
The very initial issue raised was the system of government to be adopted: parliamentary 
or presidential. This question was recognized to be the core feature of the constitution, 
based on which other articles would be drawn.
1
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Saad Al Sabah’s (Interior Minister) immediate reaction was to oppose the parliamentary 
system, as this would give parliament the right to withdraw confidence from the 
government. The parliamentary system to him was a ‘leap’ and not gradual development 
that took account of the Kuwait’s circumstances which required stability.
2
  
For his part, the Constitution Advisor, Othman, suggested a merge between the two 
systems to achieve the desired stability. He noted that the disadvantages of a 
parliamentary system were issues like the instability of government, and party and 
parliamentary maneuvering to control it. Meanwhile, a presidential system could only be 
established in republics and its main disadvantage was that responsibility is placed on, 
and criticism is directed at the head of state. This cannot be established in a monarchy or 
emirate, as the head of the state should be placed above and away from such criticism.
3
  
Thus, working with these variables, stability was to be achieved, ‘without dropping 
manifestations of popular parliamentary system’, by the following measures: 
A. Making the head of state immune from criticism and questioning: 
Article 54:  
The Amir is the Head of the State. His person is immune and inviolable. 
B. Not giving the prime minister responsibility over a specific ministry so that even 
though parliament members could question him, withdrawing confidence from him or the 
whole cabinet would not be possible:  
Article 102: 
(1) The Prime Minister does not hold any portfolio; nor shall the question 
of confidence in him be raised before the National Assembly…  
C. Only individual ministers are susceptible to loss of parliamentary confidence whilst 
the rest of the ministry remains intact: 
Article 101:  
(1) Every Minister is responsible to the National Assembly for the affairs 
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of his ministry. 
If the Assembly passes a vote of no confidence against a Minister, he is 
considered to have resigned his office as from the date of the vote of no 
confidence and shall immediately submit his formal resignation. The 
question of confidence in a Minister may not be raised except upon his 
request or upon a demand signed by ten members, following a debate on 
an interpellation addressed to him. The Assembly may not make its 
decision upon such a request before the lapse of seven days from the 
presentation thereof. 
(2) Withdrawal of confidence from a Minister is by a majority vote of the 
members constituting the Assembly excluding Ministers. Ministers do not 
participate in the vote of confidence. 
 
These provisions were passed with the specific goal of achieving stability. Clearly, some 
of them place certain limitations on the powers of parliament mainly by restricting 
accountability. However, there was another side to the coin and, as discussed in more 
detail later, these limitations do not mean the elimination of significant and real 
parliamentary powers.  
8.2.2 The Position of Al Sabah and Consequent Issues 
The position of Al Sabah as heads of all ministries, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
was a major issue the members had to contend with. In this situation, the adoption of a 
democratic system in which the government is formed from a parliamentary majority was 
simply impossible.  
The originally proposed Article 56 (which addresses the issue of the formation of 
government) in the draft constitution stated that at least half the ministers must be chosen 
from among parliament members. This was explained by Othman to reflect the merge 
between the presidential and parliamentary system as the CC had agreed. In a presidential 
system, all ministers would be non-parliament members, while in a parliamentary system, 
all ministers would be parliament members. The idea was therefore seen to be a middle 
ground between the two, with the aim of accomplishing the desired cooperation between 
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the legislative and executive.
4
  
Saad Al Sabah, however, vehemently resist even this.
5
 He stated that Kuwait’s 
circumstances must be taken into consideration and that the members should not agree to 
something that was ‘not workable’. The government’s legal expert, Hafith, took this 
clause to mean a reversal of what Kuwait had been accustomed to, i.e. all the ministers 
being from the ruling family. Thus, he concluded, this article was meant to sideline the 
ruling family from the ministry and not meant for achieving cooperation.
6
 Therefore, 
Saad emphasized that if the article meant to sideline the ruling family, the “conversation 
must be ended”.
7
 Further, on a practical level, Hafith noted that the reality in this case 
would be that all non-parliament member ministers would be from the ruling family. 
Consequently, this would leave no room for other qualified individuals from outside 
parliament to join the ministry.
8
  
Ultimately the CC compromised, and all the members with the exception of Al Humaithi, 
who represented the Al Khateeb group in the CC, agreed that the article be amended to 
solely state that non-parliament members may be appointed as ministers without 
specifying a percentage.
9
 Othman, noting his objection, stated that democracy means that 
most ministers if not all must be chosen from parliament. He asserted that if not for the 




The situation of Al Sabah in the ministry and the consequent ramifications of that on the 
political system adopted were in fact summed up quite frankly in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Constitution. The Memorandum stated that Kuwait’s state of affairs 
necessitated that the principles of Parliamentarianism, which means that ministers must 
be chosen from among parliament members, could not be taken fully. Unlike the case in 
other constitutional monarchies, the Kuwaiti constitution grants the right of ruling family 
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members to become ministers as this is the only way they could join in government given 
the fact that they cannot run for parliament.
11
  
In sum, the status of Al Sabah was preserved as members in the ministry. Yet this 
provision gave rise to two related questions. The first was: since some ministers would be 
chosen from amongst parliament members, while others would not, how can some 
ministers have the right to vote in parliament while others do not?  
This was seen by Saad to be a form of ‘discrimination’ between ministers.
12
 As a middle 
ground, Thunayyan, the Speaker, suggested that appointed ministers from outside 
parliament would be given the right to vote except when voting for the removal of 
confidence from a minister. This would alleviate the awkwardness between ministers 
resulting from granting only some of them the right to vote whilst banning others.
13
 Al 
Humaithi, however, saw this development as undermining democracy, and rendering it 
only a façade. The Constitutional Advisor, Othman, agreed, noting that the role of the 
legislative in scrutinizing the executive would be rendered a sham. Othman further 
stressed that the originally proposed Article 56 was better, as it did not ban an elected 
member from voting (on confidence) and did not give parliament membership to 
unelected ministers. In sum, both Al Humaithi and Othman noted their disapproval of 
having ministers become members in parliament and giving them the right to vote, whilst 
banning elected parliament members who were also ministers from voting. However, to 




The second consequent question was: if ministers may be appointed from outside 
parliament, and if they had a right to vote in parliament, the inevitable issue to be raised 
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was the number of ministry posts. This issue was of magnified importance given the 
small number of parliamentary seats – fifty. 
Thus, a new front in the power struggle ensued. Predictably, Saad did not want to place 
any limit on the number of cabinet posts.
15
 The danger of this, however, was clear to the 
members and the Constitutional Advisor. Without limiting the number of ministers (who 
may predominantly be from outside parliament), Othman noted, the danger would be that 
a majority formation in parliament could easily be achieved by the executive, rendering 
the assembly valueless and a somewhat extended meeting of the cabinet. The other CC 
members agreed. Thus, the dilemma was either to limit the number of ministers and grant 
them the right to vote, or not to limit the number of ministers yet forbid non-elected 
ministers from the right to vote.
16
 
Because the second option was now ruled out (only Al Humaithi continued to insist in the 
CC that non-elected member should not have voting rights), it was naturally agreed by 
the majority of the CC members that the number of ministers must be limited.
17
 A long 
debate ensued with Saad insisting on a maximum of 20 ministers if the CC is adamant 
about placing a limit. In fact, he also at one point proposed reducing the number of 
parliament members to forty.
18
 After long discussions and negotiations, Al Zaid’s 
suggestion of assigning a percentage by having the ministry not exceed a third of the 
number of elected parliament members was finally adopted by the CC, with the only 
objection coming from Al Humaithi, based on his continued belief that the parliament in 
this case would be stripped of any real power.
19
  
The resulting Article 56 read as follows: 
 (1) The Amir, after the traditional consultations, appoints the Prime 
Minister and relieves him of office. The Amir also appoints Ministers and 
relieves them of office upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. 
(2) Ministers are appointed from amongst the members of the National 
Assembly and from others. 
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(3) The number of Ministers in all shall not exceed one-third of the 
number of the members of the National Assembly. 
Thus, as is clear, the position of the Al Sabah in government and the consequent 
dilemmas the members had to contend with clearly undermined the adoption of a more 
democratic parliamentary system of government. 
8.2.3. Why Did the Members Agree? 
The question is why did the members agree to such limitations on the power of 
parliament? As for the merchants, it must be remembered that among them were 
members of the 1930s movement, which stripped from the Ruler almost all his powers. 
Indeed, their radical movement was effectively a coup. Therefore, it is clear that the new 
post-oil realities that had ‘tamed’ their general positions, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, translated themselves in their stances with regards to the constitution. Moreover, 
their very experience in the 1930s movement, with the negative repercussions it had 
instigated, might have influenced the way or the methods by which they sought change. 
As discussed previously, the result of their movement was a violent crackdown by 
Ahmad Al Jabir with the backing of the British, which resulted in death and 
imprisonment of members of the movement, and the fleeing of others. Al Khateeb 
believes that these experiences played a role in softening their position and preferring 
‘gradualism’ instead.
20
 However, as reflected in the CA discussions, there was more to it 
than this.  
As noted earlier, the reformist movement had always been confined to the rich elite. With 
new classes now to be involved in the process, some merchants believed that 
‘gradualism’ was key. This stemmed out of a combination of elitism and realism. In this 
regard, Thunayyan, the Speaker, stated that when the CC started drafting the constitution, 
the reality of the country was taken into account. The country was in a phase of 
‘evolution’ and the beginnings of democratic rule. Moreover, the most important thing 
Kuwait needed was stability, as a country, with such geographical circumstances and 
such material wealth, ‘tempts certain foreign powers’ (tughri baath al jihat). In addition, 
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 218 
the Speaker pointed out that they looked at the existing level of intellectual, political and 
jurisprudential awareness, and found that the number of ‘intellectuals’ (presumably 
meaning college graduates) did not exceed two hundred and sixty individuals whom were 
all consumed in government departments. The Speaker went on to give several examples 
that indicate the lack of qualification, know-how and experience amongst the Kuwaiti 
population. In these circumstances, contended Thunayyan, it was better to ‘keep safe 
what they possessed’ and to ‘preserve their customs and traditions’, while at the same 
time ‘develop the country and direct the sectors of the population towards intellectual 
progress’ with the objective of ‘carrying democratization in the correct steps’. Therefore, 
with ‘stability’ being at the center of their aims, they agreed to these articles which, while 




In contrast to the merchants, the Arab nationalist intellectuals voiced their strong 
disapproval to major aspects of the new constitutional system. Al Khateeb, who was 
Deputy Speaker, summed up their objections in four main points:
22
 
(i) The appointment of ministers as members in parliament undermines the spirit of 
democracy and the desired democratic system; 
(ii) The number of ministers, which according to the constitution is a third of parliament 
members, is exaggerated; 
(iii) The Article should include the requirement of the Amir to consult the parliament and 
its speaker before appointing the ministry and not base such appointments solely on the 
recommendations of the prime minister; 
(iv) The ruling family should be above all conflicts, and a source of respect to all; thus, 
the fact that they are members in the ministry undermines this status, as they would be 
susceptible to criticism, accountability and the withdrawal of confidence. This would 
affect the position the ruling family should have in society. Moreover, it is important that 
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members of parliament feel that they have a right to question and hold any minister 
accountable, and view ministers as mere individuals who are entrusted to carry out 
certain tasks. This accountability is the ‘safety valve’ in any democratic experience, and 
it would be missing if ruling family members are ministers. 
While voicing their objections to certain articles, the realism of the ‘intellectuals’ 
described in the previous chapter allowed them to agree in the end to the constitution as 
reached. Therefore, while the political system established by the constitution was not 
ideal, they accepted it, as they saw it to be a significant step forward, with the plan of 
amending it in the future. Indeed, the idea was that they would eventually amend the 
constitution towards greater political rights, precisely in five years time as sanctioned by 
Article 174: 
 Article 174 
Either the Amir or one-third of the members of the National 
Assembly shall have the right to propose the revision of this 
Constitution by amending or deleting one or more of its provisions 
or by adding new provisions.  
If the Amir and the majority of the members constituting the 
National Assembly approve the principle of revision and its subject 
matter, the Assembly shall debate the bill article by article. 
Approval by a two- thirds majority vote of the members constituting 
the Assembly shall be required for the bill to be passed. The 
revision shall come into force only after being sanctioned and 
promulgated by the Amir regardless of the provisions of Articles 65 
and 66 of this Constitution.  
If the principle of revision or its subject matter is rejected, it shall 
not be presented again before the lapse of one year from the 
rejection.  
No amendment to this Constitution may be proposed before the 
lapse of five years from its coming into force. 
Moreover, their reassurance was a constitutional guarantee than any amendment must 
only increase the rights already prescribed, as identified in Article 175: 
Article 175  
The provisions relating to the Amiri System in Kuwait and the prin-
ciples of liberty and equality, provided for in this Constitution, may 
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not be proposed for revision except in relation to the title of the 
Amirate or to increase the guarantees of liberty and equality.  
In this context, the vote for the constitution, despite certain objects, was unanimous. As 
seen, the factors discussed in the previous chapter that characterized the post-oil era of 
the 1950s, such as the position of the Al Sabah in government; the ‘softening’ of the 
merchants’ positions; the realism of the intellectuals; and the international forces which 
in addition to pushing for reform, united the people and emphasized stability, were all 
reflected in the discussions and clearly influenced the outcome of the system adopted. 
While the discussion has so far focused on the context in which the main features 
constituting this system was agreed, the next section briefly reviews the constitutional 
articles to determine whether the constitution represents a genuine break with the past 
and a step in democratization or is as the literature would suggest, a mere façade.  
8.3. DEMOCRACY vs. DEMOCRATIZATION 
As a point of departure, it is important to recognize and acknowledge the distinction 
between democracy and the process of democratization. This conceptual distinction is 
missed by much of the rentier state literature, and might explain the readiness of some 
scholars to dismiss participatory experiences witnessed in oil states such as Kuwait. 
While both the merchants and the Arab nationalists agreed that the constitution only 
sanctioned a limited form of democracy, unlike what rentier state scholars would suggest, 
they also viewed it as an important step ahead in the process of democratization. This 
view is generally accepted, even today, by Kuwaiti opposition figures. It is an “advanced 
document”, opposition leader Al Naibari emphasizes, as it could be seen to place 
restrictions on the authority of the ruler.
23
 It is the aim of this section to demonstrate how 
this is so by reviewing the main political and civil rights assigned by the articles.  
One of the most important demonstrations of the political advances prescribed by the 
constitution was the right given to parliament in accepting and choosing the country’s 
heir apparent. Article 4 commands that the heir apparent’s designation  
…shall be effected by an Amiri Order upon the nomination of the Amir 
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and the approval of the National Assembly which shall be signified by a 
majority vote of its members in a special sitting… In case no designation 
is achieved in accordance with the foregoing procedure, the Amir shall 
nominate at least three of the descendants of the late Mubarak al-Sabah of 
whom the National Assembly shall pledge allegiance to one as Heir 
Apparent…  
Parliament, moreover, could override the ruler’s decisions, including his choice of prime 
minister. As mentioned, Article 101 grants parliament the right to withdraw confidence 
from individual ministers by a majority vote. While Article 102 prohibits parliament from 
raising the question of confidence with regards to the prime minister, it may decide ‘non-
cooperation’ with him. In doing so, the Amir may either dismiss the prime minister or 
call for new elections. If elections are held and the new parliament again decides it could 
not to cooperate with the prime minister, he is automatically considered resigned from his 
post, even if this were contrary to the wishes of the Amir:  
 Article 102 
 …(2) Nevertheless, if the National Assembly decides, in the manner 
specified in the preceding Article, that it cannot co-operate with the Prime 
Minister, the matter is submitted to the Head of State.  In such a case, the 
Amir may either relieve the Prime Minister of office and appoint a new 
Cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly. 
(3) In the event of dissolution, if the new Assembly decides by the above 
mentioned majority vote that it cannot cooperate with the said Prime 
Minister, he shall be considered to have resigned as from the date of the 
decision of the Assembly in this respect, and a new Cabinet shall be 
formed. 
  
Unlike Kuwait’s past system of government, the Amir according to the constitution has 
no right to issue legislation. He is only able to initiate laws for acceptance or rejection by 
parliament. Moreover, while a bill passed by parliament is submitted to the ruler for 
sanctioning and promulgating, if the latter does not do so and does not seek the 
reconsideration of the bill by parliament within thirty days, it is automatically considered 
sanctioned and is promulgated.  Such power limiting legislations, as identified in Article 
65, should be considered as essential pillars of the democratization process: 
Article 65  
(1) The Amir has the right to initiate, sanction, and promulgate laws. 
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Promulgation of laws takes place within thirty days from the date of their 
submission by the National Assembly to the Amir. This period is reduced 
to seven days in case of urgency. Such urgency is decided upon by a 
majority vote of the members constituting the National Assembly.  
(2) Official holidays are not counted in computing the promulgation. 
(3) If the period of promulgation expires without the Head of State 
demanding reconsideration, the bill is considered as having been 
sanctioned and is promulgated.  
Moreover, as suggested, parliament could override the ruler’s wishes in passing 
legislation. If the ruler opposes a certain bill accepted by parliament, he may only pass it 
back to the assembly for its reconsideration. If the assembly confirms its vote for the bill 
by a two-thirds majority, the ruler is required to sanction and promulgate it. Further, in a 
new parliament session, the same bill may be confirmed with only a simple majority, as 
stated in Article 66:  
Article 66 
Reference of a bill for reconsideration is by a decree stating the grounds 
therefore.  If the National Assembly confirms the bill by a two-thirds 
majority vote of its members, the Amir sanctions and promulgates the bill 
within thirty days from its submission to him.  If the bill does not receive 
the said majority, it may not be reconsidered during the same session.  If 
the National Assembly, in another session, considers the same bill by a 
majority vote of its members, the Amir sanctions and promulgates the bill 
as law within thirty days from its submission to him. 
In addition to the reviewed political rights assigned by the constitution which themselves 
shape a huge break with Kuwait’s previous system of government, one of the most 
important aspects in the process of democratization which also has significant 
implications on core assumptions of the rentier state theory is the fact that the 
constitutional system sanctioned and formalized society’s integral role in the 
appropriation of public funds. As a starting point, while the literature generally assumes 
that the distinction between state revenue and the personal revenue of the ruler in rentier 
states is non-existent or at best very blurred, the constitution designated Kuwait’s wealth 
and revenues as State property:   
 Article 21   
Natural resources and all revenues there from are the property of the State.  
It shall ensure their preservation and proper exploitation, due regard being 
given to the requirements of State security and the national economy. 
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Thus, accordingly, the ruler does not in any way have a special claim on Kuwait’s 
resources. Instead both the ruling family and citizens share alike the wealth of the 
country, and citizens, further, play the primary role in its appropriation. Even the ruler’s 
salary, in fact, is fixed by law, discussed and voted for in parliament: 
Article 78  
Upon the accession of the Head of State his annual emolument shall 
be fixed by a law for the duration of his reign. 
The following are the main constitutional articles that aim to organize public finance 
according to the rule of law as part of the democratization process with accountability 
and participation at its core: 
Article 134  [Establishing Taxes] 
No general tax may be established, amended, or abolished except by a 
law.  No one may be exempted, wholly or partially, from the duty to pay 
such taxes except in the cases specified by law.  No one may be required 
to pay any other tax, fee, or imposition except within the limits of law. 
Article 135  [Funds] 
The law prescribes rules for the collection of public funds and the 
procedure for their expenditure. 
Article 138  [State Properties] 
The law lays down the rules for the protection of State properties, their 
administration, the conditions of their disposal, and the limits within 
which any of these properties may be relinquished. 
  Article 140 
  The Government shall draw up the annual budget, comprising the revenue 
and expenditure of the State, and submit it to the National Assembly, for 
examination and approval, at least two months before the end of each 
current financial year. 
  Article 141 
The budget shall be discussed in the National Assembly Part by Part. 
None of the public revenues may be allocated for a specific purpose 
except by law. 
  Article 144 [Budget by Law] 
The budget shall be issued by a law. 
  Article 146 [Changes of Budget] 
Any expenditure not included in the budget, or in excess of the budget 
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appropriations, as well as the transfer of any fund from one Part of the 
budget to another, shall be effected by law. 
  Article 155 [Pensions] 
Law shall regulate salaries, pensions, compensation, subsides and 
gratuities which are a charge on the State treasury. 
Article 149  [Final Accounts] 
The final accounts of the financial administration of the State for the 
preceding year are submitted, within four months following the end of the 
said year, to the National Assembly for consideration and approval. 
  
Article 150  [Statement of Government] 
The government submits to the National Assembly, at least once during 
each ordinary session, a statement upon the financial position of the State. 
Article 151  [Audit Commission] 
A financial control and audit commission is established by a law, which 
ensures its independence.  The commission is attached to the National 
Assembly and assists the government and the National Assembly in 
controlling the collection of the State revenues and the disbursement of its 
expenditures within the limits of the budget.  The commission submits to 
both the Government and the National Assembly an annual report on its 
activities and its observations. 
  
Article 152  [Natural Resources] 
No concession for exploitation of either a natural resource or a public 
service may be granted except by a law and for a limited period.  In this 
respect, the preparatory measures facilitate the operations of prospecting 
and exploration and ensure publicity and competition. 
Article 153  [Monopoly] 
No monopoly may be granted except by a law and for a limited period. 
These articles beg a radically different conception of the nature of the decision-making 
process than that put forward by the rentier state literature. As seen in Chapter 2, the 
literature stresses the autonomy of state from its population, and pictures distributive 
policies as a top-down process whereby an autonomous ruler or government hands out 
selective privileges to buy the quiescence of society. The constitutional articles presented 
so far, however, render society an intrinsic and indeed major participant in the 
distribution process itself, and in doing so give Kuwait its core feature as a rentier 
constitutional state. This embodies the idea of a rentier state combined with a 
constitutional form of government in which citizens are directly involved in the decision-
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making process and are able exert direct and explicit pressure, by the rights granted, to 
influence policy in specific ways. While it is beyond the scope of this research to study 
the development of the post-constitution state of Kuwait, the implications of this system 
as presented here beg the need for such studies to no longer view state and society as 
separate entities by stressing notions like ‘autonomy’, but to look at the ways in which 
their ‘organic’ interaction influences the shaping of economic and political decisions.  
While the discussion has thus far pointed to important examples of the political rights 
assigned by the new post-oil constitutional system, the constitution also formally 
guarantees many of the civil rights and liberties granted in the most advanced 
democracies. The following are some examples: 
Article 29 [Equality and Human Dignity] 
All people are equal in human dignity, and in public rights and duties 
before the law, without distinction as to race, origin, language or religion. 
Article 30 [Personal Liberty] 
Personal liberty is guaranteed. 
Article 31 [Arrest and Movement] 
No person shall be arrested, detained, searched or compelled to reside in a 
specified place, nor shall the residence of any person or his liberty to 
choose his place of residence or his liberty of movement be restricted, 
except in accordance with the provisions of law. 
Article 34 [No Torture] 
An accused person is presumed innocent until proved guilty in a legal trial 
at which the necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence 
are secured. 
The infliction of physical or moral injury on an accused person is 
prohibited. 
Article 35  [Freedom of Religion and Belief] 
Freedom of belief is absolute.  The State protects the freedom of 
practicing religion in accordance with established customs, provided that it 
does not conflict with public policy or morals. 
  
Article 36  [Freedom of Opinion and Expression] 
Freedom of opinion and of scientific research is guaranteed.  Every person 
has the right to express and propagate his opinion verbally, in writing, or 




Article 37  [Freedom of the Press] 
Freedom of the press, printing, and publishing is guaranteed in accordance 
with the conditions and manner specified by law. 
  
Article 38  [Home] 
Places of residence shall be inviolable.  They may not be entered without 
the permission of their occupants except in the circumstances and manner 
specified by law. 
  
Article 39  [Freedom and Secrecy of Communication] 
Freedom of communication by post, telegraph, and telephone and the 
secrecy thereof is guaranteed; accordingly, censorship of communications 
and disclosure of their contents are not permitted except in the 
circumstances and manner specified by law. 
Article 43  [Association] 
Freedom to form associations and unions on a national basis and by 
peaceful means is guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and 
manner specified by law.  No one may be compelled to join any 
association or union. 
  
Article 44  [Assembly] 
(1) Individuals have the right of private assembly without permission or 
prior notification, and the police may not attend such private meetings. 
(2) Public meetings, demonstrations, and gatherings are permitted in 
accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law, provided that 
their purpose and means are peaceful and not contrary to morals. 
  
Article 45  [Petition] 
Every individual has the right to address the public authorities in writing 
over his signature.  Only duly constituted organizations and bodies 
corporate have the right to address the authorities collectively. 
These civil rights are by no means trivial. They were non-existent anywhere in the Gulf 
region, and together with the political rights sanctioned by the constitution, they clearly 
constitute a substantial departure from the previous patriarchal system of government and 
form a great step forward in the process of democratization.  
8.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter briefly reviewed the new system of government assigned by the Kuwaiti 
constitution that was framed at the height of the oil boom. In doing so, the goal is to 
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demonstrate that, unlike what the relevant literature suggests, the rights granted by the 
constitution are indeed genuine.  
The first section of the chapter reviewed the thought process that went into the framing of 
the articles which assigned the main features of the system of government. It is clear that 
many of the factors that had shaped the dynamics of the post-oil era of the 1950s and 
early 1960s reflected themselves in different ways during the discussions. These 
sometimes represented a barrier towards greater liberalization, such as the way in which 
the position of the Al Sabah in government influenced the articles concerned with the 
formation of the ministry. Other factors in this regard also included the stress on 
‘stability’ in the face of international developments, the post-oil ‘softening’ of the 
merchants’ positions, and the realism of the intellectuals that allowed them to 
compromise on certain otherwise objectionable provisions. All these internal and external 
conditions shaped the peculiar nature of the constitution in a hybrid model of a 
parliamentary and presidential system, which is also a consequence of the ‘bargaining 
process’ that ultimately resulted, however, in curbing the powers of the Amir in favor of 
the rights of Kuwaiti citizens. 
Indeed, despite its limitations, the second section of this chapter showed that the adoption 
of the new constitutional system of government was a huge step forward that 
permanently crowned the reform experiments witnessed throughout the post-oil era. The 
political and civil rights and liberties it grants, in a region overtaken by dictatorship and 
autocratic rule, are indeed remarkable and, therefore, must not be overlooked. Thus, after 
having reviewed the articles of the Constitution of 1962, it can finally be concluded that 
Kuwait witnessed a genuine process of democratization at the height of an oil boom, 





CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE RENTIER 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE IN KUWAIT: AN INTEGRATED DISCUSSION 
 
 
9.1. SUMMARISING THE RESEARCH 
 
The discussion in the preceding chapters aimed at demonstrating that the rentier state 
framework for understanding the political and economic development of Kuwait is 
insufficient in pointing out the diverse factors that shaped the country’s post-oil policy 
decisions. The focus of the study is mainly to examine the perceptions and ideas behind 
these policies through looking at primary documentation and writings of contemporary 
policymakers. In doing so, a main goal is to understand why certain policies that seemed 
distributive in nature, which also constitute a main feature characterizing Kuwait’s rentier 
economy, were undertaken. The question was if the core assumptions of the rentier state 
literature that stress the political utility of these decisions provided a sufficient answer. 
The record showed, as seen in Chapter Five and Six, that contextualizing decisions solely 
in terms of their political utility is extremely narrow in grasping the deeper and more 
complex underpinnings of the choices the Kuwaiti government had made.  
Moreover, the aim is also to understand the ideas and perceptions behind social and 
political activity and the different ways in which oil either fed or undermined it. As a 
starting point, it was clear the Kuwait’s situation did not neatly fit with the rentier state 
literature’s notion that an oil boom leads to a dampening of such activity. On the 
contrary, as reflected in Chapter Seven, the oil boom of the 1950s was coupled with an 
unprecedented increase in political activity at a level never seen previously. Not only was 
the level of activity increased, but the diversity of its agents as well. Political activity was 
now not confined to elite merchants, but had begun to spread across different classes of 
the population, in a sense marking the beginnings of the popularization of politics.  
As the analysis demonstrates, the fixation of the literature on the particularistic and/or 
undemocratic nature of activity in rentier states cannot in anyway be applied to the 
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Kuwaiti case during the period of study. As Chapter Seven also reveals, the main goal 
driving and unifying these movements was the achievement of democratic reform. While 
the Euro-centric materialistic approach of ‘no representation without taxation’ does not 
account for such a development, it also does not capture the different and largely oil-
induced factors that had shaped the thinking of policymakers as to the importance of 
undertaking certain political reforms including democratization. Indeed, as is clear from 
the documents, oil had created both domestic and international dynamics – the latter 
often completely ignored – that had pushed Kuwait in the direction of transforming itself 
into a modern constitutional state.   
The first step in understanding post-oil development was to establish responsibility for 
the policies undertaken during the era. The main reason for emphasizing the need for this 
is the nature of the British position in Kuwait at the time. Kuwait had been under British 
protection and the latter had had great influence on both the external and internal affairs 
of the former. However, the extent and nature of such influence had to be untangled, as it 
was either given exaggerated weight or more often completely overlooked. The 
exaggeration of British influence is clearly reflected in the discourse amongst 
contemporary political activists as seen in Chapter Seven, and indeed this view continues 
to resonate till this day. At the same time, the British role in the post-oil development of 
Kuwait is ignored in the current literature on rentier states.  
Therefore, the focus of Chapter Four was to carefully examine this issue. The archival 
documents revealed that the British had played an essential role in the creation of the 
Kuwaiti economic system. Their influence, however, was not commanding, and the final 
word, as concluded in the Chapter, remained in Kuwaiti hands. Nevertheless, Chapter 
Five also shows that many of the ideas behind the schemes adopted, whether relating to 
internal development or external investments, were centered on British thoughts. These 
schemes had taken into consideration not only Kuwaiti but British interests as well. This 
is clearly seen in the case of the foreign investment scheme of 1953. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the rentier state literature would view such investments as a perpetuation of 
the rentier nature of the economy and as an alternative to industrialization in order to 
avoid future class conflicts. The historical documents revealed, however, that the scheme 
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had nothing to do with such views. Rather, it was a British idea triggered first and 
foremost by the fact that the huge sterling surpluses could pose great harm on the sterling 
area if not handled properly. In fact, the Ruler initially accepted the proposals without 
fully understanding them. In addition, external investments were not in any way a 
substitute to industrialization. The ‘either/or’ dichotomy is therefore false. External 
investments and industrialization were not mutually exclusive, and indeed there was no 
bias against industrialization at all. The creation of the technical college and other 
schemes in the development program were explicitly born out of the desire to build up 
large-scale future industries. Realistically, however, this was not seen as possible in the 
short term given Kuwait’s circumstances. In fact, as Chapter Five reveals, the major 
concerns raised by the British, who had themselves devised the investment scheme, were 
related to the fact that there was not enough emphasis on ‘productive’ projects in the 
development plan.  
Reviewing the British role also proved important as it became clear that some of the 
institutional set-ups dealing with development were in fact a direct result of British 
attempts at gaining more influence in the affairs of Kuwait. The idea behind the creation 
of the Development Board itself, as examined in Chapter Four, was to increase the 
influence of the British advisors vis-à-vis Kuwaiti entrenched powers. In light of such an 
intrinsic British role in the post-oil development of Kuwait, a point that must be reiterated 
is that the concept of ‘autonomy’ that the literature stresses is rendered increasingly 
vague. While the literature concentrates on autonomy of rulers from domestic interests, 
which is itself misleading, it says nothing about international interests in the shaping of 
economic policy. This, among other issues discussed below, makes it essential that ‘the 
international’ be brought into the analysis of rentier states. 
Examining British attempts to gain influence and direct economic and administrative 
reforms, with the resultant discussions, agreements and disagreements with Kuwaiti 
officials, proved extremely important in bringing out clearly the ideas held by both 
parties about the desired economic system. These provided crucial information and had 
shaped a basis for further research into core issues of this study. The welfare vs. super-
welfare disagreement, revealed in Chapter Five, is possibly the most significant in this 
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regard, as it begged further investigation into the Kuwaiti mindset behind the extremely 
‘generous’ system they had chosen to create, and formed the topic of Chapter Six.  
9.2. REFLECTING ON THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
After the brief yet essential background as described above, the research resulted in four 
main findings: 
(i) Distributive Policy: Beyond Political Utility 
(ii) Social and Political Activity: Beyond Materialism and Ideology  
(iii) The International Dimension to Domestic Reform 
(iv) The Genuine Nature of Political Reform  
 
(i) Distributive Policy: Beyond Political Utility 
One main contribution of this research is the exposition of the ideas and perceptions 
behind the post-oil ‘distributive’ policies undertaken by the state. This was achieved by a 
close examination of primary documentation and writings of contemporary policy-
makers. The rentier state literature assumes that distributive policies are but a tool used 
by governments to placate society and buy quiescence. However, while this research does 
not discount such a desire, the findings suggest that the fixation on political utility is 
insufficient to understand the socioeconomic policies undertaken by Kuwaitis.  
The idea of ‘welfare’ and distributing the profits of development amongst the Kuwaiti 
people, as shown in Chapter Five, was a core feature of the development plan. This was 
not only viewed as vital for societal content, but was also believed to be important for the 
health of the economy. Among other things, it was to ensure the vitalization of the 
economy and people and the circulation of money in the state. The land acquisition 
program which was the chief method by which money was distributed, for example, was 
seen in part as a means to keep economic activity going as its funds were used for 
domestic investment and consumption, and naturally providing purchasing power to help 
give momentum to the various sectors of the economy (Planning Board, 1968: 28; IBRD, 
1965: 88-90). In addition, government intervention in the economy to stabilize prices, for 
instance, was viewed as crucial for the success of the plan, as it would avoid creating a 
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financial spiral that would increase the cost of living and result in “a lowering of output 
and value for the money expended”.
1
  
In addition, while it is clear that the distribution of money for social content was part of 
the development plan, the documents revealed a core distinction between the welfare 
state envisaged by the plan, and the super-welfare state the Kuwaitis were determined to 
create, whereby free benefits and subsidized services are provided by the government 
unsupported by fees or taxation. The two systems (i.e. the welfare and super-welfare 
state) were seen as distinct from each other. The super-welfare policies were not part of 
the official development schemes the British had prepared. The British were adamantly 
against them, even though they had emphasized the importance of distributing oil wealth 
to achieve social content and indeed had themselves placed this aim at the core of the 
development plan.  
The super-welfare policies, in contrast, were seen as undermining this very goal and were 
believed to produce exactly the opposite result: social agitation and unrest. It was 
therefore essential to examine closely the Kuwaiti mindset behind the decision to create a 
super-welfare state despite it being clear that it was potentially dangerous, as the British 
had continued to warn and point out. Chapter six reveals four general themes that shaped 
the attitudes and perceptions of Kuwaiti policy-makers. 
The first and clearly dominant theme that cut across the discourse during the period was 
the perception of state benefits as being a natural continuation of Kuwaiti heritage, with 
‘takaful’ or cooperation, and the sharing of wealth at its core. As shown, these were the 
terms used in rationalizing such policies by members of different classes of society. In 
addition, oil wealth was seen as a ‘right’ that Kuwaitis had to ‘share’. Indeed, as opposed 
to the prevailing arguments, the research stressed the importance of making a conceptual 
distinction between ‘sharing’ the wealth as a social obligation in its historical, traditional 
and cultural context, and ‘distributing’ the wealth as a political mechanism to buy loyalty. 
The former was clearly the dominant mode of thinking during the period amongst the 
Kuwaitis. As the Ruler clearly pointed out to Churchill in reply to the latter’s warnings, 
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 FO1016/217: Preliminary Report on Development of Kuwait State presented to Ruler of Kuwait, 
February 1952, p. 1. 
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“he had to take into account the Arab traditions with regard to families and sharing of 
wealth between members of society”.
2
  
The research also pointed out that free education, which is used by the rentier state 
literature as a prime example of distributive policies in the context of buying loyalty, was 
in fact an ideal that Kuwaitis implemented before the abundance oil wealth. Free 
education had been provided by the charities collected amongst merchants and self-
imposed taxation with this specific purpose in mind. As discussed, the Ruler only 
inherited what the people had instituted and later formalized in the 1938 Legislative 
Council. Thus, public services, as Hussein, the Director of Education at the time pointed 
out, were seen as a ‘right’; the task of providing them was now entrusted to a state that 
was capable, after Kuwaitis had themselves undertaken such a task prior to oil out of 
local traditions of cooperation, takaful and the provision of assistance. 
The second rationalization of distributive policies stemmed from the idea that the citizens 
of Kuwait had the right to have a priority in enjoying the oil wealth of their own country, 
and not foreigners. Priority given to citizens, although normal in other countries, is 
somehow seen as a form to placate society in the rentier state literature. While such 
preferential policies are indeed normal in most countries, the feelings of Kuwaitis in this 
direction assumed increased weight due to the huge and rapid influx of foreigners, which 
rendered citizens a minority. In such an environment, a sense of protectiveness 
developed. Perceived exploitation by foreign companies and employees also fed this 
feeling. In addition, the research showed that the views with regards to giving priority to 
Kuwaitis in jobs, for instance, were not solely aimed at allowing them to ‘enjoy’ the 
wealth. An important aspect was also control. In fact, as discussed, Kuwaiti control over 
the country’s wealth was at times the primary force behind the preferences and priorities 
given to citizens.  
The third factor that became apparent from the documents was the clear influence of 
dominant currents overtaking the region at the time, particularly Nasserite influenced 
Arab nationalism, on the Kuwaiti mindset. Such currents played an essential role in 
                                                 
2
 FO371/104329: Political Agent to Foreign Office, August 16, 1953, p. 1; emphasis is added. 
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shaping what a ‘proper’ economic system looked like. It stressed the importance of 
welfare and the placement of the social obligations of states at the core of national 
agendas. Kuwait, as demonstrated, was part of this dynamic that was indeed very much 
typical of the period. Therefore, it is extremely important that countries are not analyzed 
as if in a vacuum, and such international influences must be given their right weight in 
understanding domestic attitudes. 
The final observation was the idea of ‘social justice’, in the context of the Kuwaiti 
experience, as a rationalization for certain socioeconomic policies. As discussed, one of 
the most tangible manifestations of this notion was the view relating to the situation of 
divers and seafarers whose skills had become useless in the new economy. This portion 
of society constituted the majority of the population. It was they who had carried most of 
the burdens and hardships of the past, and it was upon their strenuous labor that Kuwait’s 
pre-economy had thrived. Helping them and giving them special attention when wealth 
had become abundant was therefore seen a form of social justice. This was not viewed as 
a form of charity but an obligation. The state was obliged to grant them their ‘rights’ and 
enable them to lead a ‘dignified’ life. These beliefs had a great impact on the views 
regarding employment of Kuwaitis. In the context of social justice, it was thought that the 
fact that the majority were illiterate should not form an impediment towards providing 
them with job opportunities and preferring them to foreigners. In sum, cultural and 
traditional norms and values, social justice, and perceived rights in their specific 
historical context, played an important role in determining the nature of rentierism in the 
evolution of the political economy of Kuwait. 
 
(ii) Social and Political Activity: Beyond Materialism  
 
It was clear from the outset that the Kuwaiti situation in the 1950s contradicted the 
general view of the rentier state literature regarding the impact of oil booms on political 
activity. As seen in Chapter Seven, activity increased greatly during the period, and the 
oil decade was crowned by the drafting of the 1962 Constitution. In fact, as argued in 
Chapter Three, even Kuwait’s pre-oil experiences do not conform to the general views in 
the literature. As examined, while merchants possessed much of Kuwait’s wealth 
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independently of the Ruler, and although people paid taxes, this situation did not translate 
into increased political participation in government nor was it sufficient to produce calls 
for such participation. In the 1930s, there were many different factors influencing the 
development of a reformist movement that led to its short-lived success, and changes in 
these factors also soon led to its ultimate failure.  
 
In any case, while it was shown in Chapter Seven that factors like the long-held beliefs of 
the merchants and the relative progressiveness of the ruler had helped provide a fertile 
ground for the development of movements calling for reforms after oil, the documents 
also revealed that oil was central in the rise of such movements, both directly and 
indirectly. Oil granted the opportunity for people to gain greater education, ultimately 
creating a class of intellectuals that led the democratic movement at the time. Moreover, 
oil led to an influx of Arab teachers and a spread of the media at a scale unseen before. 
This further fed the rise of Arab nationalism and the popularization of politics. The 
perception of oil company interference in Kuwaiti affairs, together with such a rise of 
Arab nationalism, also played a role in feeding dissent. Importantly, the fact that after oil 
the corruption of the ruling family became highly visible and on a scale never seen before 
created great discontent amongst different sectors of the population. Therefore, while the 
literature assumes that oil dampens activity, it is clearly important to examine more 
closely the different situations that are created by such wealth, some of which result in 
precisely the opposite effect.  
According to the rentier state literature, as discussed in Chapter Two, social movements 
in oil states would be particularistic and/or ‘undemocratic’ in nature. As demonstrated, 
however, the post-oil movements during the 1950s placed democracy at the core of their 
demands, and there did not seem to be any hint of particularism. The fact that different 
classes of society had come together with very similar goals of political reform is an 
important indicator in this regard.  
The literature does allow for the possibility of non-particularistic movements to develop. 
These would be based on tradition, culture, or ideology. Like particularistic movements, 
however, they too would be undemocratic in nature. It is true that Arab nationalism in 
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Kuwait was a dominant ideal that had swept the country and indeed the region as clearly 
reflected in Chapter Seven. However, Arab nationalism was not in any way a substitute 
for the democratic struggle; on the contrary, it reinforced it. Moreover, Arab nationalist 
aims during the period highlight the movement’s non-materialistic motivations. The call 
for union with the United Arab Republic is but one example. Thus, Chapter Seven 
demonstrates that on all counts, the rentier state framework fails to accommodate for the 
nature of the dominant forces that developed in Kuwait during the oil boom of the 1950s: 
non-particularistic and democratically motivated. 
 
(iii) The International Dimension to Domestic Reform    
 
The rentier state literature hardly gives any attention to international factors in explaining 
the policies undertaken by rentier governments. As discussed in Chapter Seven, in a 
small and rich country like Kuwait, the international dimension had a huge impact on the 
perceptions of Kuwaiti policymakers towards the importance of undertaking major 
reforms, and oil was not disconnected with this dynamic. Oil led to the rise of the status 
and importance of Kuwait to regional and international powers. In such an environment, 
Kuwaitis felt that their domestic policies were under constant scrutiny. In 1958, Kuwait 
came under enormous pressure (including threats) to join the Union of Iraq and Jordan. 
The primary interests of Iraq in pressing Kuwait to join were seen to be its desire to get a 
hold on Kuwaiti oil. During the negotiations, Kuwait’s Ruler felt deserted and betrayed 
by Britain, which itself acted in light of its oil interests. While Qassim’s revolution 
possibly – and ironically – saved Kuwait in this particular instance, the perception of the 
Ruler towards the insufficiency of British protection and the need to gain closer contacts 
and relations with the Arabs now became ingrained in his strategic thinking.  
In this context, the Ruler realized that he had to enhance Kuwait’s image in the Arab 
world. There were three related factors that had to be contended with. First, the country 
and region were overtaken by Arab nationalism. Second, a main target of Arab nationalist 
resentment was Britain. Third, Kuwait was at the center of British interests in the region 
due to its oil wealth. Naturally, then, the special British connection with Kuwait became a 
focus of Arab attention and resentment. One of the crucial ways to enhance Kuwait’s 
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image was therefore to gradually distance itself from Britain and to demonstrate 
independence from British influence. The steps in this direction played a crucial role in 
forcing Kuwait to undertake serious domestic reforms.  
The ultimate step towards independence was the abrogation of the 1899 Treaty with 
Britain and joining the Arab League and the United Nations. The declaration of 
independence, however, brought with it an Iraqi threat of annexation and later a veto 
against Kuwaiti membership to the UN. In this environment, Kuwait was forced to 
undertake even quicker and more fundamental reforms aimed at gaining acceptability in 
Arab and international community. The main means to achieve this was two-fold. The 
first involved utilizing Kuwait’s oil wealth. The fact that Kuwaiti wealth was invested in 
the West and not in Arab states had been a source of discontent amongst Arabs. 
Addressing this issue, Kuwait created the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. 
The second means by which Kuwait sought to gain acceptability and enhance its image 
was through undertaking a major step towards democratic development. It called for the 
election of a Constituent Assembly to frame a modern ‘respectable’ constitution. In this 
way, the international dimension in the Kuwaiti experience had led to a perception 
amongst policy makers that reforms had to be genuine and not, as the rentier state 
literature would suggest, a mere façade. In sum, Chapter Seven shows that while 
domestic pressures for reform were not enough to push for such a major step, the 
international dimension in the context of the small and rich oil state of Kuwait was the 
factor that had tipped the balance towards democratization.  
 
(iv) The Nature of Reform 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, writers on rentier states view any sort of opening in the 
political arena, such as participatory institutions, as a ploy undertaken by the ruler that 
has no real democratic value. Thus, it was important to examine this issue, as much of the 
arguments in this research assumed that such reforms, undertaken during the period of 
study, were indeed genuine. In this regard, Chapter Eight shows that the passing of the 
constitution of 1962 was a very clear process in democratization. The constitution gives 
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parliament real and effective legislative and oversight powers, and in doing so limits the 
powers of the Al Sabah and the Ruler himself.  
Possibly the most significant implication of the new Kuwaiti constitutional system on 
rentier state theory is the clear invalidity of the ‘state-society’ dichotomy. The rentier 
state literature stresses the autonomy of the state from society and views distributive 
policies as a ‘top-down’ process by which an independent government hands out benefits 
to a separate society. As seen from reviewing the constitutional articles, however, this is 
very much misleading. The constitution formally rendered society a party in the direct 
appropriation of state funds. Rather than it being a passive receiver, society is an intrinsic 
and active part of the distribution process itself. This clearly and fundamentally places the 
validity of the theory’s core assumption in this regard into question. Indeed, a new 
approach is needed, whereby government and society are not seen as two distinct entities. 
In this way, society should be perceived in government policy choices. In analyzing these 
choices, therefore, the literature must take into account not only the interests of the Ruler 
but that of societal actors as well. In fact, this provides the main feature of what is 
described in this study as a ‘rentier constitutional state’, which, as mentioned in Chapter 
Eight, embodies the idea of a rentier state combined with a constitutional form of 
government in which citizens are directly involved in the decision-making process and 
are able exert direct and explicit pressure, by the rights granted, to influence policy in 
specific ways. This renders Kuwait unique in the region, which in turn stresses the need 
of the literature to examine closely individual cases rather than to make general and 
sweeping claims, as rentier state scholars, as discussed in Chapter Two, tend to do. 
 
9.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The research highlighted the insufficiency of the rentier state literature’s approach in 
capturing the diverse dimensions that shape the thinking of policymakers and social 
actors in the advent of an oil boom. The insistence in the literature on applying certain 
pre-conceived notions, much of them stemming from European experiences, to the 
experiences of the oil-producing Gulf States has hindered a better understanding of the 
different and distinct ‘local’ influences on policy decisions. To understand such 
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influences, a shift of focus is required with the aim of examining the localized ideas, 
perceptions and attitudes behind policy choices. Doing so would also shed important light 
on the different and more complex ways in which oil influences such views and therefore 
policies. These may be due to the different situations created for states by oil’s dynamics 
with domestic and international factors, the latter often completely ignored by the 
literature. 
 
It is true that ‘rentier theory’ represents the Eurocentric position in understanding the 
political economy of Kuwait and other oil-rich states.  In doing so, as mentioned above, 
internal and external micro dynamics in creating such a political economy and the 
particular realities of the countries examined are not taken fully into account.  Further, in 
a very ‘modern’ way, a largely homogenous explanation is offered to explain the political 
economy of all oil-rich countries. However, as the post-modern position argues, rather 
than looking into universal reality and truth, perhaps local particularities can have more 
explanatory power and provide further insight into the production of the observed 
political economies, as this study of Kuwait has attempted to demonstrate.   
 
Thus, rather than using ‘rentier state theory’ as the ultimate universal explanatory 
framework, perhaps different versions of such a theoretical framework can be attempted 
which reflects upon the micro dynamics of the political, economic and social realities of 
the respective country in the production of ‘rentierism’.  As this study demonstrates, 
‘beyond buying legitimacy’, there were other motivations that convinced the ruling 
family and elite ‘to share the wealth’, such as Arab traditional values expressed in terms 
like ‘co-operation’ and takaful, perceptions of ‘rights’, and ‘social justice’. Such micro 
dynamics were also instrumental, alongside political concerns, in articulating a 
distributive state, which only later led to the development of a ‘rentier mentality’ in 
society.  This study, hence, argues that Eurocentric approaches, which have significantly 
influenced theoretical frameworks such as the ‘rentier state’ model in which the GCC 
countries are generally contextualized, should be modified according to the micro 
dynamics of respective countries, the importance of which is clearly reflected in the case 
of Kuwait as this study has shown. 
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What must finally be emphasized is the need to separate the different stages of the 
development of a rentier state. This research is concerned with the transformation of 
Kuwait into a rentier constitutional state from its pre-oil primitive nature. It does not 
address how things developed after this transformation. In another words, it does not 
analyze Kuwait as a rentier constitutional state but explains how and why it became one. 
Indeed, the year 1962 marked a turning point. Not only did Kuwait implement its new 
constitutional system of government, its economy was seen to have reached the end of a 
stage and the beginning of a new one. Thus, in 1962 a Planning Board was formed. As it 
stated, its establishment was due to “the realization that the country had reached a new 
stage in its modern history; a state characterized by the need for integrated scientific 
planning” with the aim to “consolidate” Kuwait’s “past achievements and overcome” its 
“weaknesses” (The Planning Board, 1968: 32). 
Importantly, the developments that happened in post-1962 Kuwait must be 
contextualized in the proposed notion of the rentier constitutional state, as the way in 
which the constitutional system has rendered citizens not only owners of the wealth but 
also direct participants in its appropriation, and has at the same time preserved the role of 
the Al Sabah in government ministerial posts, has had a huge impact on both the politics 
and economics of Kuwait. It has led the Al Sabah to undertake policies throughout the 
years to try and consolidate their ‘power’ within a constitutional system that aims to limit 
it. Policies in this regard have included, for example, rigging parliamentary elections as in 
1967, changing the demographics of the country by illegally and fraudulently handing out 
citizenships, and corrupting state institutions, including the parliament itself, to retain 
influence and support. Meanwhile, society has developed unfortunate symptoms that 
have rendered it a direct and active participant in the push for unsustainable economic 
policies through its parliamentary powers. Parliament, at least in the past few years, is 
arguably the major force behind the huge hikes in public spending into proportions that 
are now posing a serious threat to the viability of the state. Thus, between a ruling family 
attempting to break away from the shackles of the constitution, and a society aiming to 
get more and more from the country’s assets, Kuwait seems to be locked in a vicious 
cycle of unsustainable and potentially disastrous policies. Very far from the optimism 
that resonated in the Constitutional Assembly, Kuwait has descended into a critical stage 
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in its development and, if the situation is not remedied fast, could see the end of whatever 
bright future the framers of the Constitution had hoped for. The way to study such a 
system, therefore, begs a departure from the simplistic assumptions of rentier state theory 
and closer look at the different and more complex forces that shape policy in Kuwait and, 
more generally, the oil producing Gulf states. 
 
9.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Rentier state theory has provided the framework for much of the current studies on the 
political and economic development of oil-rich states. This study has demonstrated that 
many of the assumptions of the theory are not only limited in accounting for certain 
important developments in a country like Kuwait, but are also misleading – as the stress 
on autonomy is – and therefore form an impediment to a greater understanding of the 
political economies in place. It is therefore hoped that scholars would look beyond such 
assumptions and study closely the more complex factors underpinning the political 

















10.1. GENERAL SUMMARY 
 
The research presented in this study was instigated by the simple preliminary 
observation that the political dynamics witnessed in Kuwait differ from what would 
be expected by rentier state theory. In the case of Kuwait, society is highly politically 
active and plays an intrinsic role in the appropriation of public funds. This role is 
made possible largely by the constitutional rights and powers granted to society in 
general, and parliament in particular. The noteworthy point is that the enactment of 
this constitution, with all the events leading up to it, took place in 1962, a time during 
which Kuwait was witnessing a huge surge in its oil revenues. Thus, contrary to the 
expectations of the rentier state model, Kuwait actually witnessed a process of 
democratization hand-in-hand with the development of the distributive state. This 
naturally places the core assumptions of rentier state theory regarding the motives 
behind the creation of such a state and its expected political ramifications into 
question, at least in the case of Kuwait.  
In examining the archival record, the initial doubts about the validity of the rentier 
state model’s assumptions were confirmed. Economically, there were more complex 
and diverse factors that pushed Kuwaitis to adopt certain policies that went far beyond 
the idea of ‘political utility’ stressed in the literature. In fact, the documents reveal 
that the ‘ultra-generous’ economic policies undertaken by the Kuwaiti government 
were thought to be, interestingly, dangerous for political and social content. While 
certain socioeconomic policies were seen as necessary to invigorate the economy, and 
while other important schemes were adopted in light of the interests of foreign powers 
– Britain in this case, the factors that mostly influenced Kuwaitis’ determination to 
create what was called a ‘super-welfare state’ include certain perceptions of culture 
and tradition; views on citizens’ ‘rights’ and social justice in their relevant historical 
context; national protectiveness over the oil wealth from intruding aliens; and 
influences of social currents overtaking the region during the concerned period.  
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Politically, it is argued that oil was central to the rise of political and social activity 
during the 1950s. However, by juxtaposing internal oil-related factors that fueled 
dissent against others that reinforced the status quo, it becomes clear that ‘the 
internal’ was insufficient to bring about long-lasting structural change. Nonetheless, 
the oil boom simultaneously sparked new international dynamics that influenced the 
perceptions of Kuwaiti policymakers towards the importance of undertaking major 
political reforms. These ultimately culminated in the framing of the 1962 
Constitution, which, as demonstrated, amounted to a clear and genuine process of 
democratization.  
Thus, in examining the case of Kuwait during the period 1950-1962, it became clear 
that, contrary to the position of rentier state theory, oil booms in certain contexts 
could actually lead to political liberalization and democratization. Such a process, 
which created in Kuwait what is described as ‘rentier constitutional state’, further 
challenges other assumptions in the literature, most important of which is the stress on 
the autonomy of state from society in the undertaking of economic policy. Thus, 
Eurocentric theories may not always be sufficient or effective enough in explaining 
the development of political-economic structures, which may have been socially 
constructed through different and distinct ‘local’ dynamics. 
 
10.2. CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research presented in this study aimed at understanding the different sets of 
variables that influence policy decisions in states experiencing oil booms beyond the 
general assumptions of rentier state theory. It did so by shifting the focus of study to 
an examination of the ideas and perceptions behind economic and political policies in 
their historical context. Thus, a stress on archival research was necessary to achieve 
the stated aim.  
This shift of focus beyond the Eurocentric worldview shapes a new approach in the 
study of rentier states, as it investigates the reasons behind policies away from what 
has been generally assumed, like ‘political utility’, as a sufficient explanation for the 
distributive state. The research also brings in new factors in the study of the internal 
development of oil producing countries that have been overlooked by the literature. 
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These include often-ignored foreign and international variables, such as the 
significant role of the British and the pressures created for a small and newly rich 
state in the midst of a turbulent region.  
In sum, as a contribution of this study, not only does the focus of the research shape a 
new approach to the analysis of rentier states, but the findings also suggest that rentier 
state theory, together with many of its core assumptions, must be seriously revisited. 
 
10.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Similar to any other social research, there are two main possible limitations to this 
study. The first has to do with certain factors that might affect the reliability of the 
views expressed by British officials as extracted from the primary material utilized. 
These include potential bias, which is inevitable as the British were an interested 
party in the developments taking place. In addition, their understanding of events and 
circumstances must have been limited by an incomplete awareness of the culture in 
which they operated. As such, they may have understood certain developments out of 
their correct context. Nevertheless, as much care as possible was taken in dealing with 
the documentary record to discern the more solid and fact-based material from the 
otherwise seemingly opinionated positions. Moreover in this regard, while thousands 
of documents have been examined to reach the conclusions of this research, most of 
these documents are printed and made publicly available in different volume 
collections. While these volumes are precisely aimed at facilitating research by 
making original documents easier to access, some of them, even though publishing 
thousands of pages of invaluable original documents, such Records of Kuwait 1899-
1961, which parts of this paper significantly utilizes, remain selected and categorized. 
Thus, some important documents must have been missed. However, other volumes 
like the Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf 1904-1958 contain most written monthly 
diaries for the period indicated, and Persian Gulf Administration Reports 1873-1957 
all Annual Reports of the Residency for the period indicated. These and others, when 
studied together, compliment each other, and it can confidently be stated that the 
result is a clear understanding of the different situations taking hold. 
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The issue that must also be brought up here relates more to the subject matter of the 
research. As mentioned in Chapter Six, there seems to be a complete divorce between 
the views expressed regarding the pre-oil economic system with its harsh debt 
structure, and the assertions that Kuwaiti society was one in which ‘takaful’ or 
‘cooperation’ prevailed. The latter formed an important rationalization of post-oil 
socioeconomic policy. These seemingly contradictory views would have been 
interesting to investigate. As mentioned, it seems that the debt structure of Kuwait’s 
primary pre-oil economic activity was taken as given – a fact of industry – inherited 
over many centuries and prevailing throughout the region. In this sense, such a system 
was not at all unique to Kuwait, and in fact the ‘harshness’ of the system was much 
milder in the country than it was in the rest of the Gulf. Nevertheless, while this does 
not seem to undermine the genuineness of the feelings expressed in rationalizing post-
oil socioeconomic policy to any significant degree as demonstrated in the chapter, it 
would have been valuable to research this issue further, particularly by conducting 
more interviews to untangle what on the surface, at least, looks like a contradiction.  
As alluded to earlier, the research stresses the need for future studies to take a more 
post-modern approach to understand the development of rentier states. Studies must 
look closely at particularities of individual systems and attempt to understand more 
fully the actual motivations behind economic and political policies, rather than to 
have them preconceived. In the case of Kuwait, the study of the post-1962 rentier 
state must also consider the constitutional system in place and the social and political 
dynamics resulting from it. It can be argued that failure to account for such factors has 
rendered most, if not all, economic plans and strategies, at times composed by major 
international experts and economic institutions such as the World Bank, largely 
ineffective. Indeed, all development strategies have so far been ignored, resisted, or 
implemented in ways which have yielded undesirable results. In sum, this situation, 
which places Kuwait at an extremely critical stage in its development, cannot be 
comprehended or indeed solved without taking into account the complex interplay 
between the social, economic, and political variables that is producing Kuwait’s 






This study set out to investigate the development of Kuwait into a rentier 
constitutional state by examining the perceptions and ideas behind its creation. By 
researching the archival record and writings of contemporaries, as evidenced in the 
analysis presented in the preceding chapters, it can be stated that the study has 
achieved its stated aims and objectives. It is hoped that the findings reached by the 
research would be helpful to scholars in developing further studies into the nature of 
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Text of Exclusive Agreement between Mubarak, Ruler of Kuwait, and Britain on January 23, 
1899:  
 
Praise be to God alone—  
The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby 
covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, 
I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British 
Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of 
Koweit, on the other pant, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his 
own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and 
successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or 
Government at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, 
without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds 
himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for 
occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the 
Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her 
Majesty’s Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any 
portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the 
possession of the subjects of any other Government.  
 
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty’s Political Resident 
in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the former on behalf 
of the British Government and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and 
successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this, the 






M. J. Mead, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.  
  
 

















Text of Letter of Assurance handed to the Ruler of Kuwait by the British Political Agent on 
October 23, 1958:  
 
I am instructed by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to convey 
the following assurance to Your Highness. Her Majesty’s Government do not 
wish for any change in their relationship with Kuwait. They continue to be ready, 
as in the past, to provide any support which may be necessary in connection with 
Kuwait’s relations with other countries. They understand that it is Your 
Highness's intention to deal with certain matters affecting Kuwait's relations with 
other Arab States by your own efforts to the extent that Your Highness considers 
this desirable in the interests of Kuwait. This would not of course impair the 
relationship between Kuwait and Her Majesty's Government described above.  
 
2. Her Majesty’s Government wish at the same time to confirm Your Highness’ 
understanding that when matters affecting Kuwait’s interests arise between them 
and other Governments they will consult Your Highness and will not enter into 
any commitment relating to such matters before consultation has  
taken place.  
 
3. Her Majesty’s Government are convinced of the value to both Kuwait and 
themselves of free and frank exchanges of views on international questions. Their 
representatives have been instructed to keep Your Highness generally informed 
of their views on such questions and they continue to value the views which Your 
Highness expresses in return. 
 
 
























Text of Exchange of notes regarding relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait. From the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf 
to the Ruler of Kuwait:  
 
Kuwait, The 19th of June, 1961. 
Your Highness, 
I have the honour to refer to the discussions which have recently taken place 
between Your Highness and my predecessor on behalf of Her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom about the desirability of adapting the 
relations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
State of Kuwait to take account of the fact that Your Highness’ Government has 
the sole responsibility for the conduct of Kuwait’s internal and external affairs. 
 
The following conclusions were reached in the course of these discussions: 
 
(a) The Agreement of the 23rd of January, 1899, shall be terminated as being 
inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait. 
(b) The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a 
spirit of close friendship. 
(c) When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters 
which concern them both. 
(d) Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty’s 
Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such 
assistance. 
 
If the foregoing correctly represents the conclusions reached between Your 
Highness and Sir George Middleton I have the honour to suggest, on the 
instructions of Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
that the present Note together with Your Highness’ reply to that effect shall be 
regarded as constituting an Agreement between the United Kingdom and Kuwait 
in this matter which shall continue in force until either party gives the other at 
least three years’ notice of their intention to terminate it, and that the Agreement 
of the 23rd of January, 1899, shall be regarded as terminated on this day’s date. 
 
Source: The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, p. 50. 
 
 
 
 
